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Foreword
Seasonal hunger is often a characteristic feature of rural poverty in many 
parts of the developing world. Even though agricultural diversification, 
made possible through technological breakthroughs and infrastructural 
investments, has lessened the severity of seasonal hunger, the phenome-
non still persists in many agricultural settings of tropical Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa. A crop failure or a poor harvest attributable to natural 
calamities like flood and drought can intensify seasonal hardships, some-
times taking the proportion of a famine. Seasonal hunger thus remains a 
routine cycle of food insecurity, a potential contributor to famine, and a 
trigger for policy responses such as the seasonal employment programs in 
Bangladesh, China, and India. The seasonality issue also deserves renewed 
attention because of the new threat of climate change and associated 
extreme weather conditions that are likely to exacerbate the frequency, 
severity, and unpredictability of seasonal shocks. 
More than four-fifths of the world’s poor live in rural areas and depend 
mostly on agriculture for their livelihoods. A large proportion of them are 
vulnerable to seasonal food insecurity but are “invisible” in poverty eco-
nomics because the poverty numbers are usually based on annualized data 
and, as such, cannot keep track of the extent and severity of seasonal pov-
erty. As a result, policies aimed at reducing poverty may disregard the 
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seasonal poor if the causes of seasonal poverty differ from those that 
underlie year-round poverty. Moreover, the adverse seasonal effects, when 
left unattended, may contribute to endemic poverty by causing irrevers-
ible damage to health and livelihood sustainability. Even worse, the regions 
prone to severe seasonal hunger are also often disadvantaged in attracting 
the public investments required to break the seasonality-poverty cycle 
through strengthening and diversification of the local economy. 
This book provides an exhaustive inquiry of seasonal hunger in rural 
Bangladesh, with a special emphasis on the country’s northwest region. 
This region is known for its famine history and is particularly vulnerable 
to seasonal hunger. By combining large data sets from nationally represen-
tative household surveys and from surveys conducted specifically for the 
northwest region, the authors attempt to analyze the extent and causes 
of seasonal hunger while highlighting the interlocking nature of seasonal-
ity and endemic poverty. The book also attempts to assess the impacts of 
several recently launched policy interventions for mitigating seasonal 
hunger in the northwest region, thus providing insights into what works 
and what does not. 
Although based on the case study of Bangladesh, the book’s findings 
have far-reaching relevance for today’s global efforts in mitigating food 
insecurity. The concerns for food insecurity have gained renewed impor-
tance in the global policy agenda because of the recent crises in the global 
food markets and also because of the increasing risks to livelihoods arising 
from environmental degradation and climate change. The problem of 
seasonal hunger is thus likely to persist or even deepen further because of 
these increasing threats to food security. This situation calls for an explicit 
recognition of seasonality in efforts to improve food security. As the book 
persuasively argues, seasonally targeted programs and policies within a 
well-coordinated approach to poverty alleviation need to be supported 
by international development agencies such as the World Bank. 
One reason seasonal hunger does not receive enough attention in 
policy making is lack of seasonal information in the poverty estimates at 
the country and global levels. The other reason is inadequate appreciation 
of the complexity of issues surrounding seasonal hunger. On both counts, 
the book makes valuable contributions. It demonstrates how the same 
household survey data from which the official poverty estimates are 
derived can be used to capture seasonality. The book contributes to our 
understanding of why hunger linked to agricultural seasonality persists 
and how the problem can be tackled efficiently and cost-effectively, if not 
eliminated altogether. It also serves as a reminder of the challenges lying 
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ahead for policy makers and practitioners engaged in combating hunger 
and poverty worldwide. I am sure this book will also be valuable in defin-
ing the scope of further research in poverty economics. 
Justin Yifu Lin 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
Development Economics
The World Bank

xvii 
Seasonal hunger arising from agricultural seasonality persists as a distinctive 
feature of rural livelihood across many regions scattered throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa and tropical Asia. Yet the subject has not received 
enough attention in contemporary poverty discourses or in global efforts 
to combat food insecurity. This lack of attention is partly because of the 
deficiency of official annualized poverty estimates in capturing seasonality, 
but partly also because of inadequate understanding of the complex issues 
surrounding poverty-seasonality links. This book represents a modest effort 
to remedy this situation by drawing on the case study of Bangladesh. 
More than 70 percent of Bangladesh’s nearly 150 million people live 
in the rural areas of Bangladesh, where life revolves around what is called 
a rice economy. Although the rural economy has become increasingly 
diversified with the growth of nonfarm activities, nearly 60 percent of 
the rural workers (and about half of the country’s entire workforce) are 
still employed in the agriculture sector. The country is also prone to 
floods and other natural disasters. In such a setting, one would expect 
regular occurrences of seasonal stress, which is only made worse by the 
natural calamities. 
This book provides an exhaustive analysis of seasonal hunger in 
Bangladesh, with a special focus on the country’s northwest region 
Preface
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of greater Rangpur. Well known in the famine literature, Rangpur 
was  among the worst-hit regions during the Great Bengal Famine of 
1942–44 and was at the epicenter of Bangladesh’s 1974 famine. The 
region not only has lagged the rest of the country in poverty reduction, 
but also has remained particularly vulnerable to seasonal hunger, locally 
known as monga. Studying the phenomenon of monga in Rangpur can 
thus  provide insights into how the interlocking of seasonality and 
endemic poverty can intensify the severity of seasonal hunger. Moreover, 
the recently launched policy interventions in the region provide a test 
case of what works and what does not in combating seasonal hunger. 
The quasi-experimental designs of some of these interventions are par-
ticularly suitable for assessing their effects.
The statistical exercises reported in the book are based on large, sea-
sonally decomposed data sets from both nationally representative house-
hold surveys and specially designed surveys for the Rangpur region. The 
results from these exercises help to identify the causal mechanisms 
behind seasonal hunger while also providing insights into household 
responses in terms of, for instance, coping mechanisms, risk management, 
and livelihood choices. For example, seasonal hunger’s relationship is 
found to be at least as strong with seasonal income as with year-round 
income. Hence, seasonal hunger is often a combined result of several fac-
tors: endemic poverty; a marked seasonality in agricultural income; and 
the limited ability of the poor households to smooth consumption 
through savings, borrowing, or food storage. Moreover, depending on the 
households’ coping mechanisms, poverty and its seasonality may lead to 
an interlocking cycle that needs to be studied as a dynamic process in the 
context of long-term livelihood strategies of the poor. 
Given the famine history of the region, seasonal hunger in Rangpur 
may be seen as a recurrent famine-like phenomenon; hence, much of the 
famine analysis in terms of households’ “food entitlement failure” is rel-
evant for explaining monga as well. For example, monga does not seem 
to be caused by lack of food availability, but by the seasonal loss of liveli-
hoods for the poor. Moreover, as in the case of the past famines in this 
region, it is the agricultural day laborers who are found to be most at risk. 
The seasonal loss of employment for this group can be seen to be the 
most proximate cause of monga. Seasonal food price inflation may make 
monga more severe, but it is not a necessary correlate, whereas most fam-
ines are associated with food market failure resulting in food price hikes. 
Thus, monga may remain unnoticed as a form of silent hunger, because it 
is the abnormal increases in food prices that usually create public uproar 
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and attract the attention of policy makers. This difference associated with 
monga also explains why the government’s interventions for food price 
stabilization as a means of ensuring food insecurity have not worked to 
mitigate monga.
The variety of recent initiatives undertaken to combat monga in 
Rangpur includes introduction of new crop technology, provision of pub-
lic works and other safety nets, facilitation of out-migration, asset transfer 
and skill training, and introduction of specially designed microcredit pro-
grams in addition to the regular ones. These initiatives to combat monga 
in Rangpur have been prompted by widespread public awareness, which 
in turn has been largely created by media reports and civic activism. The 
beneficial effects of these initiatives are already visible. Amartya Sen and 
others have argued that the incentives in democracy are more effective in 
averting major economic disasters such as famines than in addressing the 
problem of endemic hunger and poverty. Bangladesh’s recent experience 
in mitigating monga suggests that political incentives can be created for 
combating severe incidence of seasonal hunger as well, once the phenom-
enon catches public attention. However, lack of similar awareness may 
have resulted in neglect of other regions in Bangladesh that are vulnerable 
to seasonal poverty and hunger.
The recent data show that, in addition to the greater Rangpur region, 
areas along the southern coastal belt have now emerged as new poverty 
pockets because of such agroclimatic factors as salinity intrusion and 
increased frequency, severity, and unpredictability of natural disasters. 
The pattern of hunger and seasonality in these emerging poverty pock-
ets may be different from that of Rangpur, but lessons can still be drawn 
from the experience of combating monga in Rangpur. There is no single 
cure for seasonal hunger, and each type of environment, being unique 
in some respect, will have its own priorities and will require its own mix 
of policies. Ultimately, the challenge is how to enhance the ability of the 
rural poor to cope with the increasing complexity and uncertainty 
linked to seasonality by making their livelihoods more flexible, adapt-
able, and resilient.
The book is the outcome of a collaborative research project of the 
World Bank and the Institute of Microfinance (InM) in Bangladesh. The 
project is part of the InM’s activities under the program called Promoting 
Financial Services for Poverty Reduction (PROSPER), which is supported 
by UKaid from the Department for International Development (DFID). 
Part of the support has also come from the International Growth Centre’s 
country program in Bangladesh. 
xx       Preface
The book draws heavily on earlier works on a number of topics done 
jointly by Shahidur Khandker, Baqui Khaliliy, and Hussain Samad. We are 
indebted to both Baqui Khaliliy and Hussain Samad for their contribu-
tions in the data analysis and findings used in this book. We would like to 
thank the research staff at the InM, especially Syed Badruddoza, Abdul 
Khaleque, Suburna Barua, and Jabeer Sherazy, for excellent research sup-
port. We are indebted to Rashid Faruqee, Md. Mosleh Uddin Sadeque, 
Abdul Latif, and Atonu Rabbani at the InM for providing institutional 
support of various kinds as we carried out this study. 
The household survey data used in this study have arisen in large part 
from the InM’s impact evaluation of specially designed microcredit pro-
grams that are aimed at mitigating seasonal hunger in the Rangpur region 
and implemented by Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a wholesale 
microcredit lending institution. We are especially indebted to Jashim 
Uddin and Quazi Mesbahuddin Ahmed at PKSF for helping us understand 
the modalities of these program interventions and interpret the data.
At the World Bank, we are indebted to Will Martin for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this book. His comments were instrumental 
in revising the manuscript substantially and increasing its analytical focus. 
We are also indebted to Peter Lanjouw for his thoughtful comments, 
which were helpful in revising the manuscript further. We would like to 
thank Stephen McGroarty and Mary Fisk in the Office of the Publisher 
of the World Bank for their support in processing the book’s publication. 
We also thank Estella Malayika in the Development Research Group, 
Agriculture and Rural Development, for production support. 
We are, however, solely responsible for any errors or omissions con-
tained in the book. Also, the views expressed in this book are entirely ours 
and do not reflect the views of the World Bank, InM, PKSF, DFID, or any 
other concerned organizations. 
Shahidur R. Khandker Wahiduddin Mahmud
World Bank, Washington, D.C. Institute of Microfinance, Dhaka
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1 
C H A P T E R  1
Introduction
Seasonal hunger induced by agricultural seasonality is often a character-
istic feature of rural poverty. The evidence of seasonal distress in many 
agrarian societies can be found in the narratives of economic historians.1 
With agricultural diversification made possible through technological 
breakthroughs in many parts of the developing world, the severity of 
seasonal stress and adversities has been reduced considerably, if not alto-
gether eliminated. In certain agricultural settings, however, the seasonality 
of poverty and hunger, along with the associated seasonal shortfalls in 
income and consumption, is still a policy quagmire. The problem gets 
more complicated when agricultural seasonality is locked into a cycle of 
endemic poverty, seasonal hunger, and risk of further impoverishment. 
Poverty and seasonality may also reinforce each other through various 
other forces that create and sustain both. The thrust of policy needs to be 
to break this interlocking cycle of poverty and seasonality. 
The importance of the seasonal dimension of poverty and hunger 
derives from the fact that more than 80 percent of the world’s poor live 
in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Most of the 
rural poor live in areas with marked seasonal contrasts; these areas cover 
Southeast Asia and much of Sub-Saharan Africa (besides parts of Central 
and South America and parts of Southeast Asia). Even in areas with 
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nonseasonal climates, such as equatorial Africa, rural poverty may be 
linked to distinct crop cycles (see, for example, chapter 8 in Chambers, 
Longhurst, and Pacey 1981). All major food crops, such as wheat, rice, 
and maize, are seasonal crops with distinct annual production cycles. The 
seasonal stress can therefore become particularly acute in the event of a 
crop failure or a poor harvest. 
Economically depressed and ecologically vulnerable areas are particu-
larly likely to experience seasonal hunger. In areas where water or tem-
perature constraints allow only one major crop harvest in a year, food 
scarcity and lack of employment may sharply deteriorate in the prehar-
vest months. The seasonality of monocrop agriculture dependent on cli-
matic conditions not only leads to large seasonal variations in rural 
incomes, but also makes such incomes subject to the vagaries of nature 
and, thus, unpredictable to a large extent. Such regions are also disadvan-
taged in attracting the investments that are needed to make the local 
economy more diversified and resilient and, thereby, to break out of the 
cycle of poverty and seasonality.
Seasonal hunger arising from the regular patterns of the agricultural 
cycle often escapes the attention of policy makers because of its short 
duration and endemic nature. As a result, it often remains unchecked and 
hidden. Yet such hidden hunger sometimes pushes millions of women and 
children—the most vulnerable in a rural society—to the brink of starva-
tion every year. In Sub-Saharan Africa and other vulnerable regions, chil-
dren fall prey to deadly diseases, such as diarrhea and malaria, during the 
period of seasonal hunger because of nutritional deficiency and the weak-
ening of their immune systems. They may even succumb to permanent 
stunting of physical and cognitive development if they suffer from 
repeated seasonal undernutrition. In fact, one might reasonably argue that 
most of the world’s acute hunger and undernutrition occur in the annual 
“hunger season,” the time of year when the previous year’s harvest stocks 
have declined, food prices are high, wages are low, jobs are scarce, and 
poor people are left with very little “entitlement” to food in terms of 
income, savings, or access to credit. 
Although predictable seasonality creates hardship on a regular basis, it 
also allows some recovery. But irregular occurrences, such as floods or 
failure of the monsoon rains, can magnify the adverse seasonal effects and 
can culminate in a faminelike situation. Seasonal hunger has thus been 
varyingly described as the “cycle of quiet starvation” and the “father of 
famine,” indicating that controlling seasonal hunger is a step toward avert-
ing famine (Devereux, Vatila, and Swan 2008). Seasonal episodes of 
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unusual intensity can also leave irreversible adverse effects on livelihood 
sustainability. These “ratchet” effects may arise from the various coping 
strategies poor households adopt to try to survive. Such strategies may 
include mortgaging or selling their land and other assets and making 
advance sales of crops and labor. The interlocking of poverty and season-
ality is thus a dynamic process and needs to be studied in the context of 
livelihood strategies extending beyond a season or a year. 
In discourses on food insecurity, seasonal hunger has seldom received 
the attention that it deserves. Yet the costs of ignoring seasonal hunger can 
be enormous. Lack of public awareness about seasonal hunger may be in 
part due to the way that poverty is usually measured. Seasonal hunger is, 
in fact, missing in the system of official data collection and analysis that 
averages and annualizes poverty numbers (IDS 2009). Consequently, 
these poverty estimates do not help identify the extent and severity of 
seasonal poverty. According to estimates made by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations for the mid-1990s, 1 billion poor 
people at that time were not food secure in the sense that they did not 
have at all times access to sufficient food to meet the dietary requirements 
for maintaining a healthy life. Recent estimates show no significant decline 
in that number. However, there is no direct account of how many of “the 
bottom billion,” as Paul Collier (2007) calls them, suffer from seasonal 
hunger. In fact, the findings of several studies indicate that a much larger 
number of rural households may be vulnerable to food insecurity than the 
standard poverty statistics imply. In other words, some of the nonpoor 
measured by annual data may be seasonal poor because they cannot main-
tain consumption above the poverty line in response to seasonal shocks 
(see, for example, Dercon and Krishnan 2000). 
Ideas about food insecurity, along with the associated policy debates, 
have changed over time. For example, emphasis has shifted from the 
deficiency of food availability on an aggregate level to a lack of entitle-
ment to food at the household level as the source of food insecurity and 
famines (Sen 1981). The conceptualization of food insecurity in terms of 
household food entitlement can be useful in explaining seasonal hunger 
as well, particularly when combined with such ideas as livelihood secu-
rity, risks and vulnerability, and ecological sustainability. 
Along with the conceptual changes, the characterization of food inse-
curity has also changed, with some studies particularly focusing on short-
term variability in entitlements (Chisholm and Tyers 1982). Following the 
lead of the World Bank (1986), researchers now often draw a distinction 
between chronic and transitory food insecurity. While transitory food 
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insecurity focuses on risk of short-duration variations in household food 
access, this category has been further divided into cyclical and temporary 
food insecurity. These categorizations are meant to draw attention to the 
fact that many households experience large fluctuations in both consump-
tion and income over relatively short periods of time, thereby causing 
substantial short-run movements of many people in and out of poverty. 
Although none of these categories particularly focuses on endemic sea-
sonal hunger, they have common features that can help its analysis.
Although seasonality of poverty and hunger has been studied and has 
figured in policy discussions, the literature on it remains rather unconsoli-
dated. Moreover, there is not enough emphasis on the possibility of sea-
sonal hunger persisting because of policy failures to address the problem 
adequately and timely. Some early studies on seasonality emphasized the 
multidimensional nature of the problem, covering such diverse topics as 
seasonal labor use and energy needs, nutrition, ecology of disease, patterns 
of vital events, and community responses.2 More recent studies have 
focused on income seasonality and constraints to consumption smooth-
ing.3 Rural households that lack buffer food stocks or past savings, or are 
credit constrained, or do not have enough access to remittance or public 
transfer schemes are found to face difficulty in smoothing consumption in 
the face of income seasonality related to crop cycles. But neither income 
seasonality nor lack of consumption smoothing necessarily leads to sea-
sonal hunger; it depends on the extent of consumption shortfall relative 
to the threshold consumption level needed to prevent food deprivation. 
Governments across the developing world adopt various policies for 
ensuring food security, including public food distribution and feeding pro-
grams and a variety of social protection schemes. These policies have varying 
success in combating seasonal hunger. A focus on seasonality is often missing 
in these policies and in investments in agricultural and rural development. 
Policies also must respond to the ever-changing complexity of seasonal hun-
ger. The threat of climate change, for example, adds new concerns for food 
security. The extreme weather conditions associated with climate change 
may make seasonal shocks more frequent, severe, and unpredictable. It is the 
poor people in ecologically vulnerable regions who will be most at risk.
Moreover, seasonal hunger is also context specific, meaning that each 
rural society has its own dynamics of seasonality and seasonal hunger. 
Rural households experience and cope with seasonality in many diverse 
ways. A better understanding of this diversity is necessary to formulate 
policies and programs to strengthen the seasonal coping mechanisms of 
rural households. 
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This book draws on the example of Bangladesh in analyzing the nature 
and diversity of seasonal hunger, its underlying causes, and the effective-
ness of mitigating policies and programs. More than 70 percent of the 
country’s nearly 150 million people live in the rural areas, where life 
revolves around what is called the rice economy. Although the rural 
economy has become increasingly diversified with the growth of nonfarm 
activities, nearly 60 percent of the rural workers (and about half of the 
country’s entire workforce) are employed in agriculture.4 The country is 
also prone to floods and other natural disasters. In such a setting, one 
would, therefore, expect to find seasonality of income and consumption 
to be a regular phenomenon, only to be made worse by the occurrence of 
natural calamities. 
To analyze the interlocking nature of seasonality and poverty, the book 
particularly draws on the experience of rural households from a region in 
northwest Bangladesh: the greater Rangpur region.5 The region not only 
has lagged in poverty reduction compared to other regions, but also has 
remained particularly vulnerable to seasonal hunger, locally known as 
monga (Elahi and Ara 2008; Narayan, Yoshida, and Zaman 2007; Rahman 
1995; Zug 2006). The region is both economically depressed and eco-
logically vulnerable. It is prone to river erosion and frequent floods, crop 
yields are low because of the adverse effects of sand deposits caused by 
floods, infrastructure is poor, agricultural wage rates are considerably lower 
than in other parts of the country, and few employment opportunities 
exist outside agriculture. The households in Rangpur thus seem trapped 
by economic geography in which livelihood opportunities are limited, are 
vulnerable to natural disasters, and are tied to seasonal crop cycles. 
For many reasons, addressing hardcore poverty and seasonality simul-
taneously is a formidable task for policy makers. When poverty is already 
rampant and year round, pronounced seasonality of income and con-
sumption only worsens seasonal poverty. Although seasonal poverty may 
be alleviated to some extent by bolstering safety-net programs, the roots 
of the problem may lie deeper and must be addressed through long-term 
investments in human and physical capital (Jalan and Ravallion 2000). A 
combination of adverse economic geography and agroecological vulner-
ability underlying the poverty-seasonality nexus can make the problem 
even more challenging. Rangpur can thus be an ideal test case for judging 
the effectiveness of policies in dealing with seasonal hunger. In fact, 
Rangpur is well known in the famine literature: it was among the worst-
hit districts in the Great Bengal Famine of 1942–44 and was literally the 
epicenter of the 1974 famine in Bangladesh (Alamgir 1980; Sen 1977). 
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Using unique cross-sectional and panel data from Bangladesh, the 
book presents the findings from quantitative exercises to explain sea-
sonal hunger in Rangpur vis-à-vis other regions and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of policies. Traditionally, the government of Bangladesh 
has attempted to contain seasonal hunger or pronounced seasonality of 
income and consumption through short-term measures such as Food 
for Work and other safety-net programs. But given the extent of 
endemic poverty in Bangladesh—particularly in Rangpur—the policy 
of mitigating seasonal food insecurity through short-term measures 
may not likely succeed unless it is accompanied by interventions that 
enhance levels of income and productivity as a long-term cure for 
poverty. Such a policy mix would involve interventions that affect 
credit, labor, and commodity markets as well as public investments in 
infrastructure. 
In recent years, a great deal of public awareness has been created 
regarding the problem of seasonal hunger, or monga, in Rangpur. Both 
the government and a number of nongovernmental organizations have 
started various programs of interventions, some of them on a pilot basis. 
The programs, which are aimed at having both short-term and long-
term effects, include cash or food for work, skill training, transfers of 
assets such as livestock or equipment, and specially designed microcre-
dit programs in addition to the regular ones. Although the projects vary 
in scope and design, the target group is the same—namely, the poor 
households that are vulnerable to monga. These recently launched ini-
tiatives in the Rangpur region thus provide a test case for determining 
what works and what does not in combating seasonal hunger in par-
ticular and seasonality of income and consumption in general. The 
quasi-experimental designs of such projects are particularly suitable for 
assessing their effects. 
This book, therefore, has several objectives: 
• To understand the nature and the extent of seasonal hunger in Bangla-
desh in general and the greater Rangpur region in particular
• To examine why seasonality of income and consumption still persists 
in Rangpur and is more marked than in other parts of Bangladesh
• To identify the reasons traditional policies have failed and to determine 
the effectiveness of new initiatives 
• To draw lessons from these new initiatives for tackling new poverty 
pockets that are emerging in other areas of the country because of 
environmental degradation and climatic changes. 
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Within these broad themes, the book addresses a number of more 
specific policy concerns. For example, how do variations in local charac-
teristics—economic and agroecological—affect the extent of seasonality? 
How do policies and programs affect both poverty and seasonality simul-
taneously? Is seasonal hunger persistent in Rangpur because of the failure 
of the labor market, the credit market, or both? How much of the sever-
ity of seasonal hunger is due to seasonal shortfalls in consumption, and 
how much is due to chronic poverty? Are the observed coping mecha-
nisms welfare enhancing, or do they carry the risk of further impoverish-
ment? For example, how effective is seasonal migration as a coping 
strategy? To what extent can short-term measures such as social safety 
nets alleviate seasonal hunger? What are the mechanisms through which 
seasonal poverty can be mitigated in a sustainable way? In particular, do 
microcredit programs—the conventional ones or those specially designed 
for tackling seasonal hunger—have a role? An analysis of these issues is 
expected to shed light for policy makers elsewhere as they design and 
implement programs for combating seasonal hunger. 
The analysis of seasonality requires seasonal data. The findings from 
statistical exercises reported in this book are based on cross-sectional, 
seasonal, and multiyear panel data. The first set of data comes from the 
2000 and 2005 rounds of the nationally representative Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics. The HIES data allow the examination of not only the extent 
of seasonality of income, consumption, and poverty in various regions 
of Bangladesh, including the greater Rangpur region, but also the role of 
infrastructure, the safety-net programs, and local area characteristics in 
affecting the extent of poverty and its seasonality. It may be noted that 
although the published results of the HIES refer to year-round averages, 
the survey is designed to capture the effects of seasonality and their 
variations among regions within the country.
The second data set comes from a baseline household survey con-
ducted by the Institute of Microfinance (InM) in 2006 to assess the situ-
ation of monga in the Rangpur region. These data were collected as part 
of a new initiative of the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a pre-
mier wholesale facility of microfinance, to combat extreme and seasonal 
poverty in that region. The survey was, in fact, a household census in the 
selected villages that collected information on almost half a million poor 
households, which represented nearly the bottom 60 percent of all house-
holds in the survey villages. The InM survey data also include household 
panel data from a follow-up survey conducted in 2008 with respect to a 
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subsample of the InM baseline survey of 2006.6 Together, all these data 
allowed an in-depth analysis of the policy questions that the book was 
intended to answer.
The book has nine chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the key conceptual 
issues and presents a global perspective on the challenge of addressing 
seasonal hunger. Chapter 3 brings Bangladesh’s reality to the fore regard-
ing seasonal poverty and food insecurity and the vulnerability of the 
northwest region. Chapter 4 analyzes the vulnerability of households to 
seasonal hunger, their coping strategies, and the extent to which income 
seasonality affects seasonal poverty and food deprivation. Chapter 5 
reports some findings for both the Rangpur region and the country as a 
whole regarding the effects of policies and programs on poverty and food 
deprivation. The findings reported in the next three chapters are mainly 
related to the Rangpur region only. Chapter 6 examines the issue of sea-
sonal migration in the context of mitigating seasonal deprivation. In 
chapter 7, the impact of the social safety-net programs is tested, whereas 
the effectiveness of microfinance is assessed in chapter 8. The concluding 
chapter, chapter 9, looks at the policy implications while also pointing to 
some emerging challenges.
Notes
 1. See, for example, Destombes (2006) for a review of long-term patterns of 
seasonal hunger and malnutrition in northeastern Ghana. A discussion on 
agricultural seasonality in South Asia in a historical context can be found in 
Ludden (1999). 
 2. For an early study on the subject, see, for example, Chambers, Longhurst, and 
Pacey (1981).
 3. For examples of these later studies, see Chaudhuri and Paxson (2001, 2002); 
Deaton (1991); Dercon and Krishnan (2000); Rosenzweig (1988); and 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993).
 4. This estimate is based on the Labor Force Survey of 2005/06, the latest year 
for which official information is available. Agriculture includes livestock, fish-
ery, and forestry, in addition to crop agriculture.
 5. The greater Rangpur region was one of the old 17 administrative districts of 
Bangladesh and now comprises five districts: Rangpur, Gaibandha, Kurigram, 
Lalmonirhat, and Nilphamari. The region accounts for 11 percent of both the 
land area of Bangladesh and its population, according to the preliminary 
results of the 2011 population census. 
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 6. The follow-up survey was designed to evaluate PKSF interventions that 
included targeted microcredit for the poor along with a host of other program 
inputs. Since then, the InM has conducted two more follow-up surveys, in 
2009 and 2010. The final chapter of the book provides a brief overview of the 
results of those surveys.
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C H A P T E R  2
Understanding Seasonal Hunger
Key Issues in a Global Perspective
Key Conceptual Issues
Seasonal food deprivation is essentially an extension and particular 
manifestation of poverty and food insecurity. Prevalent among rural 
communities dependent on tropical agriculture, it also may be one of the 
most persistent and intractable aspects of global food insecurity. Yet as 
pointed out in chapter 1, the phenomenon has often been bypassed by 
the way poverty and food insecurity have been commonly characterized 
or conceptualized. 
Before the 1980s, the global initiatives related to food security were 
concerned with national and global food supplies.1 Since then, the focus 
has gradually shifted to questions of access to food at the household and 
individual levels. At the conceptual level, this shift has been helped by 
Sen’s (1981b) analysis of famine, which emphasized the lack of house-
hold “entitlement” to food rather than a deficiency of food availability on 
the aggregate as the source of food insecurity and famine (see also 
Ravallion 1987; Sen 1981a). With further elaboration of this concept, 
food security is now commonly defined as “secure access to enough food 
all the time.” Implicit in this notion of food security are the concepts of 
(a) sufficient food intake in relation to physical needs; (b) access to food 
in relation to entitlement through production, purchase, exchange, or 
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assistance; (c) security involving risk and vulnerability; and (d) time, 
when food insecurity can be chronic, transitory, or cyclical (Maxwell and 
Smith 1992). Beyond these core concepts, the wider considerations of 
vulnerable livelihoods, such as those in the context of agroclimatic adver-
sities, have also sometimes been brought into discussions on food security. 
Although none of these concepts specifically focuses on seasonal hunger, 
some common features can help its analysis.
Rural households in different agrarian settings experience and cope 
with seasonal hunger in diverse ways. But essentially, seasonal hunger is a 
manifestation of agricultural seasonality associated with annual crop 
cycles. Three distinct sets of factors interact with one another to produce 
seasonal hunger. First, at particular times of the annual agricultural cycles, 
some rural households—usually the poorer ones—find their livelihoods 
falling below a critical threshold for avoiding hunger. Second, those 
households lack enough capability for year-round smoothing of food con-
sumption. In other words, they are unable to insure themselves against 
seasonal loss of livelihood. Third, seasonal hunger is mostly an extension 
of year-round poverty, because the households living at the margin of 
poverty have less room to maneuver and are therefore more likely to go 
under at times of seasonal stress. For an understanding of seasonal hunger 
in more specific contexts, these three basic underlying factors and their 
interactions need further elaboration.
Seasonal Loss of Livelihoods
Agricultural seasonality arises because of the lag between the planting 
and harvesting of major food crops, such as rice, wheat, and maize, all of 
which have distinct seasonal production cycles. As a result, the prehar-
vest period may be characterized by the lack of paid employment for 
agri cultural workers, dwindling food stocks of subsistence farmers, and 
high food prices. Of course, the production environment is determined 
by agroclimatic conditions and level of technological development. 
Seasonal stress will be more severe and more unpredictable in the case 
of monocrop agriculture dependent on the vagaries of nature than in a 
more favorable production environment that allows multiple cropping 
and crop diversification. Moreover, rural communities living in particular 
poverty pockets will be most at risk because of their limited capacity to 
deal with income seasonality. 
Apart from looking at the effect of varying production environments, 
tone must break down the analysis of seasonal hunger by socioeconomic 
group. As with famine analysis, the mechanisms for the loss of entitlement 
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to food can differ substantially among these various household groups and 
so also can be the remedial measures. For example, having access to off-
farm employment and income sources will likely reduce the adverse 
effects of agricultural seasonality. More important, landless laborers are 
affected by seasonality because of a decline in the demand for hired labor 
during the lean season, whereas smallholder subsistence farmers may face 
starvation when their food stocks are drawn down before the next harvest. 
Although the time of seasonal stress may coincide for both groups, the 
sources of their food insecurity differ. Thus, for example, if the crop cul-
tivation activities in a year are disrupted by natural calamities like drought 
or floods, landless laborers suffer immediate loss of employment and 
income (provided they are paid in cash), whereas smallholder farmers will 
be disadvantaged over the following crop cycle because they will begin 
with lower-than-usual food stocks because of harvest losses. 
For both landless laborers and food-deficit marginal farmers, their food 
entitlement may be further squeezed by possible preharvest increases in 
food prices. Seasonal hunger is thus related to food market efficiency as 
well. As discussed in the famine literature, a severe loss of food entitle-
ment may occur for certain household groups even in a year of plentiful 
food availability if there is a market failure, such as one resulting from 
irrational price expectations and a buildup of food stocks.2 But more 
important for the analysis of recurrent seasonal hunger is the fact that it 
can occur because of the loss of employment and income alone (linked 
to the crop cycle), even without seasonal increases in food prices. 
Consequently, such food deprivation may remain unnoticed as a form of 
“silent hunger,” because the abnormal increases in food prices usually cre-
ate public outcry and attract the attention of policy makers. This factor 
also explains why food price stabilization alone as a means of ensuring 
food security is unlikely to work in mitigating seasonal hunger.
Lack of Self-Insurance and Consumption Smoothing
Seasonal hunger does not result from income seasonality alone; it is 
typically a particular manifestation of poverty in general. The poor, typi-
cally the extremely poor, lack the capacity to maintain their food con-
sumption at the time of a seasonal decline in income; they are even less 
capable of self-insuring against occasional seasonal stress of unpredict-
able severity. In other words, seasonal hunger occurs when mechanisms 
for consumption smoothing fail for poor households. For example, rural 
households use traditional risk management devices, such as local pool-
ing of resources or mutual support provided by family or friends. Such 
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community-based insurance is more feasible when the risks are idiosyn-
cratic (that is, particular to households) than in the event of aggregate 
shocks like seasonal ones. 
Lack of access to credit or lack of ability to save may prevent rural poor 
households from smoothing consumption. Even if they would like to save 
for precautionary reasons, they may not have access to appropriate finan-
cial institutions to do so. In the case of self-provisioning smallholder farm-
ers, they might store grains as a buffer stock to smooth consumption; but 
the cost of storage due to spoilage can be high because of inadequate 
storage facilities.3 The unpredictability of the extent of seasonal stress 
may also be a reason for inadequate self-insurance by poor households, 
either through savings or through storage of grains. Even in the case of a 
predictable decline in income, it is difficult for a poor household that lives 
near subsistence to consciously plan for coping with future hardship. 
Avoiding severe starvation in the hunger season by undergoing less severe 
starvation year round may be preferable with regard to the nutritional 
well-being of family members, but that hardly looks like an option! In 
other words, immediate food needs may compromise poor households’ 
ability or willingness for smoothing consumption. 
The inability to smooth consumption raises some conceptual issues 
regarding household decisions of intertemporal substitution of food con-
sumption. The problem primarily arises because food contrasts sharply 
with consumer durables that provide services smoothly over time in line 
with demand. The human body is able to build up reserves in the form 
of excess fats that can be used for energy during difficult times. In fact, 
the effect of seasonal food deprivation can be borne to some extent by 
drawing on any such bodily reserves; but this is, of course, an extremely 
inefficient and unhealthy means of coping with seasonal food depriva-
tion. Seasonal hunger also needs to be distinguished from seasonality in 
food consumption that may arise from preferences related to changes 
in food prices, labor effort and energy requirements, or seasonal food 
choices. The seasonal hunger discussed here can hardly be the outcome 
of this kind of benign preference.
The question still remains whether poor households are incapable of 
smoothing food consumption in the face of adverse seasonality for some 
behavioral reasons. Various hypotheses have been offered to explain why 
poor people may be behaviorally averse to saving, such as the present bias 
in decision making, lack of self-control, or time-inconsistent preferences 
reflecting high discount rates (Fafchamps and others 2012; Spears 2009). 
For example, in discussing “the logic of self-control” for the poor, Banerjee 
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and Duflo (2011, 198−204) point to the use of microcredit (in produc-
tive activities rather than for current consumption) as a way of helping 
the poor think about long-term goals. The fact remains that for those 
who live at the margin of poverty, the concept of intertemporal con-
sumption substitution that is welfare enhancing is an ambiguous one. 
The Nexus between Endemic Poverty and Seasonal Hunger 
Seasonal hunger usually occurs when year-round endemic poverty is 
made worse by seasonal stress. Although predictable seasonality creates 
hardship regularly, it also allows some recovery. But an irregular occur-
rence, such as floods or failure of the monsoon rains, can magnify the 
adverse seasonal effects to an extent that leaves irreversible adverse 
effects on livelihood sustainability. These “ratchet” effects may arise from 
the way poor households try to survive by adopting various coping 
strategies—such as mortgaging or selling land and other assets and mak-
ing advance sales of crops and labor. Poverty and its seasonality can thus 
be mutually reinforcing in an interlocking cycle. As such, the phenome-
non needs to be studied as a dynamic process in the context of livelihood 
strategies of the poor extending beyond a season or a year. 
Much depends, however, on the way poor households cope with sea-
sonality. Although rural households adopt a variety of coping mecha-
nisms, they may have only limited access to such coping mechanisms and 
are therefore unable to smooth food consumption year round.4 Even 
then, households may take desperate measures, as mentioned earlier, to 
avoid the direst consequences of seasonality. Those measures are taken 
under adversity, even at the risk of damaging long-term livelihood sus-
tainability. Some authors, therefore, prefer to distinguish between those 
“erosive” coping measures and “nonerosive” ones that do not undermine 
future livelihood (de Waal 1989). Yet others have identified distinct pat-
terns in coping mechanisms that reflect stages of desperation, ranging 
from insurance mechanisms like savings to destitution behavior such as 
sale of assets and distress migration (Corbett 1988).
A household’s perception of future risk of seasonal hunger is also an 
important factor in its choice of coping strategies. Several studies have 
shown how such perceptions, in the absence of adequate insurance 
mechanisms, can lead households to make inefficient choices, such as 
when entering into labor contracts, selling assets, or using production 
inputs.5 In their efforts to minimize livelihood risks, households are pre-
pared to accept lower but more steady and assured income. Such advance 
income-smoothing measures are a way for poor households to adapt to 
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seasonality and uncertainty. The result is often a precarious balance 
between the household’s own insurance mechanisms and risks that can 
be easily disrupted by shocks, triggering a cycle of impoverishment. 
Policy Implications: Evidence from Global Experience
What policies can avert or alleviate seasonal poverty and hunger? The 
foregoing discussions on the key conceptual issues regarding seasonal 
hunger, together with the available studies on the global experience, sug-
gest that policies need to be context specific.6 Although global perspec-
tives on the problem are useful, policies and programs derived from any 
single global template can hardly be the answer.
It is important, for example, to ascertain the sources of seasonal food 
deprivation that are amenable to policies in specific agrarian and socio-
economic settings. If a country has particular regional pockets of severe 
poverty and seasonal hunger, policies should focus on strengthening the 
local economy of those regions. Policy makers also need to take into 
account that farming systems and households’ self-insurance arrange-
ments vary across rural societies. In addition, to the extent that seasonal 
hunger is caused by seasonal increases in food prices, a policy goal 
should be to keep such fluctuations within reasonable limits. But if lack 
of employment in the agricultural lean season is the problem, price sta-
bilization alone will not suffice. In that case, policies to promote rural 
nonfarm employment could be one way of limiting the effect of agricul-
tural seasonality. 
In broad terms, the pattern of seasonal hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
distinct from that in South Asia. The contrast has been highlighted in the 
famine analysis as well (Ravallion 1987; Sen 1981a, 1981b). The Sub-
Saharan pattern is characterized by the dominance of self-provisioning 
smallholder farmers in the production and storage of grains. In light of 
poorly integrated grain markets, local food availability is largely determined 
by smallholder supply, often resulting in large seasonal and interyear varia-
tions in grain prices. Poor farmers face seasonal hunger when their food 
stocks are depleted, which is also when market prices are high. In any case, 
they may have little cash to buy food from the market. Strengthening 
production on smallholder farms, along with improving grain storage 
facilities, is thus a policy priority for avoiding seasonal hunger. 
In contrast, the household groups that are most vulnerable to sea-
sonal hunger in rural South Asia consist of landless agricultural laborers 
and food-deficit marginal farmers. These household groups are adversely 
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affected by the preharvest increases in food prices, more so if there is also 
a dip in the wage rates. But the main source of their vulnerability to sea-
sonal hunger is the lack of agricultural employment in the lean season, 
which alone can result in seasonal hunger. Therefore, providing income-
earning opportunities for landless agricultural laborers during the agricul-
tural lean period needs to be a top policy priority.
Policies may also directly address the roots of seasonal hunger by trying 
to reduce the extent of agricultural seasonality through changes in crop-
ping patterns. The problem is that all major food crops, such as wheat, 
rice, and maize, are seasonal and have distinct annual production cycles. 
Replacing numerous traditional crops with high-yielding varieties has no 
doubt helped increase food production, but it has also increased vulner-
ability to crop failure from natural calamities, such as drought, flood, 
salinity, or even pests (Strange and Scott 2005).7 Public policies support-
ing research to develop high-yielding crop varieties that are suited to the 
local environment and are resistant to such natural calamities will benefit 
farmers, particularly in ecologically vulnerable regions that are prone to 
seasonal hunger. 
Another possibility is to diversify food production and food choices by 
growing nonseasonal crops like cassava, which can be grown and har-
vested at any time of the year. For example, it has been suggested that the 
most promising way to reduce the severity of seasonal hunger in a country 
like Madagascar is to increase agricultural productivity of the secondary 
food crops, such as cassava and other roots and tubers (Dostie, Haggblade, 
and Randriamamony 2002). Not surprisingly, cassava is known as a “fam-
ine reserve crop” in Africa. More than 80 percent of cassava produced in 
the world is consumed by humans, and it is the principal source of energy 
for 500 million people in the tropical world (Lozano 1986). However, the 
problem with the production of cassava and similar root crops is a low 
yield per hectare compared with wheat or maize. 
In the monsoon-fed rice agriculture of India and Bangladesh, promoting 
the production of irrigated winter rice has not only contributed to the 
growth of rice production but has also significantly reduced the extent of 
the seasonal agricultural cycle.8 Crop diversification through a shift from 
cereals to high-value crops like vegetables and fruits can potentially reduce 
seasonal hunger by increasing farmers’ income and creating more agricul-
tural employment, but it will need government support for marketing 
and technology promotion (Mahmud, Rahman, and Zohir 2000). 
With regard to the various mechanisms that households adopt as insur-
ance against seasonal hunger (for example, buffer stocks, past savings, 
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informal credit markets, or interfamily risk pooling), it is necessary to find 
out how efficient these mechanisms are and whether there is scope for 
institutional innovations. Improved storage, for example, has been found 
to help consumption smoothing in a cost-effective way. Microcredit is also 
found to have a role in consumption smoothing, both when loans are used 
directly for consumption and when they are used to support income-
generating activities year round (Pitt and Khandker 2002). As noted ear-
lier, ample evidence exists to suggest that lack of access to credit not only 
is a major constraint to consumption smoothing but also can result in seri-
ous efficiency losses for poor households in their effort to diversify liveli-
hood risks.9 It is worth noting, in this context, that alternatives to formal 
credit, such as informal lenders, could be costly and susceptible to failing 
completely in the event of an aggregate shock (Townsend 1995).
Various public programs for targeted income transfer can be a way to 
reduce the severity of seasonal consumption shortfalls. However, the 
problem here is often inadequate coverage and extent of assistance, as 
well as poor program implementation. Innovative programs of nongov-
ernmental organizations can also help (Matin and Hulme 2003). The 
categories of interventions include emergency assistance; social protec-
tion safety nets, such as those provided by public works programs; and 
rural livelihood development, such as through asset transfer to vulner-
able households (Devereux, Vatila, and Swan 2008). When targeted 
seasonally, these interventions can enhance the welfare of poor house-
holds by providing them increased food entitlement when they need it 
and by preventing them from resorting to desperate coping strategies 
(for example, Chetty and Looney 2006). The safety nets can thus act as 
social insurance.
In contrast, the interventions that are not seasonally targeted can 
affect seasonal hunger by altering year-round income and consumption. 
But this outcome will then depend in part on the capacity of the benefi-
ciary households to smooth consumption. Targeted public works pro-
grams, such as Food for Work, may not always be suitable for seasonal 
targeting. The optimal timing of public works programs can thus pose a 
policy dilemma. Much of the rice cultivation in South Asia depends on 
the monsoon rains so that the preharvest lean season coincides with the 
late rainy season. This season is not often suitable for public works involv-
ing earthwork, although jobs are most needed then. Seasonal hunger 
aside, social safety-net programs are found to be more effective in arrest-
ing transitory poverty than persistent poverty (Ravallion, van de Walle, 
and Gautam 1995). 
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Because seasonal hunger is a manifestation of poverty in general, the 
answer to the problem ultimately lies in promoting poverty-alleviating 
economic growth. Experiences of countries show that economic growth 
alone is not enough; growth must be broad based enough to make the 
rural economies stronger, more diversified, and resilient to shocks— 
particularly in regions that are prone to seasonal hunger. Because of the 
interlocking nature of poverty and its seasonality, the two problems need 
to be addressed simultaneously, which is a formidable task for policy 
makers. Although seasonal poverty may be alleviated to some extent by 
bolstering safety-net programs, the roots of the problem may lie deeper 
and will need to be addressed through long-term investments in human 
and physical capital (Jalan and Ravallion 2000). 
The persistent nature of seasonal hunger is evident from its prevalence 
across many parts of the developing world. However, in the absence of 
official data, there is no direct account of how many people actually suf-
fer from seasonal hunger, and one must rely on the available studies. Of 
the examples from India, Malawi, and Myanmar, one such recent study 
provides a compelling account of the magnitude of seasonal hunger 
(Devereux, Vatila, and Swan 2008). The nature of seasonal stress in rural 
India is also analyzed by Agarwal (1990). In Sub-Saharan Africa, seasonal 
hunger is found to be a major dimension of declining food availability and 
increasing instability in food supply (Devereux 2009; Hadley, Mulder, 
and Fitzherbert 2007; Reardon and Matlon 1989). One might reasonably 
argue that most of the world’s acute hunger and undernutrition occur 
during what is known in many countries as the annual “hunger season.” 
The findings of several studies indicate that, compared with the standard 
poverty statistics, a much larger number of rural households may in fact 
be vulnerable to food insecurity. In other words, some of the nonpoor 
measured by annual data may be seasonal poor because they cannot 
maintain consumption above the poverty line in response to seasonal 
shocks (for example, Dercon and Krishnan 2000). 
Policy makers may, however, draw some comfort from the fact that 
many rural communities successfully cope with income seasonality. 
For example, in the ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics) sample of Indian villages used in Chaudhuri 
and Paxson’s (2001) study, agricultural households received on average 
75 percent of their annual income in a three-month period, yet seasonal 
food consumption is found to be largely unrelated to income seasonality. 
The study further finds that food consumption may still show seasonality 
because of other factors, such as seasonal variations in prices, preferences, 
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labor efforts, and precautionary savings motives. But the consumption 
seasonality of this nature is by choice, not a result of a lack of capacity to 
tackle the problem of income seasonality. Similarly, in the case of rural 
Thailand, Paxson’s (1993) findings suggest that the observed seasonality 
in consumption patterns results from seasonal variations in prices or 
preferences, rather than from an inability of households to use savings or 
borrowing to smooth consumption. Other studies show that in many 
rural settings in the developing world, households may be able to smooth 
consumption (controlling for price and preference) even when they lack 
access to credit markets (Deaton 1991; Kazianga and Udry 2006). 
Households may do so using mechanisms such as savings, buffer stocks, 
or interfamily transfers. These examples show that seasonal food depriva-
tion is not inevitable even with marked agricultural seasonality and that 
the way households can ensure against such seasonality may vary across 
diverse agrarian settings. 
Fighting Hunger and Its Seasonality: A Global Challenge
From what is known about seasonal hunger, one might look at the roles 
that governments, international aid agencies, and donor countries could 
play in fighting this global problem. At the top of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) is “eradicating extreme poverty and hun-
ger,” and among the indicators for measuring progress toward reducing 
hunger are prevalence of child malnourishment (the proportion of under-
weight children younger than five) and the proportion of the population 
below a minimum level of dietary energy consumption. Thus, the empha-
sis on food security is not lacking in the goals set by the global commu-
nity. However, there seems to be insufficient awareness about the seasonal 
dimension of the problem, which remains, at best, implicit in these goals. 
Although—following the lead of the World Bank (1986)—global dis-
course now commonly distinguishes between chronic and transitory food 
insecurity, seasonal hunger does not figure prominently in its character-
ization of food insecurity (Maxwell and Smith 1992). 
Can Growth Handle Hunger and Its Seasonality? 
Significant progress has been made in the past two decades or so in 
accelerating economic growth and reducing poverty in the developing 
countries. The world as a whole seems to be on track to reach the pov-
erty reduction target included in the MDGs. Progress, however, has not 
been uniform with some parts of the developing world; Sub-Saharan 
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Africa, in particular, lags other regions. The acceleration of economic 
growth has also been accompanied by a sharp increase in income 
inequality, thus reducing the extent of the favorable effect of growth on 
poverty reduction. 
It is commonly agreed that raising per capita income will likely reduce 
poverty and that economic growth can be the route out of poverty even 
for the poorest segments of the population. Figure 2.1 shows how global 
poverty has been reduced with growth. As Collier (2007, 11) argues, the 
problem of the so-called bottom billion of the world’s population is that 
“they have not had any growth” rather than the “wrong type of growth,” 
and “growth usually does benefit ordinary people.” But there is also a 
debate regarding the nexus between poverty, inequality, and growth; that 
is, the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty can be compromised 
if it also increases inequality. Economic growth needs to be inclusive as 
well as sustainable. For example, the volatile growth history in Sub-
Saharan Africa has demonstrated that gains in poverty reduction through 
commodity boom−based growth are hardly sustainable. 
Although growth on average is matched by proportionate reductions 
in poverty, the incomes of the poorest may increase less than propor-
tionately with growth (Ravallion 2001). The magnitude of the growth 
Figure 2.1 Relationship between Growth and Poverty Reduction Worldwide, 
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 elasticity of poverty is found to be influenced by various factors, such as 
initial inequality, the distributional pattern of growth, the composition 
of public expenditure, the level of human development, and the role of 
labor markets. Governments can intervene in these respects to make 
growth more pro-poor (Besley and Cord 2007). 
But the aspect of poverty reduction that is the focus of this book and 
that has been rather ignored in policy discourses is the interlocking 
nature of poverty and its seasonality. As already discussed, extreme pov-
erty makes seasonal poverty more acute, whereas the latter can have 
ratchet effects on future poverty because of the adoption of “erosive” 
coping strategies. Moreover, the uncertainty associated with seasonality 
can lead to serious efficiency losses in the livelihood strategies adopted 
by the poor. In such delicately balanced livelihood systems, an episode 
of seasonal distress, particularly of occasional high intensity, can easily 
trigger a cycle of impoverishment. For that reason, extreme poverty and 
seasonality need to be addressed simultaneously, a formidable task for 
policy makers. In agroecologically vulnerable areas, the complexity of 
the underlying poverty-seasonality nexus can make the problem even 
more challenging. 
Compared with poverty reduction, the global record of reducing hun-
ger and undernourishment is rather disappointing (UN 2011). According 
to the estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, the absolute number of undernourished people has not declined 
since the early 1990s; the number increased to more than 1 billion in 
2009, partly as a result of the global recession during 2008−09 and the 
food crisis of 2008, and then declined to 925 million in 2010. This num-
ber is well above the MDG target for hunger reduction. Micronutrient 
deficiencies, termed hidden hunger, affect 2 billion people worldwide. 
Unfortunately, there is no official estimate of the people affected by the 
other hidden hunger, namely, seasonal hunger.
The progress in various hunger-related indicators across countries can 
be seen from the Global Hunger Index, which is prepared by a trio of 
think tanks led by the International Food Policy Research Institute. The 
index combines data on undernourishment in the population, under-
weight children, and under-five mortality rate to arrive at an overall 
measure of the degree of food deprivation.10 Figure 2.2 shows the esti-
mates for the most recent period for some of the worst-performing coun-
tries.11 According to this index, most of the countries where hunger is rife 
are in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. When compared with similar 
estimates for the early 1990s, the countries in South Asia are found to 
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have made better progress over the past two decades or so compared 
with the African countries. In some countries during the same period, 
hunger has worsened—staggeringly so in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (with a 66 percent increase in the index), but also in Burundi, the 
Republic of Korea, and Zimbabwe. In contrast, Angola, Bangladesh, and 
Ethiopia have each achieved more than a 30 percent reduction in the 
hunger index.
Although progress has generally been good in reducing the child mor-
tality rate, particularly by adopting such low-cost solutions as child 
immunization and the use of oral saline for diarrhea treatment, the con-
tinuing high prevalence of child malnourishment remains a major con-
cern. The prevalence of underweight children is particularly high in 
South Asia (figure 2.2). In fact, South Asia’s persistent poor ranking in 
the Global Hunger Index, particularly in the case of Bangladesh and 
India, is due to the disproportionately high incidence of child malnutri-
tion. Evidence worldwide shows that children in rural areas are twice as 
likely to be underweight as urban children (UN 2011).
Economic growth in the recent decades appears to have been far less 
successful in reducing hunger than in reducing income poverty. Household-
level food security thus deserves separate attention in the strategies for 
poverty reduction. The nutritional well-being of children, particularly in 
Figure 2.2 The Worst-Performing Countries According to the Selected Factors 
of the Global Hunger Index, 2004–08
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rural areas, seems to be most at risk. This finding may be due to intra-
household food distribution that discriminates against children, but sea-
sonal hunger that particularly affects child nutrition may also be a 
contributing factor. Several studies have pointed out the long-run adverse 
nutritional effect of repeated seasonal stresses, particularly for children 
(for example, Ferro-Luzzi 1990; Ferro-Luzzi and Branca 1993). 
The world’s grain production has been increasing in response to 
increased demand. The increase in demand has been propelled by both 
population growth and increased per capita income in the developing 
countries, where income elasticity of demand for staples remains rela-
tively high among poorer households. Figure 2.3 shows how the world’s 
grain production has increased with the reduction in global poverty; 
there was a 1 percent growth in food production with reduction in pov-
erty at a rate of 1.92 percentage points per year (figure 2.3). One can 
perhaps conclude from this information that the world’s food production 
has failed to abate hunger because of policy failures, not because of the 
inability to make enough food available. Consequently, the shift of policy 
emphasis from aggregate food supply to access to food at the household 
level makes sense. 
Even if the world’s food production has not been a constraint thus far 
in reducing global poverty and hunger, it may yet prove so in the future. 
Growing population and income in emerging and developing countries 
will add significantly to the demand for food in the coming decades, 
Figure 2.3 Poverty Reduction and Growth in Grain Production (Rice, Wheat, 
and Maize), 1981–2004
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exerting pressure on food prices. According to the latest medium-term 
outlook projections of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (FAO and OECD 2011), prices of crops and most live-
stock products will be higher in both nominal and real terms during the 
2010s than they were during the decade preceding the 2007−08 price 
spike in the global grain markets. A supply shock in a situation where 
the supply-demand balance is already tight can easily trigger a serious 
problem of food insecurity in various parts of the developing world as 
happened during the 2007−08 food crisis. 
The way increased food demand will be met will have implications for 
food insecurity and its seasonality. In the less developed countries, 
increasing food production through technological innovations not only is 
a means of increasing food supply but can also be important for creating 
rural employment and mitigating the adverse effects of agricultural sea-
sonality. It is noteworthy that the supply response to the price hike of 
2007−08 that subsequently helped calm the global grain markets came 
largely from increased production in the developed countries and not the 
developing ones. In the case of smallholder farming in Africa, increasing 
food production will require assisting small farmers with improved tech-
nologies and facilities for water and soil management and postharvest 
processing, storage, and marketing. All these improvements can be the 
tools for combating seasonal hunger as well.
Toward a Coordinated Policy Approach 
The slippage in achieving the global food security targets has created 
awareness about the complexity of the problem and the need for a coor-
dinated approach. Clearly, addressing the seasonal dimension of the prob-
lem needs to be part of such an approach, not only because seasonal 
hunger is one of the most prevalent forms of food insecurity but also 
because it is interlocked with extreme poverty and other forms of food 
insecurity. Moreover, hunger and poverty are recognized as an overall 
outcome of actions taken by various actors across the globe. Thus, con-
cerns about food insecurity are being increasingly linked with such 
diverse subjects as the functioning of global markets, the depletion of 
freshwater resources, management of energy resources, risks to ecosys-
tems, climate change, and so on. Dealing with food insecurity and its 
seasonality in such multidimensional contexts requires partnerships, at 
both national and global levels, among government agencies, nongovern-
mental organizations, the private sector, and research institutions.
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A coordinated approach to deal with seasonal hunger will require cre-
ating public awareness.12 Although some interventions have proved their 
effectiveness in different country contexts around the world, such inter-
ventions are rarely formulated and implemented on a large scale in an 
integrated manner. This deficiency is primarily because nonemergency 
chronic and seasonal hunger has ranked low on the list of national and 
global priorities. It has been argued that governments, particularly demo-
cratic ones, are more successful in averting dramatic disturbances like 
famines than in addressing endemic hunger and deprivation (Drèze and 
Sen 1989). International donors likewise respond more readily with 
humanitarian assistance in the event of disasters like famines, cyclones, or 
floods than in dealing with hidden hunger of different forms, like micro-
nutrient deficiency in diet, child malnourishment, and seasonal hunger 
and food insecurity. Although such action by international donors in deal-
ing with emergency situations is understandable, it is less easy to explain 
the neglect of seasonal hunger even in the regular aid programs. 
One reason for the neglect of seasonal hunger is the lack of informa-
tion. As mentioned earlier, the seasonal dimension of poverty and food 
deprivation is missed by the official data collection systems that annualize 
poverty estimates. There is less information on seasonal hunger than even 
on the other forms of hidden hunger, such as child malnutrition. The lack 
of data also makes it difficult to monitor the effect of whatever policies 
and programs are undertaken to address seasonality. Another reason for 
inadequate action is a lack of understanding of the phenomenon of sea-
sonality. Seasonal hunger is commonly perceived as part of endemic or 
chronic poverty, which is only partly true. Although addressing poverty 
generally will also help reduce seasonal hunger, such an approach will 
miss many policies that can specifically address seasonality. As discussed 
earlier, a strategy to break out of the cycle of poverty and its seasonality 
must address both simultaneously.
An integrated approach needs to be developed to monitor and evaluate 
actions against seasonal hunger (IDS 2009). According to the Institute of 
Development Studies, the following actions may be essential ingredients 
of this approach. First, awareness on seasonality must be increased among 
development professionals, policy makers, and field workers, including 
agricultural extension officials. Second, a standard practice must be to 
include seasonality assessments in the design of rural social protection 
programs and investment programs for agricultural and rural develop-
ment. Third, while supporting the growth of annual agricultural produc-
tion, public policies must also intervene to stabilize  intra-annual food 
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consumption of the poor, such as by providing access to credit, weather-
indexed insurance schemes, and off-farm employment. Finally, gov-
ernments need to promote effective seasonally targeted interventions 
that promote livelihood resilience and that stabilize the effects of sea-
sonal shocks. 
Developing such an integrated approach is likely to involve trade-offs 
and balancing among competing objectives. For example, promoting 
 agricultural growth through technological innovations may some-
times increase rather than decrease the extent of income seasonality. Con-
sequently, there will be a greater need for promoting consumption-
smoothing mechanisms. To promote rural diversification in regions that 
are particularly vulnerable to seasonal hunger, public investments, such as 
those for infrastructure development, may need to be directed to those 
regions even if the returns from such investments may be lower than in 
other regions. As for social security programs, a balance must be achieved 
between what Drèze and Sen (1989, 60) call the protection and promotion 
aspects, that is, between short-run measures that prevent immediate hard-
ship and programs that have longer-run effects in promoting livelihoods. 
Although learning from international experience is important, policies 
for addressing seasonal hunger need to be locally relevant, socially accept-
able, and economically feasible. Because of the multidimensional nature 
of the problem, these policies need to be harmonized within the general 
economic, social, and environmental policies of a country. There is no 
single cure for seasonal hunger; a country may need to implement an 
array of specific measures with the help of international actors. Meeting 
the emerging threats of climate change and environmental degradation 
will need even more innovative solutions. Ultimately, the challenge is 
how to enhance the ability of the rural poor to cope with the increasing 
complexity and uncertainty linked to seasonality by making their liveli-
hoods more flexible, adaptable, and resilient. This book addresses some of 
these questions using data from Bangladesh with the hope that the find-
ings are relevant for policy makers from the governments and interna-
tional agencies fighting poverty and hunger worldwide. 
Notes
 1. For a chronological review of global initiatives related to food security from 
1943 to 1990, see Maxwell and Smith (1992). 
 2. For an analysis of the role of price expectation in the functioning of rice mar-
kets in Bangladesh during the 1974 famine, see Ravallion (1985).
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 3. In fact, small subsistence farmers are often forced to sell their produce at 
bottom prices during harvest and buy food later at high prices. This outcome 
may occur because they have to repay the loans they take out to meet the 
production costs. Farmers are thus deprived of entitlement to the food they 
produce. 
 4. See, for example, Longhurst (1986) for a discussion of household coping 
strategies.
 5. For evidence on perceptions and choices in various contexts, see Besley 
(1995); Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993); Bliss and Stern 
(1982); Dercon (1998, 2002); Eswaran and Kotwal (1989, 1990); Jalan and 
Ravallion (1999, 2003); Kochar (1995); Mordoch (1995); Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger (1993); and Townsend (1995).
 6. For a host of policy options for reducing hunger that are practiced in the 
developing world, see Drèze, Sen, and Hussain (1995). 
 7. It may be noted that seasonality affects not only the crop cycles but also the 
prevalence of plant diseases, which sometimes can spell ruin and starvation 
for farmers (Strange and Scott 2005).
 8. In Bangladesh, about 60 percent of total rice production now comes from 
irrigated dry-season rice, although in India, rain-fed rice production is still 
dominant.
 9. As noted earlier, there is a sizable literature on the lack of access to credit. See 
also Alderman and Paxson (1992); Behrman, Foster, and Rosenzweig (1997); 
Chaudhuri and Paxson (2001); Harrower and Hoddinott (2004); Jalan and 
Ravallion (1999); Rosenzweig (1988); and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993).
 10. Under-five mortality rate is per 10,000 live births.
 11. The index is measured with a maximum of 100, but this scaling down is not 
shown in figure 2.2 because it does not affect the country rankings. 
 12. The importance of creating public awareness leading to effective action to 
combat hunger is discussed by Drèze and Sen (1989).
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Seasonal Poverty and Hunger 
in Bangladesh
Vulnerability of the Northwest Region
Country Context
Bangladesh emerged from its 1971 war of independence poor, overpopu-
lated, and reeling from overwhelming war damage to its institutional and 
physical capital. The country was ravaged by acute food shortages and 
famines during the early years of its independence. Its income per capita 
was among the lowest in the world along with dismally low levels of 
various social development indicators. According to some authors, 
Bangladesh was designated as a “test case” for development, and Henry 
Kissinger called it “an international basket case.”
In the decades since the 1974 famine, the country has made com-
mendable progress in several development areas. With sustained growth 
in food production and a good record of disaster management, famines 
have become a phenomenon of the past. Bangladesh’s per capita real 
gross domestic product (GDP) has more than doubled since the mid-
1970s. Life expectancy has risen from 50 years to 63 years; population 
growth rates of around 3 percent a year have been halved; child mortality 
rates of 240 per 1,000 live births have been cut by 70 percent; literacy 
has more than doubled; and the country has achieved gender parity in 
primary and secondary schools.
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Most of these gains have taken place since the early 1990s, when the 
introduction of wide-ranging economic reforms coincided with the tran-
sition to democracy. The growth of per capita GDP was slow in the 
1980s, at an annual average of 1.6 percent a year, but it accelerated to 
3.0 percent in the 1990s and averaged about 4.0 percent more recently. 
The acceleration resulted partly from a slowdown in population growth 
but also from a sustained increase in GDP growth, which averaged 3.7 
percent annually during the 1980s, 4.8 percent during the 1990s, and 
5.7 percent since then.
Progress in the human development indicators was even more 
impressive. Bangladesh ranks among the top-performing countries in the 
extent of improvement in the United Nations Development Programme’s 
Human Development Index since the early 1990s, and it is among the 
few developing countries that are on target for achieving most of the 
Millennium Development Goals. As a result, Bangladesh is now clearly 
an overperformer in many social development indicators in relation to 
its per capita GDP, whereas two decades or so ago it lagged among 
countries with similar per capita income levels. These achievements 
have in fact been dubbed a “development surprise,” given the country’s 
desperate initial conditions and allegedly poor record in governance 
(Ahluwalia and Mahmud 2004; Mahmud 2008; Mahmud, Ahmed, and 
Mahajan 2010).
Despite these positive changes, pervasive poverty and undernutri-
tion persist. The most disturbing consequence of widespread poverty 
is that 40 percent of Bangladesh’s 150 million people cannot afford an 
adequate diet. Chronically food insecure and highly vulnerable, many 
of these people remain without assets (other than their own labor 
power) to cushion lean-season hunger or the crushing blows of illness, 
floods, and other natural calamities. The country also has to tackle 
several growth-retarding factors: (a) poor governance, (b) a low-skilled 
labor force, (c) extremely high population density and the associated 
scarcity of land and natural resources, and (d) vulnerability to floods 
and other natural disasters, including the prospect of being one of the 
major victims of climate change. One commentator has aptly put 
Bangladesh’s development challenge in the following words: can “the 
people of one of the poorest and yet resilient and innovative countries 
transform it from being the world’s most famously ‘vulnerable’ coun-
try to being recognised as one of its most ‘adaptive’ countries?” 
(Mahmud 2010).
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Poverty and Food Security
Trends in Poverty 
With the acceleration in the growth of per capita income, considerable 
progress has been made in poverty reduction. The incidence of poverty 
has declined from 57 percent in 1991–92 to 32 percent in 2010 and that 
of extreme poverty from 41 percent to 18 percent (table 3.1). The official 
estimates of poverty in Bangladesh are derived from the data of the 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) using poverty lines 
based on the “cost of basic needs,” which includes the cost of a minimum 
food basket and an allowance for nonfood expenditures. Estimates are 
also made for the incidence of “extreme poverty,” which is defined by the 
household’s total consumption expenditure—on food and nonfood 
combined—falling short of the cost of the food basket included in the 
cost of basic needs.1
In recent years, growth acceleration in many developing countries, 
including those in South Asia, has been accompanied by increased income 
inequality (Mahmud and Chowdhury 2008). In contrast, the pattern of 
economic growth in Bangladesh seems to have been relatively pro-poor—
with the main stimulus to economic growth outside agriculture coming 
from labor-intensive garment export, micro- and small-scale enterprises in 
manufacturing and services, and remittances from migrants working 
abroad. All these sectors typically provide scope for upward economic 
mobility for the poor. Yet inequality tended to increase in the 1990s, for 
two reasons: (a) even within a generally employment-intensive pattern of 
growth, the more dynamic parts of the economy happened to be those 
Table 3.1 Head-Count Rates of Poverty and Extreme Poverty, 1991/92–2010: 
Cost-of-Basic-Needs Method 
Year
Moderate poverty rate (%) Extreme poverty rate (%)
Rural Urban National Rural Urban National
1991/92 58.7 42.7 56.6 43.7 23.6 41.0
1995/96 54.5 27.8 50.1 39.4 13.7 35.1
2000 52.3 35.2 48.9 37.9 20.0 34.3
2005 43.8 28.4 40.0 28.6 14.6 25.1
2010 35.2 21.3 31.5 21.1 7.7 17.6
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), various rounds. 
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with relatively unequal income, and (b) growth was not strong enough to 
increase wages in the vast agricultural and informal labor markets. But 
since the late 1990s, real wages in the agricultural and other informal labor 
markets have shown strong upward trends. As shown by the Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey of 2000 and later years, income inequal-
ity in urban and rural areas has not worsened, even if it has not improved; 
as a result, poverty has been reduced at a much faster rate.
The poverty estimates above may be compared with the estimates of 
the proportion of the population with calorie-intake deficiency (the so-
called direct calorie-intake method of poverty estimation). For this, two 
cutoff points of per capita daily calorie intake are considered: the higher 
one is the same as that used in the estimate of the poverty line by the 
cost-of-basic-needs method and refers to what we call moderate calorie-
intake deficiency, whereas the lower one may be considered to represent 
severe deficiency. In line with the poverty estimates, the proportions of 
people with deficient calorie intake, both moderate and severe, can be 
seen to have declined steadily since the early 1990s (table 3.2).2 It may 
be noted, however, that the extent of this decline is less than the decline 
in the rate of poverty estimated by the cost-of-basic-needs method, 
although the latter relates to the same level of per capita calorie intake as 
that used for defining moderate calorie-intake deficiency. Although this 
inconsistency may be explained by the way poverty estimates differ 
depending on the estimation methodology (Ravallion and Sen 1996), the 
point to note is that the improvements in calorie-intake deficiency seem 
to have been far less encouraging compared with the official poverty 
estimates. 
Particularly since the early 1990s, Bangladesh has achieved rapid 
improvements in many human development indicators, such as female 
Table 3.2 Percentage of Population with Moderate and Severe Deficiency 
in Calorie Intake, 1991/92–2005 
Year
Moderate deficiency 
(< 2,122 kilocalories/person/day)
Severe deficiency 
(< 1,805 kilocalories/person/day)
Rural Urban National Rural Urban National
1991/92 47.6 46.7 47.5 28.3 26.3 28.0
1995/96 47.1 49.7 47.5 24.6 27.3 25.1
2000 42.3 52.5 44.3 18.7 25.0 20.0
2005 39.5 43.2 40.4 17.9 24.4 19.5
Source: HIES, various rounds.
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school enrollment, child mortality, and contraceptive adoption rates. 
These achievements have been possible in spite of widespread poverty, 
low per capita public social spending, and the poor governance of service 
delivery systems in Bangladesh. Much of this progress has resulted from 
the adoption of low-cost solutions, such as the use of oral rehydration 
saline for diarrhea treatment, leading to a decrease in child mortality. 
More progress has come from increased public awareness created by 
effective social mobilization campaigns, such as those for child immuniza-
tion, contraception, or female child enrollment in school.3 But as the gains 
from low-cost easy solutions are reaped, further progress will increasingly 
depend on the amount of public social spending, quality of services, and 
synergies with poverty reduction. Also, in spite of the achievements cited, 
child malnutrition rates in Bangladesh remain among the highest in the 
world, with an estimated 46 percent of children under five suffering from 
malnourishment compared with 27 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(UNICEF 2011).4 As discussed in chapter 2, this problem is common in 
other South Asian countries as well, especially India.
Food Production and Availability
Since the 1970s, the growth of domestic production of food grains—rice 
and wheat combined—has kept pace with or even surpassed population 
growth. Yet the government’s avowed goal of achieving national self-
sufficiency in food grains has remained elusive. Toward the late 1990s, the 
acceleration in rice production led to predictions of achieving the goal of 
self-sufficiency within a short period, but those predictions turned out to 
be too optimistic (figure 3.1). 
Food grain supply and price stabilization remain central to the gov-
ernment’s policy of ensuring food security. The policy has changed sig-
nificantly since the early 1990s. As part of market-oriented economic 
reforms, the public food-rationing system was dismantled and the grain 
trade was liberalized to allow private grain import. The emphasis of 
public procurement and distribution of food grain shifted from support-
ing and stabilizing prices to strengthening social safety nets and disaster 
mitigation programs. Private grain imports helped stabilize prices in the 
domestic grain market by meeting the shortfalls in domestic production 
and preventing the risk of speculative price hikes in the preharvest peri-
ods (Dorosh 2001). The increased domestic production along with the 
liberal import policy also led to a secular decline in real rice prices in 
the domestic market, thus benefiting the consumers. The sense of 
urgency regarding national food security was thus eliminated in spite of 
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the continuation of chronic food insecurity reflected by the large num-
bers of undernourished people cited earlier. 
The global food crisis of 2007−08 has changed all that. Bangladesh was 
severely affected by the food crisis with regard to large grain import bills 
and price volatility in the domestic grain markets. The experience of the 
crisis and its likely repetition has brought the issue of food self-sufficiency 
to the fore again. Although Bangladesh has little prospect of eliminating 
dependence on imported wheat, self-sufficiency in rice is possible given 
the decline in population growth and the fact that, with the increase in 
income, the average diet is likely to become more diversified. But as the 
benefit from the modern high-yield variety (HYV) technology in rice 
production has largely been reaped, maintaining growth in rice produc-
tion will become increasingly difficult. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to the 
adverse effects of climate change will pose an additional challenge. 
According to the official food statistics, per capita availability of food 
grains has shown an upward trend since the mid-1990s, after having 
remained stagnant during the preceding decade or so (figure 3.2).5 The 
increase in per capita income seems to have led to increased demand for 
food grains, which is explained by the fact that a large segment of the 
population still remains calorie deficient and food grains are the cheapest 
source of calories in the diet. 
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Figure 3.1 Production and Import of Rice and Wheat in Bangladesh, 
1980/81–2009/10
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It is noteworthy that the per capita availability of rice increased even 
during the food crisis of 2007−08. The domestic prices of both wheat 
and rice nearly doubled during that time, keeping pace with prices in the 
international markets. The real wages of agricultural day laborers did not 
fall, in spite of this sharp price spike (see figure 3.5 later in this section). 
Although poverty rates were predicted to have been adversely affected 
by the food price increases, not much evidence of that could be found in 
the subsequent poverty estimates, with the poverty head-count rates 
falling more rapidly than ever between 2005 and 2010 (table 3.1). 
Unlike many food-importing low-income countries, Bangladesh thus 
seems to be an exception in demonstrating that poverty can be reduced 
even in the face of sharp increases in essential-food prices, provided that 
adequate food supply can be ensured, economic growth remains robust, 
and enough employment opportunities can be created to keep real 
wages from falling. 
Agricultural Seasonality
Because of the predominance of rice in crop production, agricultural 
seasonality in Bangladesh is mainly determined by the timing of planting 
and harvesting of the three seasonal rice crops: early monsoon aus, late 
monsoon aman, and the dry season boro. Over the years, the relative 
importance of these three rice crops has changed significantly with the 
introduction of modern irrigation along with the HYVs. Although trans-
plant aman rice was previously the main rice crop, the HYV boro rice 
Figure 3.2 Per Capita Availability of Rice and Wheat, 1980/81–2009/10
Source: Food Policy Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Food, Government of Bangladesh.
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now accounts for the largest share of rice output, about 60 percent. The 
spread of HYV boro rice has also diminished the importance of aus rice 
because of the overlapping growing period.
An important outcome of the change in the seasonal pattern of rice 
output is a more even year-round availability of rice from domestic 
production and the consequent changes in the rice price seasonality. 
The preharvest price peaks seem to have become bimodal and less 
marked, thus reducing the extent of the seasonal price spread (see 
Dorosh, Ninno, and Shahabuddin 2004, 61). This change can be seen 
from the average annual cyclical pattern of rice prices estimated for the 
late 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s (figure 3.3). The monthly price 
indexes for each period are calculated as annual averages of the ratios 
of the monthly price to the 12-month lagged moving average; esti-
mates are based on the national average wholesale price of coarse rice. 
No further systematic changes can be detected in the more recent 
years, except for occasional volatility related to changes in prices in the 
global markets. 
Although the change in the rice crop cycle has helped reduce the 
seasonal spread in rice prices, the traditional lean season preceding the 
aman harvest and spreading from September to November has changed 
little in its characteristics. It is the season of the least crop-related activity 
with no major crops planted or harvested, as can be seen from the crop 
Figure 3.3 Seasonal Price Indexes of Coarse Rice, 1977/78–1979/80, 
1980/81–1989/90, and 1990/91–2001/02
115
p
er
ce
n
t
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1970s 1980s 1990s
Source: Dorosh, Ninno, and Shahabuddin 2004.
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calendar shown in figure 3.4. Although the wheat-growing season starts 
in November, the crop is grown in only about 5 percent of the cultivated 
land area. Moreover, the aftermaths of natural disasters like floods, 
drought, or excessive rains are usually felt most severely in this season. 
The cropping patterns in Bangladesh are delicately balanced within 
the natural cycles of rains and annual floods. Thus, farmers’ production 
options and perception of risk are often determined by the physical envi-
ronment: the degree of seasonal flooding, the timing and quantity of 
rainfall, and the soil characteristics (Mahmud, Rahman, and Zohir 1994, 
2000). Investment in irrigation and flood control as well as improvement 
in crop production technology can change the cropping patterns by influ-
encing the physical constraints. Some regions may thus be disadvantaged 
relative to others because of a lack of investment and adverse agrocli-
matic factors. 
Regional Disparity in Poverty: Rangpur and the Rest of Bangladesh 
The main focus of this book is seasonal hunger—locally known as 
monga—in the Rangpur region of northwestern Bangladesh. As men-
tioned in chapter 1, the region not only has lagged in poverty reduction 
compared with other regions, but also has remained particularly vulner-
able to seasonal hunger (Elahi and Ara 2008; Rahman 1995; Zug 2006). 
The phenomenon of monga in Rangpur needs to be understood in the 
context of how a certain region can be disadvantaged because of its 
adverse economic geography and agroecological vulnerability—a recur-
rent theme of this book.
Bangladesh’s impressive performance in poverty reduction, discussed 
earlier, has not been uniform across the country; although overall poverty 
has declined, the incidence of poverty is much higher in lagging regions 
than in others (Khandker 2012; Narayan, Yoshida, and Zaman 2007). 
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Figure 3.4 Crop Calendar of Major Crops
Source: Estimated from the data reported by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (various years).
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Map 3.1 shows the incidence of extreme poverty, as defined in the official 
poverty estimates discussed earlier, in the seven regions surveyed in 2005. 
All these regions are currently administrative divisions (each comprising 
several districts). Rangpur has been given the status of a division only 
recently. 
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Table 3.3 shows the estimates of poverty incidence among the rural 
households in Rangpur compared with the national estimates. The persis-
tently higher incidence of poverty in Rangpur is evident from the esti-
mates. However, along with a fairly rapid decline in the poverty levels 
generally over this period, the relative disadvantage of Rangpur with 
regard to the gaps in the poverty levels has also substantially declined. Of 
course, these estimates do not show how poverty incidence varies among 
other regions of the country or how such disparities are changing over 
time. Besides Rangpur, there are other poverty pockets as well, and new 
ones may be emerging with increasing environmental degradation and 
climatic risks; this topic is discussed in the final chapter of this book.
Earlier in this chapter, the trends in real wages were mentioned in the 
context of Bangladesh’s record of ensuring food security in the face of the 
price volatility in the global food markets in recent years. The disadvan-
tage of the Rangpur region is evident from these wage trends as well. 
Figure 3.5 shows that the agricultural wage rates in real terms have gener-
ally showed an upward trend, but the wage rates in Rangpur have consis-
tently remained lower compared with the country as a whole.6 
Seasonality of Income, Consumption, and Poverty: 
Rangpur and the Rest of Bangladesh 
Given that the rural economy of Bangladesh is predominantly a “rice 
economy,” the important policy question is the following: How much 
does agricultural seasonality matter to the consumption and income pat-
terns of the rural households? And if seasonal poverty or monga is pro-
nounced in the Rangpur region, does it mean that other regions of 
Bangladesh do not experience seasonality in agriculture? As stated in 
chapter 1, more than 70 percent of the population in Bangladesh lives in 
rural areas and nearly 60 percent of the rural workers (and about half the 
Table 3.3 Moderate and Extreme Poverty in Rural Areas of Bangladesh 
and the Rangpur Region, 2000−10
Country or 
region
Moderate poverty head count (%) Extreme poverty head count (%)
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
Bangladesh 52.3 43.8 35.2 37.9 28.6 21.1
Rangpur 70.9 61.0 44.5 55.5 44.2 29.4
Source: HIES, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
Note: The estimates are based on the rural sample of households. The national estimates (that is, for 
Bangladesh) are the official ones; for Rangpur, the authors’ estimates are based on the HIES data. 
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country’s entire workforce) are employed in agriculture as their main 
occupation. 
The extent of seasonality in income and consumption can be shown 
through a disaggregate analysis of income and consumption data by sea-
son. As mentioned in chapter 1, it is possible to derive estimates by region 
and by season from the data of the HIES because the HIES collects data 
at various times of the year across the different regions of the country.7 
For most of our analysis, we divide the country into two regions: Rangpur 
(representing the greater Rangpur region) and the rest of Bangladesh. 
Further, in view of the cropping cycle, four seasons are distinguished for 
the estimates: (a) the boro (winter rice) season of March−May, (b) the 
aus (early rain-fed rice) season of June−August, (c) the preharvest aman 
(the main rain-fed rice) season of September−November, and (d) the 
postharvest aman season of December−February. It may be noted that, in 
addition to the three cropping seasons in Bangladesh, we create another 
season as the pre-aman or monga period to examine whether household 
circumstances and their response behavior differ in this season compared 
with other seasons. 
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Figure 3.5 Monthly Trend in Agricultural Wage Rates of Males (without Meals), 
2007−10
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the official data of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Figures are deflated by monthly rural consumer price index (1995–96 = 100).
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Because the seasonality of poverty and hunger is a rural phenomenon, 
we use data from the rural samples of the HIES of 2000 and 2005.8 Rural 
areas, as defined in the HIES, include semi-urban areas that are outside 
the municipalities. This inclusion is in fact helpful in capturing the sea-
sonality of nonfarm activities in these areas that are often tied with the 
rhythm of the annual agricultural cycle.
The HIES data on household consumption can be estimated by season 
because the information on food intake was collected daily for one month 
for each surveyed household, whereas that on most nonfood consumption 
expenditures was collected at the end of the month for a reference period 
of one month. For only some items of durable nature like clothing, the 
data refer to one year preceding the interview so that the estimates of 
seasonal consumption will capture only the annualized estimates for these 
items. These latter expenditures may have seasonality arising from the fact 
that rural households usually spend more on such items in the postharvest 
seasons or at the time of annual religious festivals. Nevertheless, it is the 
seasonality of recurrent types of expenditure for current consumption 
that is relevant for analyzing seasonal poverty and hunger. The HIES data 
on consumption are therefore particularly suitable for showing the kind of 
seasonality in household consumption that is relevant for our analysis. 
The estimation of seasonal income from the HIES data is somewhat 
problematic, because for all the income data collected, the reference 
period is one year preceding the date of interviews. However, the income 
from crop production can be sorted by season because we know which 
crop is harvested during which months of the year.9 This estimate omits 
income from all other sources, including all wage employment as well as 
employment in noncrop agriculture and off-farm activities. The estimates 
of seasonal income used in this study therefore do not capture the sea-
sonality that may exist in these sources of income. The estimates may still 
be taken as reasonable approximations, given that the annual crop cycle 
is the predominant source of seasonality in rural incomes.
The poverty lines used in the official poverty estimates are estimated 
in a disaggregated way to reflect price variations across the rural and 
urban areas of various regions.10 Also, for the poverty estimates of 2000 
and 2005, the poverty lines and consumption expenditures were esti-
mated at 2000 prices. Because we have used these same price deflators, 
all monetary figures in this book relating to the HIES for these two years 
are at 2000 prices.
The seasonal patterns of household food expenditure in Rangpur 
compared with the rest of the country for 2000 and 2005 are shown in 
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figure 3.6.11 For both years, monthly food consumption per household is 
much lower in Rangpur than in the rest of the country, although the dif-
ference appears to have decreased because of the increase in the level of 
food consumption in Rangpur in 2005 compared with 2000. It appears 
that there is marked seasonality in food consumption for the country as 
a whole, but it is more pronounced in Rangpur. The generally lower level 
of food consumption in Rangpur, along with its sharp seasonality, seems 
to explain the severe food deprivation in this region during monga (the 
third period in figure 3.6). Moreover, as can be seen in figure 3.6, house-
holds in Rangpur seem to recover from the dip in seasonal consumption 
more slowly than in the rest of the country.
If the dip in food consumption expenditure during monga were to be 
accompanied by a seasonal rise in food prices, an even larger decline in 
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Figure 3.6 Seasonal Pattern of Household Food Expenditure by Region, 
2000 and 2005
Source: Khandker 2009.
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food intakes would have occurred, and such price increases would have 
been a further cause for seasonal food deprivation. Using the HIES data, 
we examined the seasonal price movements for rice, which accounts for 
half the food expenditure in Rangpur and two-fifths in the rest of the 
country. Although a seasonal peak in rice price during the (preharvest) 
boro season is observed for all regions and for both years, the monga sea-
son prices were not found to be very different from those of the other 
two seasons. This finding is in line with our earlier analysis about the 
changing patterns of rice price seasonality in Bangladesh (figure 3.4). 
Thus, the income seasonality seems to be the primary reason for seasonal 
food deprivation.
To disentangle food expenditure from prices, we also estimated actual 
food content for per capita calorie intake.12 Figure 3.7 shows the seasonal 
patterns of calorie intake in Rangpur and the rest of the country in 2005. 
As expected, calorie-intake levels are generally lower in Rangpur than in 
the rest of the country. There is also a clear decline in calorie intake in all 
regions during the monga season, but there is also a similar decline in the 
boro season in Rangpur. Two additional points may be noted, particularly 
in the case of Rangpur. First, the seesaw pattern observed in Rangpur sug-
gests that the seasonality in food intake extends beyond monga—with a 
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Figure 3.7 Seasonal Pattern of Calorie Intake by Region, 2005
Source: Khandker 2012. 
48       Seasonal Hunger and Public Policies
fall in the (preharvest) boro season as well, and a rise in both the (post-
harvest) aman season as well as in the aus season (which is the posthar-
vest season of boro rice). Second, for the relatively poorer households, the 
extent of seasonal fall in calorie intake must be much higher than that 
shown in figure 3.7, which depicts the average for all households. 
It is also useful to see how the seasonality in food consumption varies 
across regions in the country. Figure 3.8 shows seasonal variations in per 
capita monthly food consumption for the seven regions of Bangladesh, 
estimated on the basis of the 2005 HIES. The seven regions are adminis-
trative divisions of the country: Barisal, Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, 
Rajshahi, Rangpur, and Sylhet (among which Rangpur has been given the 
status of a division only recently and was previously a part of Rajshahi 
division). The estimates show some variations in the patterns of seasonal-
ity in food consumption across regions, which is explained by regional 
variations in the cropping patterns and the resulting income seasonality. 
But a dip in food consumption during monga or the pre-aman season, 
along with a subsequent recovery after the aman harvest, is common to 
most regions. As expected, the food consumption curve for Rangpur lies 
at the bottom of those for other regions.
The consumption expenditure of rural households is cyclical in 
response to income seasonality arising from the crop cycle. In figure 3.9, 
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the estimates of seasonal monthly household income, food consumption, 
and total consumption are shown together for both Rangpur and the rest 
of the country for 2005. As noted earlier, the estimates of seasonal income 
reflect the seasonality of crop income only, estimated on the basis of the 
timing of the crop harvests. If the incomes from other sources are also 
linked to the crop cycle to some extent, then the extent of seasonality in 
total income has been underestimated. However, the estimates of food 
consumption and total consumption fully capture seasonality, except for 
some nonrecurrent expenditure, such as on durables. 
A distinct pattern of income and consumption seasonality occurs in 
Rangpur and other regions, as shown in figure 3.9. Although the monthly 
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expenditure on food is clearly less than monthly income, total income 
falls short of total consumption during the monga period in both regions. 
But this shortfall in income is strikingly more pronounced in Rangpur 
than in the rest of the economy. The problem lies in the fact that the 
households in Rangpur not only have lower income than households in 
other regions, but also are more dependent on farm income, making them 
more vulnerable to agricultural seasonality.
The fact that seasonality influences household consumption does not 
mean that seasonal poverty will result as a consequence. Similarly, even if 
consumption smoothing varies by region, it does not indicate how much 
poverty is actually caused by seasonality (through either idiosyncratic or 
aggregate shocks). More specifically, the estimates in figure 3.9 cannot tell 
us how many households fall into seasonal hunger or poverty owing to 
seasonality combined with a lack of ability to smooth consumption. To 
gauge that number requires an examination of how seasonality affects the 
ability of households to maintain a minimum livelihood during particular 
times of the year. In other words, how many rural households experience 
a decrease in seasonal income that lowers consumption enough to force 
them below the poverty line? 
Following the official methodology for poverty estimates discussed 
earlier, we have estimated the incidence of moderate and extreme pov-
erty by season for Rangpur and the rest of the country. The official esti-
mates of poverty (called here moderate poverty) are based on the 
cost-of-basic-needs method. For applying this method, one must establish 
the cost of a minimum food basket and then add an allowance for non-
food expenditure to estimate the poverty line. In contrast, extreme pov-
erty is defined as a situation in which a household, with combined 
expenditure on food and nonfood, cannot match the cost of the mini-
mum food basket, let alone remain above the total poverty line. We have 
used the appropriately disaggregated and price-deflated poverty lines to 
derive the respective poverty estimates by season and by region.
Figure 3.10 presents the estimates of seasonal incidence of moderate 
and extreme poverty by region (Rangpur compared with the rest of the 
country) based on the HIES data of 2000 and 2005. The seasonal varia-
tions in poverty incidence are clearly demonstrated by these estimates, 
with poverty generally peaking toward the monga period. However, in 
contrast to the rest of the country, seasonal poverty in Rangpur seems to 
persist even beyond the monga period. The higher incidence of poverty 
in Rangpur than in other regions is also clearly shown, particularly with 
respect to the estimates of extreme poverty.
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Figure 3.10 Seasonal Pattern of Moderate and Extreme Poverty by Region, 
2000 and 2005
Source: Authors’ estimates based on HIES 2000 and 2005 data, rural samples.
Table 3.4 reports the distribution of moderate and extreme poverty for 
rural households, disaggregated by region and season, for 2000 and 2005. 
Three basic trends are observed from these poverty figures. First, 
the poverty situation is worse in the Rangpur region than in the rest of 
the country. Second, the poverty situation is generally worse during the 
monga season than during the non-monga season. And third, the poverty 
situation improves from 2000 to 2005. All these findings conform to our 
earlier findings. 
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Table 3.4 Head-Count Rates of Moderate Poverty and Extreme Poverty 
by Season and Region, 2000 and 2005
percent
Period
Greater Rangpur Rest of the country
2000 2005 2000 2005
Monga season MP = 76.0
EP  = 66.0
MP = 59.2
EP  = 48.3
MP = 59.0
EP  = 43.9
MP = 44.6
EP  = 31.6
Non-monga season MP = 69.4
EP  = 59.4
MP = 61.5
EP  = 43.0
MP = 53.1
EP  = 38.4
MP = 43.1
EP  = 28.6
Number of households 440 520 4,600 5,520
Source: Adapted from Khandker 2012. 
Note: EP = extreme poverty, MP = moderate poverty.
Nature and Extent of Seasonal Hunger in Rangpur 
Estimates of Seasonal Hunger from the InM Baseline Survey, 2006
Besides the HIES data, another data set used for the analyses in this book 
is much more directly focused on seasonal hunger in Rangpur. The base-
line survey administered in 2006 by the Institute of Microfinance (InM) 
covered nearly half a million rural households from 23 upazilas (subdis-
tricts) and some 2,300 villages (after data cleaning, 480,918 households 
are retained for our analysis). These households constitute roughly 
60 percent of all households in the survey villages. The survey covered 
the greater Rangpur region, comprising five administrative districts— 
Gaibandha, Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur.13 
The InM survey was carried out as part of an effort by the Palli Karma-
Sahayak Foundation, the only wholesale outlet of microfinance in 
Bangladesh, to identify the extreme poor who are vulnerable to monga 
and to design and implement appropriate interventions to mitigate monga. 
The extreme poor in the InM survey are identified as those households 
that satisfy at least one of the following criteria: (a) having less than 50 
decimals (0.5 acre) of land, (b) having a monthly income of Tk 1,500 
(equivalent to US$22) or less, or (c) selling labor for daily wage. Of the 
three criteria, the one relating to landownership was found to be pervasive, 
applying to 98 percent of the surveyed households. Although the HIES 
data contain detailed questionnaires about living conditions, the InM sur-
vey contains limited information, with a focus on the extent of seasonal 
food deprivation and the coping mechanisms adopted by the households. 
We have also used data from a much more intensive follow-up survey 
conducted in 2008 with respect to a subsample of households covered in 
the InM baseline survey of 2006.14 
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The InM survey categorizes households in three groups by their food 
deprivation status: starvation (having no meals on some days), meal 
rationing (skipping of one or two meals or having half meals each time on 
some days), and full meals (having full meals usually three times a day). 
This information was recorded for both monga and non-monga periods 
for all households. Figure 3.11 shows the extent of seasonal hunger in the 
Rangpur region as a whole, and table 3.5 provides a breakdown by the 
five administrative districts. 
Both the extent and the seasonality of hunger become strikingly evi-
dent from the estimates presented here, particularly if one takes into 
account the fact that the lean season of 2006 was no different from that 
of a normal agricultural year in Rangpur. The situation would of course 
have been much worse if it were a year of abnormal floods or other natu-
ral calamities. Some 47.0 percent of the households experienced starva-
tion during the monga season, whereas only 4.4 percent had full meals. 
About half the population had to ration meals in both seasons, indicating 
a persistent form of food insecurity among the poor households in the 
Rangpur region. Even during the non-monga season, about 9 percent of 
households experienced starvation—an indication of the dire situation 
among the very poor in that region. The extent of seasonality is evident 
from the very large changes in the category of starvation and full meals 
between the seasons.
Although the entire region appears to suffer from severe forms of food 
insecurity, there are some intraregional differences. The incidence of star-
vation varies from 26 percent to 58 percent across the districts during the 
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Monga and Non-monga Seasons in the Greater Rangpur Region, 2006
Source: Institute of Microfinance baseline survey, 2006.
Table 3.5 Distribution of Poor Households by Food Deprivation Status in the Rangpur Region, 2006
percent
Consumption status Kurigram district Gaibandha district Nilphamari district Lalmonirhat district Rangpur district Rangpur region
Non-monga period
Starvation 2.08 12.18 2.32 14.36 17.10 8.53
Meal rationing 49.36 63.44 32.89 54.78 53.33 50.85
Full meals 48.56 24.38 64.79 30.86 29.57 40.62
Monga period
Starvation 48.47 57.62 26.16 47.95 56.34 47.27
Meal rationing 50.14 40.79 60.37 49.54 40.35 48.29
Full meals 1.39 1.59 13.47 2.51 3.31 4.44
Overall
Starvation 49.68 62.69 27.13 52.07 60.35 50.22
Meal rationing 49.03 36.22 60.11 46.73 37.50 45.97
Full meals 1.29 1.09 12.76 1.20 2.15 3.81
Number of 
observations
120,426 128,987 102,866 56,772 71,867 480,918
Source: InM baseline survey, 2006.
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monga period and from 2 to 17 percent in the non-monga period. Again, 
the extent of full meals varies from 1 to 13 percent during the monga 
period and from 30 to 60 percent in the non-monga period. The 
Nilphamari district seems to be relatively better off, whereas Rangpur 
and Gaibandha are the most disadvantaged districts.
The InM survey data also allow us to construct the distribution of the 
households by defining their overall or year-round meal intake status as 
follows: (a) starvation means experiencing starvation during any period of 
the year (that is, during either the monga or the non-monga period); 
(b) meal rationing means having to ration meals during at least one period 
but avoiding starvation in all periods; and (c) the rest of the households 
have full meals during both monga and non-monga seasons. As table 
3.5 shows, about 50 percent of households experience starvation in at least 
one period; 46 percent ration meals year round without experiencing star-
vation in any period; and only 4 percent have year-round full meals. Again, 
the Nilphamari district seems to be better off than the other districts. 
One indirect implication of these estimates of the overall or year-
round meal intake status compared with those for the monga and non-
monga seasons separately is that most households experience a worsening 
of their situation during monga. In other words, monga represents an 
aggregate seasonal shock. For example, the proportion of households that 
experience starvation in any season of the year (50 percent) is not much 
higher than the proportion that experience starvation in the monga 
period only (48 percent). Thus, about 2 percent of the households 
undergo starvation in the non-monga period only—presumably as a result 
of some idiosyncratic or household-specific reasons.
Why Seasonal Hunger Persists in the Rangpur Region: 
Some Proximate Causes 
The severe and persistent seasonal hunger that is observed in Rangpur 
can hardly occur unless there is a confluence of many adverse factors. 
Some of the factors that put the region at a disadvantage in this respect 
compared with other regions of the country can be readily identified. The 
following are some proximate causes:
• A generally high level poverty, particularly extreme poverty
• Inadequate investments in infrastructure, including electricity, resulting 
in a lack of diversification of the rural economy and limited off-farm 
employment opportunities
• Low crop yields because of poor soil quality (for example, sandy soil)
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• A high proportion of households that are landless and depend on 
income from daily wages
• Low wage rates for both male and female agricultural day laborers
• Risk of floods and river erosion
• Livelihood vulnerability of the people living in the char areas consisting 
of land reclaimed from rivers, including tiny island-like land fragments
• Low inflows of remittances from migrant family members working 
within or outside the country. 
This list is not necessarily exhaustive, but it is based on the evidence 
that is readily available. We have already discussed the relatively high 
incidence of poverty in Rangpur as estimated from the various rounds of 
the HIES. Evidence has also been presented regarding the relatively low 
wage rates in Rangpur (figure 3.5). According to the baseline survey, 
households owned on average only 8.2 decimals (100 decimals make an 
acre) of land, meaning they are virtually landless.15 Among the house-
holds surveyed, 19 percent lived in the ecologically vulnerable char 
areas—presumably compelled by poverty and land scarcity. According to 
the population census of 2001, the proportion of rural households with 
access to electricity varied from 4 to 13 percent among the districts in 
Rangpur compared with 20 percent among all rural households 
in Bangladesh. The official crop statistics show that the yield of aman rice 
in Rangpur is considerably lower than the national average. 
Looking at the pattern of income of rural households in Rangpur com-
pared with the rest of the country provides further insights into the sources 
of their vulnerability to seasonal hardship. Table 3.6 provides such a com-
parison based on the HIES data of 2000 and 2005 (see also figure 3.12).
It can be seen that household per capita income in Rangpur was nearly 
about 70 percent of that in the rest of the country in both years. In addi-
tion, the households in Rangpur draw a higher proportion of their income 
from farming (about 50 percent compared with about 28 percent for the 
rest of the country in 2005). Moreover, the share of crop income in total 
income is also higher in Rangpur.16 
Although remittance income is a significant proportion of income in 
other areas, it is negligibly low in Rangpur (table 3.6). In many areas of 
rural Bangladesh, remittances from family members working abroad is now 
a substantial source of inflow of funds into the local economy, but Rangpur 
is not one of those areas. It is also noteworthy that the receipts from the 
safety-net programs not only are a negligible proportion of total household 
income for all areas, but also are lower in Rangpur than elsewhere on a per 
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Table 3.6 Selected Welfare Indicators of Rural Households, 2000 and 2005
Indicator
Rangpur region Rest of the country Whole sample
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Per capita farm income (A) 
(Tk/month)
269.9 318.3 288.2 256.3 286.5 262.2
Per capita nonfarm income (B) 
(Tk/month)
216.1 258.0 378.2 376.5 363.4 365.2
Per capita nonearned income (C) 
(Tk/month)
130.3 72.0 235.8 294.5 226.2 273.4
Per capita total income (A + B + C) 
(Tk/month)
616.3 648.3 902.2 927.3 876.1 900.8
Share of crop income in total
income
0.168 0.177 0.110 0.123 0.115 0.128
Per capita receipt from remittance 
(Tk/month)
17.9 17.1 106.7 132.6 98.6 121.7
Per capita receipt from safety-net 
programs (Tk/month)
1.8 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.3 3.2
Per capita total expenditure 
(Tk/month)
541.6 630.4 740.5 875.7 722.4 890.2
Sources: Estimated from HIES 2000 and 2005 data, rural samples.
Note: Per capita total income includes farm and nonfarm income (which are receipts from active employment) 
as well as all nonearned income such as receipts from investments, assets, pensions, remittances, gifts/charities, 
and safety-net programs. Safety-net programs are VGD, VGF, IFS, FFW (money), Test Relief, GR, Money for 
Education, RMP, Old Age Pension, Freedom Fighters Pension, and so on. Monetary figures are deflated by the 
consumer price index with base year 2000. 
capita basis. Finally, by comparing total household income and expendi-
ture, one can see that the households in Rangpur have less surplus cash; 
consequently, they have less room to maneuver against any adversities, 
including seasonal stress. 
Another concern is that the rural households in Rangpur depend more 
on the agricultural labor market, thereby making wage income from agri-
culture a higher share of total income compared with the rest of the 
country (figure 3.12). The high dependence of the poor households in 
Rangpur on wage income is also evident from the InM survey, with 
54 percent depending on wage employment and only 16 percent on self-
employment as the main source of income.17 However, agricultural wage 
workers fare worse in Rangpur than do their counterparts in the rest of 
the country in daily wage rates (see figure 3.5). 
The lower wage observed in Rangpur compared with other regions does 
not resolve the problem of lack of employment during the monga season, 
because the observed wage rates are hardly market clearing. The wage rates 
in the informal labor markets in Bangladesh seem to be determined by 
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social norms established in relation to a variety of factors such as subsis-
tence needs, the average living conditions of the locality, and the degree of 
interregional integration of labor markets. The supply-demand situation in 
the local labor market is only part of the story. This can also be seen from 
the relatively low degree of seasonal variation in agricultural wages as 
shown in figure 3.13. The wage rates decline slightly during the monga 
months of September to November both in Rangpur and in Bangladesh as 
a whole, but this decline is unlikely to reflect the extent of the fall in agri-
cultural employment in that season. 
As noted earlier, the seasonal variations in rice prices relative to the 
rice harvesting seasons have been reduced over time (figure 3.3). 
Moreover, the rice market has also become more spatially integrated over 
time so that the higher incidence of poverty in Rangpur cannot be attrib-
uted to higher food prices.18 The poverty line income used in the official 
poverty estimates based on the HIES is in fact slightly lower for Rangpur 
than for the rest of the country for both 2000 and 2005.
If agricultural wages and food prices are not the reasons for the season-
ality of food deprivation in Rangpur, what could then explain it? We 
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Figure 3.12 Breakdown of Household Income by Source in Rangpur and the Rest 
of Bangladesh, 2005
Source: HIES, 2005.
Seasonal Poverty and Hunger in Bangladesh        59
argue that the source of seasonality lies mainly in the lack of employment 
and income-earning opportunities during the monga season. The seasonal 
distribution of employment among poor households in Rangpur can be 
estimated from the InM follow-up survey conducted in 2008 with 
respect to a subsample of households covered in the InM baseline survey 
of 2006. Figure 3.14 shows the estimates of monthly days worked in farm 
and nonfarm sectors by season. The estimates are averages for the entire 
sample of households, whereas the employment patterns will obviously 
be different for different occupational groups within those poor house-
holds. Nevertheless, the results are quite revealing. 
The major source of employment seasonality is the strikingly large 
decline in farm wage employment during the monga season. Moreover, 
within farm employment, wage employment is far more dominant than 
self-employment, which is expected because the survey covered house-
holds with meager amounts of land. Compared with the wage laborers, 
the self-employed in the farm sector can better protect themselves from 
lack of employment; even then, farm self-employment declines in the 
monga season as well. Employment in the nonfarm sector—wage or 
 self-employment—shows only small seasonal variations with no fall in the 
monga season. However, because of the lack of diversification of the rural 
economy, the rural nonfarm sector is not large enough to provide employ-
ment to many farmworkers during a particular season. 
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Concluding Remarks
The seasonality of income, consumption, and poverty is a common feature 
of entire rural Bangladesh, but it is more marked in the Rangpur region, 
where the interlocking of seasonality and endemic poverty results in 
severe seasonal hunger.19 The persistent phenomenon of seasonal hunger 
in Rangpur is explained by the adverse economic geography and agroeco-
logical vulnerability of the region that are reflected in the pattern of 
employment and income-earning opportunities of the poor households.
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As noted earlier, Rangpur in fact features prominently in the famine 
literature; it was among the worst-hit districts in the Great Bengal Famine 
of 1942−44 and was literally the epicenter of the 1974 famine in 
Bangladesh (Alamgir 1980; Sen 1977). Although famine is epochal, sea-
sonal hunger or monga is a recurrent phenomenon; yet famine can be 
seen as the extreme manifestation of the monga phenomenon. The expla-
nation of famines with regard to a lack of entitlement can thus be relevant 
for explaining seasonal hunger as well. For example, monga does not seem 
to be caused by the lack of food availability, but by the failure of the 
income-earning opportunities for the poor.20 Moreover, as in the case of 
past famines in this region, it is the landless agricultural laborers who are 
found to be most at risk. 
But unlike in the case of famine, failure of income-earning opportuni-
ties need not be accompanied by food price inflation to cause monga. That 
is why monga may remain unnoticed as a form of silent hunger, because 
it is the abnormal increases in food prices that usually create public uproar 
and attract the attention of policy makers. This situation also explains why 
the government’s interventions for food price stabilization as a means of 
ensuring food insecurity have not worked to mitigate monga. However, 
poverty reduction generally, along with more integration of labor and food 
markets, is likely to have helped to some extent in reducing the adverse 
effects of seasonality in the country as well as in Rangpur. These factors 
may explain why, since 1974, seasonal hunger in Rangpur has never taken 
on the proportions of famine in spite of the much more severe intensity 
of floods and crop damage than happened in that year. 
Notes
 1. This definition of extreme poverty suggests that even if the entire household 
expenditure is on food, it will meet only the minimum food needs, let alone 
the needs of nonfood consumption.
 2. The estimates for 2010 are not yet available from the published results.
 3. In Bangladesh, the scaling up of programs through the spread of new ideas is 
helped by a strong presence of nongovernmental organizations and by the 
density of settlements and their lack of remoteness (see Ahluwalia and 
Mahmud 2004; Mahmud 2008).
 4. Malnourishment is defined as moderate to severe underweight (weight 
for age).
 5. The estimates are based on domestic production net of wastage and uses for 
seed and feed, offtakes from public stocks net of domestic procurement, and 
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private imports. The population estimates since 2001 are the official pro-
jected ones. 
 6. These trends are the same for the wage rates of female agricultural laborers as 
well, although wages for females are much lower than those for males across 
all regions.
 7. The HIES divides Bangladesh into 23 statistical regions, one of which is the 
Rangpur region. Although different households were interviewed at various 
times of the year, the data can be used for both interseasonal and cross-
regional comparisons because of the random sampling of households by sea-
sonal and regional strata.
 8. The HIES of 2000 included a total sample of 7,440 households, of which 
5,040 were drawn from rural areas. In 2005, the rural sample was 6,040 out 
of a total sample of 10,080 households.
 9. Because the HIES collected households’ crop income by specific crop, the 
income can be distributed by season. Incomes from nonseasonal crops were 
excluded in the estimating of the seasonal crop income in this way. 
 10. Food prices are derived from the household-level information on quantity 
and expenditure, and nonfood price deflators are based on official cost-of-
living indexes.
11. The figures on seasonal patterns of consumption and poverty shown in this 
chapter are based on HIES data and are taken from Khandker (2012). 
12. The methodology of converting food quantities into calories is the same as 
that used in the official poverty estimates based on the direct calorie-intake 
method. The HIES reports food consumption by both quantities and 
expenditures. 
13. The survey covered all the upazilas in the Kurigram and Lalmonirhat districts; 
in the other three districts, selected numbers of monga-prone upazilas were 
covered.
14. Since then, the InM has conducted two more follow-up surveys, in 2009 and 
2010, the overview results of which will be briefly mentioned in the final 
chapter of this book.
15. This finding about landownership was not unexpected given that the amount 
of land owned was used as a criterion for being defined as poor and included 
in the survey. The significant factor to note is that these households consti-
tuted about 60 percent of all households in the survey villages.
16. Crop income does not include wage income in crop production.
17. These estimates include employment in both farm and nonfarm sectors. 
Households earning income from certain sources such as begging, remit-
tances, or safety-net programs are not included in the estimates.
18. For rice market integration, see Mahmud, Rahman, and Zohir (1994).
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19. Ahmed (2000) presents survey-based evidence of seasonal poverty and food 
deprivation in some economically depressed areas in the country, including 
Rangpur. 
20. Note that the word monga does not necessarily mean shortage of food in this 
part of the country; rather, it connotes a lack of purchasing power, income, 
and employment for a large section of people. 
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C H A P T E R  4
Household Vulnerability 
and Coping Strategies
For a proper understanding of the phenomena of seasonal poverty and 
food deprivation, a number of issues relating to the circumstances of 
vulnerable households and their behavioral responses need to be ana-
lyzed. This chapter addresses questions about three such issues. The first 
issue concerns household vulnerability to seasonal food deprivation, 
which in turn is related to the question of to what extent is such depri-
vation predictable and therefore structural in nature. A second issue 
refers to the capacity of poor households to self-insure against seasonal 
income shortfalls. In other words, to what extent is seasonal hunger 
caused by the inability of poor households to smooth consumption year 
round in the face of income seasonality? Yet a third issue relates to the 
coping strategies households may adopt when they actually face sea-
sonal hunger—an issue that is also related to wider livelihood consider-
ations for the poor.
Household Vulnerability to Food Deprivation
The phenomenon of household poverty and hunger can be considered in 
either the ex post or the ex ante sense, that is, either as actual outcomes 
or as future probability. The various measures of household well-being 
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(such as food deprivation of various extents or moderate and extreme pov-
erty) presented in the last chapter are actual or ex post measures. In con-
trast, vulnerability refers to the ex ante measure of future probability that 
takes into account the current characteristics of a household and the likely 
fluctuations in its consumption or income (Chaudhuri 2003; Chaudhuri, 
Jalan, and Suryahadi 2002; Pritchett, Suryahadi, and Sumarto 2000). 
The analysis of vulnerability can be helpful in many ways. For policy-
making purposes, it is important to know who is likely to be poor or food 
insecure in the future. How far poverty or food insecurity is structural in 
nature can be judged by the extent to which the characteristics of the 
poor are found to coincide with those of the vulnerable. In the same way, 
one can also look at whether vulnerability to aggregate shocks such as 
seasonal hunger has the same correlates as those of poverty, in which 
case, seasonal hunger can be said to be structurally determined by pov-
erty in general. It can also be seen that the main difference between 
poverty and vulnerability is the risk or uncertainty related to future well-
being. As such, the analysis of vulnerability is related to the key defining 
characteristics of household food security (see the earlier discussion in 
chapter 2 of this book). 
Seasonal Transition in Household Food Deprivation 
Status in Rangpur
Looking at the movements of households with respect to food deprivation 
status from one season to another can be a way of determining ex ante 
vulnerability to seasonal hunger (Dercon 2002). For such an analysis of 
vulnerability, data can be used from the Institute of Microfinance (InM) 
baseline survey of 2006, discussed in chapter 3. The survey has informa-
tion on household meal consumption patterns at two times—during the 
monga (seasonal hunger) period (September–November) of 2006 and the 
following non-monga period (December–February) of 2006/07. Because 
of this time span, a transition matrix can be used to observe households’ 
movements among various food deprivation statuses from one period to 
another. Such a transition matrix can indicate vulnerability to seasonal 
hunger. Because the InM survey is representative of the bottom 60 percent 
of households in the Rangpur region, the analysis based on this data set 
helps focus directly on the poor and food- vulnerable households.
Table 4.1 presents a transition matrix of household food consumption 
patterns across seasons. It was found that 58.8 percent of the sample house-
holds (shaded in dark gray) were subjected to what we can call a perpetual 
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shortfall in food consumption because these households experienced 
some form of food deprivation in both monga and non-monga seasons. 
Among this group, 5.6 percent of all households faced the most severe 
form of food deprivation because they experienced starvation during both 
periods. In addition, 36.8 percent of the sample households (shaded in 
light gray) experienced occasional shortfall in consumption because they 
experienced meal rationing or starvation during the lean season only. 
It is remarkable that out of the 47.3 percent of households who suf-
fered starvation during monga, the majority (36.6 percent of all house-
holds) experienced meal rationing, if not starvation, during the non-monga 
season. Only less than 5 percent of the households experienced a transi-
tion from the full meals status in the non-monga season to starvation in 
the monga seasons. This is a clear demonstration that the phenomenon of 
monga largely represents an extension of perpetual food deprivation and 
is therefore strongly linked to structural poverty that is aggravated by 
seasonal factors. 
The InM survey data also allow us to look at the households’ own 
perceptions about the perpetuity of consumption shortfall during a future 
monga, which is a subjective way to look at vulnerability. Households 
were asked about the likelihood of their falling into food deprivation dur-
ing the following monga season. Table 4.2 reports this likelihood, grouped 
by the households’ food consumption patterns during the most recent 
monga, that is, by their anticipated future deprivation against their cur-
rent deprivation. 
Among those that face starvation during monga (47.3 percent of all 
households), a large majority (81.6 percent as calculated from table 4.2) 
anticipated that they were very likely to face seasonal food deprivation 
during the following monga, while only 6.8 percent were of the opinion 
that food deprivation was somewhat likely, and 11.6 percent did not 
Table 4.1 Transition of Poor Households in Rangpur between Monga and 
 Non-monga Periods
Non-monga period
Monga period
Starvation Meal rationing Full meals Total
Starvation 0.056 0.029 0.001 0.086
Meal rationing 0.366 0.137 0.005 0.508
Full meals 0.051 0.317 0.038 0.406
Total 0.473 0.483 0.044 1.000
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Institute of Microfinance baseline survey data, 2006.
Note: Number of observations is 480,918.
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Table 4.2 Household Perception of Suffering in a Future Monga by Food 
Deprivation Status during Monga Period
Perception about future monga
Exposure of last monga
Starvation Meal rationing Full meals Total
Suffering is very likely 0.386 0.142 0.002 0.530
Suffering is somewhat likely 0.032 0.222 0.030 0.284
Suffering is not likely 0.055 0.119 0.012 0.186
Total 0.473 0.483 0.044 1.000
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Institute of Microfinance baseline survey data, 2006.
Note: Number of observations is 480,918. 
foresee food deprivation during a future monga. Again, of all households 
that were food deprived during the monga (95.6 percent of all house-
holds), most of them (78.2 percentage points, shaded in dark gray in 
table 4.2) feared possible food deprivation in a future monga, and only 
the remaining 17.4 percent of households (shaded in light gray) did not 
anticipate so. This again is an indication of the perpetuity of food depri-
vation as a structural feature of poverty. As discussed in chapter 2 of this 
book, such perceptions about future risk of seasonal hunger are impor-
tant determinants of how poor households adapt their livelihood sys-
tems to an environment of risk and uncertainty. And this can be part of 
a poverty cycle. 
Estimation of Vulnerability to Extreme Poverty from 
the  Household Income and Expenditure Survey Data
Vulnerability can be analyzed by using the statistical methods of estima-
tion (for example, Chaudhuri 2003). This is done by using data from the 
nationally representative official Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES) discussed in chapter 3 in this book. The vulnerability 
estimates presented here relate to what we call extreme poverty. As may 
be recalled from the discussion in chapter 3, a household is considered 
extremely poor if its per capita consumption expenditure falls short of 
the cost of the minimum food basket as incorporated in the official 
poverty line estimates. Such a household cannot meet its minimum food 
requirements, even if its entire consumption expenditure is only on 
food, and is therefore likely to experience severe food deprivation. 
The vulnerability estimates are made in a way to reflect both the pre-
dicted level and the volatility of a household’s per capita total expenditure 
(see the annex of this chapter for the detailed estimation methodology). 
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The predictions are based on the determining factors at the household 
level (household head’s gender, age, education, employment type, land 
and nonland assets, availability of electricity, and so forth) and at the vil-
lage level (prices of consumer goods, wage, infrastructure, and agroclimatic 
characteristics). Estimates are made separately for Rangpur and the rest of 
the country and, in each case, separately for the monga season and for all 
other (non-monga) seasons combined. Thus, instead of looking at the risk 
of change in poverty status between seasons (as in the earlier exercise), we 
look at the risk in each season separately. 
Table 4.3 shows the estimates of the proportion of households that 
were vulnerable to extreme poverty (EV) in 2000 and 2005, along with 
the proportion of households that actually experienced extreme poverty 
(EP) in those years. The extent of correspondence of the estimates of 
vulnerability to what is actually observed at any time (that is, between 
EV and EP) is an indication of how well the factors considered can pre-
dict extreme poverty, or in other words, how much of the extreme pov-
erty is structurally determined. A divergence between the two estimates, 
however, results from the unpredictable volatility of consumption, and 
thus, some nonvulnerable households may currently fall into extreme 
poverty while some vulnerable ones may escape it.
The estimates in table 4.3 show a much higher incidence of vulnera-
bility to extreme poverty in Rangpur than in other areas of Bangladesh 
in both seasons. As in the case of actual incidence of poverty, the esti-
mates of vulnerability clearly show the disadvantage of Rangpur com-
pared with the rest of the country. Moreover, vulnerability to extreme 
poverty is higher in the monga season compared with other seasons, 
except for Rangpur in 2005. The estimates also show that vulnerability 
to extreme poverty declined in all regions between 2000 and 2005. 
Table 4.3 Incidence of Extreme Poverty and Vulnerability to Extreme Poverty 
by Season, Rangpur and the Rest of Bangladesh, 2000 and 2005 
Period
Rangpur Rest of the country
2000 2005 2000 2005
Monga season (% of households) EP = 66.0
EV = 75.0
EP = 48.3
EV = 35.8
EP = 43.9
EV = 38.0
EP = 31.6
EV = 19.8
Non-monga season (% of households) EP = 59.4
EV = 50.6
EP = 43.0
EV = 37.8
EP = 38.4 
EV = 30.2
EP = 28.6
EV = 16.5
Number of observations 440 520 4,600 5,520
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Household Income and Expenditure Survey data, 2000 and 2005, 
 rural samples.
Note: EP = extreme poverty, EV = vulnerability to extreme poverty.
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The overall picture emerging from the estimates in table 4.3 is that the 
estimated vulnerability index can track actual extreme poverty quite 
well, as can be seen from the close correspondence between the two sets 
of estimates. This implies that extreme poverty in large part is structurally 
determined by household and area characteristics and is therefore pre-
dictable to a large extent. The other notable aspect of these estimates is 
that the proportions of households in extreme poverty are higher than 
the proportions that are vulnerable (with the exception of Rangpur dur-
ing the monga season in 2000). This suggests that because of the unpre-
dictable volatility in income and consumption, households are more 
likely to fall into extreme poverty rather than escape it at any time. Thus, 
although extreme poverty is mainly structural, the consumption volatility 
associated with the risk-prone nature of rural livelihood is also an impor-
tant determining factor.
Impact of Income Seasonality on Consumption and Poverty 
One of the main factors responsible for seasonal poverty and food depri-
vation among rural households is their lack of capacity for smoothing 
consumption in the face of income seasonality tied to the crop production 
cycle. The evidence discussed in chapter 3 clearly suggests that this is 
indeed the case for large numbers of poor rural households in Bangladesh, 
especially in the Rangpur region. In this section, this hypothesis is put to 
a more rigorous statistical test to try to gain more insight into the relation-
ships among income seasonality, poverty, and food deprivation.
Test of Household Capability for Consumption Smoothing: 
The Estimation Model 
Following the standard model used to estimate the effect of income sea-
sonality on consumption, we consider that the outcome variable Cijs (the 
per capita consumption expenditure of household i in village j in season s) 
would depend on total per capita annual income (Y) as well as its seasonal 
shares (y) along with other variables such as prices, preferences, and local 
area characteristics (for example, Deaton 1997; Kazianga and Udry 2006; 
Khandker 2012; Paxson 1993). Consider the following consumption equa-
tion in semi-logarithm form in which seasonal consumption is determined, 
among other variables, by per capita annual income (Y) and its seasonal 
shares (y):
 ln Cijs = at s + b1 ln Yij + b2yijs + gXij + m ij + msj + h j + e ijs , (4.1)
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where Xij is a vector of household-and village-level characteristics 
 (including prices) influencing consumption and income; ts is a dummy 
variable representing the seasons; a, b, and g  are unknown parameters to 
be estimated; and e ijs is a zero-mean disturbance term representing the 
unmeasured determinants of Cijs that vary across households. Note also 
that household consumption is affected by unobserved household hetero-
geneity and village heterogeneity represented by the error terms mij and hj , 
respectively, as well as unobserved season-specific heterogeneity (msj).
Because poverty is defined in terms of a poverty line of consumption 
expenditure, the relationship above can be extended to explain the effect 
of income seasonality on poverty as well. For this, equation (4.1) can be 
converted to a linear probit model of the following form:
 Pr(Cijs < Z) = at s + b1 ln Yij + b2yijs + gXij + m ij + msj + h j + e ijs . (4.2) 
Here, Pr measures the probability of consumption falling below the pov-
erty threshold (Z). Note that in both equations, b1 measures the response 
of seasonal consumption and poverty to total income, while b2 measures 
the response to seasonal income. 
Thus, if b2 = 0, seasonality is not an issue, and seasonal income does 
not track seasonal consumption and poverty, perhaps because a household 
has the ability to smooth consumption through self-insurance and other 
means to compensate for losses in income, if any, during a particular season. 
That is, seasonal consumption depends entirely on year-long income and 
not on seasonal income. This is a case of a perfect consumption-smoothing 
model. In respect to poverty, this means that a household is poor because 
its annual income falls short of the threshold level necessary to be above 
the poverty line and thus does not experience seasonal deprivation as dis-
tinct from chronic or year-round poverty. In other words, the level of pov-
erty observed for this household in the lean season is not related to seasonal 
income but is a reflection of a shortfall in overall annual income. 
In contrast, when b2 > 0, there is a lack of perfect consumption 
smoothing and a possibility of seasonality of poverty determined by sea-
sonality of income, above and beyond the poverty caused by annual 
income. That is, a household that is poor chronically or year round may 
become much poorer during a particular season, and even if a household 
is not poor based on average year-round consumption, it may become 
seasonally poor. However, this situation does not preclude the possibility 
that even the chronically poor may be able to save to manage consump-
tion smoothing, although imperfectly (Deaton 1997). In contrast, it is 
also possible that households veer from the average consumption path 
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that can be supported by their regular income; in such a case, to avoid 
severe seasonal shortfalls in consumption, they may need to rely on addi-
tional sources of funds such as remittances, government handouts, or a 
distress sale of assets. 
Estimation of equation (4.1) or (4.2) is problematic because both 
income and consumption may be jointly affected by unobserved factors 
(such as the household and village heterogeneity represented by the 
error terms m and h, respectively). There is substantial evidence for joint 
dependence of income and consumption (Strauss 1986; Strauss and Thomas 
1995). More specifically, measurement errors in consumption are likely to 
be correlated with measurement errors in income, which may seriously bias 
the estimated coefficients (Deaton 1997; Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997). 
As a way out, we use the instrumental variable method to estimate the 
income variables, both total annual income (Y) and seasonal income. The 
instrumental variables used relate to aspects of the production environ-
ment, such as community infrastructure (the distance to district and 
upazila [subdistrict] headquarters, and the presence of schools, banks, 
nongovernmental organizations, and safety net programs) and agrocli-
matic characteristics (rainfall, land elevation, average number of sunny 
months, share of flood-prone areas, and the amount of excess rain per 
month). The local wage rates are also included among the instrumental 
variables on the basis of the assumption that these influence only income 
and not consumption directly.1
The focus of this analysis is to estimate a consumption or poverty model 
to demonstrate the extent of the net effect of income seasonality on con-
sumption and poverty. To do this, we need to introduce a model with 
common seasonal effects using seasonal panel data (that is, repeated obser-
vations across seasons for more than one year). For this model, we use the 
combined data of the two rounds of the HIES of 2000 and 2005, which 
provide a cross-section of households and villages surveyed across seasons 
over the two years. Because the upazila is the lowest common sampling 
unit for collecting HIES data, we can create the panel at this level and 
estimate an upazila-level fixed-effects regression model.2 This model thus 
can control for upazila-specific unobserved seasonal bias (msj).
3 
Interpreting the Results: How Income Seasonality 
Matters for Seasonal Deprivation 
This section discusses the results obtained from the estimation of equa-
tions (4.1) and (4.2) regarding the effect of income seasonality on 
 consumption and poverty. As before, the country is divided into two 
Household Vulnerability and Coping Strategies       73
regions—greater Rangpur and the rest of the country—and two seasons 
are considered, namely, monga and non-monga.4 It was noted in chap-
ter 3 that because of data limitations, seasonal crop income is used to 
reflect income seasonality. Taking into account the seasonal variations 
in crop income, seasonal income share (y) is thus expressed as the ratio 
of monthly seasonal income to monthly year-round income.5
The estimated coefficients of the consumption equation (4.1) showing 
the effects of overall and seasonal income are presented in table 4.4. The 
consumption equation was estimated separately for seasonal food con-
sumption and total consumption. The results confirm that crop income 
seasonality does in fact affect the seasonality of consumption. As expected, 
per capita seasonal consumption (estimated on a monthly basis) is strongly 
related to per capita year-round income (also estimated as the monthly 
average). For example, a 10.0 percent increase in per capita annual income 
increases per capita seasonal consumption by 6.8 percent and food con-
sumption by 5.7 percent. 
What is more significant for this analysis is that the seasonal variation 
in income (represented by the ratio of monthly income in a season to the 
Table 4.4 Estimates of Log Per Capita Seasonal Consumption 
Selected explanatory variables
Total consumption 
(Tk per month)
Food consumption 
(Tk per month)
Log per capita year-round income 
(Tk per month)
0.687**
(0.111)
0.574**
(0.085)
Ratio of monthly seasonal income 
to monthly year-round income
1.042**
(0.427)
0.600*
(0.311)
Year (0 = 2000, 1 = 2005) 0.267**
(0.085)
0.209**
(0.079)
Year × Greater Rangpur region –0.034
(0.097)
0.108**
(0.053)
R2 0.339 0.232
Hausman F test for endogeneity F(3,7426) = 65.677,
p = 0.000
F(3,7426) = 51.07,
p = 0.000
Number of observations 7,640 7,640
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Household Income and Expenditure Survey data, 2002 and 2005, 
rural samples.
Note: Based on upazila-level fixed-effect regression with panel data. Regressions include other household 
variables (for example, household head’s gender, age, education, and land and nonland assets) and community-
level variables (for example, prices of consumer goods and daily wage). Income variables are treated as 
endogenous and so instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (for example, distance to 
district- and thana-level headquarters, and presence of schools, banks, nongovernmental organizations, and 
safety net  programs) and agroclimatic characteristics (for example, rainfall, land elevation, and average number 
of sunny months). Figures in parentheses are robust/bootstrapped standard error. * and ** refer to a statistical 
significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively.
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year-round monthly income) is also found to be a significant determi-
nant of seasonal food and total consumption. If, for example, this ratio 
increases from 1 (suggesting no income seasonality) to 2 (suggesting a 
doubling of the income in that season) in a season, the estimated coef-
ficients suggest that seasonal food consumption will increase by 60 per-
cent and total seasonal consumption by 104 percent.6 That increase 
implies a very strong relation between seasonal income and seasonal 
consumption, including food consumption.
The statistically significant coefficient of the year dummy in table 4.4 
indicates that seasonal consumption grew autonomously by more than 20 
to 27 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2005. The coefficient of 
the interaction between the Rangpur dummy and the year dummy sug-
gests that this increase was higher for Rangpur compared with the rest of 
the economy for seasonal food consumption, although not for seasonal 
total consumption.7
Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in seasonal consumption 
track seasonal income, indicating that households are unable to smooth 
consumption with crop income across seasons. This contradicts the null 
hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing. The evidence is consistent 
with findings from other countries (for example, Jalan and Ravallion 
1999; Kazianga and Udry 2006).8
The analysis so far does not, however, deal with the question of whether 
income seasonality affects poverty itself. If a lack of consumption smooth-
ing is a major hurdle for many households, particularly among the poor, it 
is expected that income seasonality would also affect the incidence of 
poverty. As already observed in chapter 3, just as consumption is sensitive 
to income seasonality, so is poverty. To estimate the effect of seasonality 
on poverty, we simulate the effects on poverty using the estimates of the 
consumption equation (4.1), as presented in table 4.4, instead of directly 
estimating the probit model represented by equation (4.2). 
The results presented in table 4.5 clearly confirm that there is a nega-
tive effect of income seasonality on all measures of seasonal poverty, 
meaning that a decrease in seasonal income in relation to year-round 
income will increase seasonal poverty, and the reverse is true for an 
increase in seasonal income. This is true for all types of poverty: moderate 
and extreme poverty and food poverty. For example, an increase in the 
ratio of seasonal monthly income to year-round monthly income by 
10.0 percentage points will decrease seasonal extreme poverty by 9.6 
percentage points and moderate poverty by 9.5 percentage points. 
However, with respect to a 10.0 percent increase in year-round monthly 
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income, the estimates of seasonal poverty reduction are 6.1 and 6.4 
percentage points, respectively (table 4.5). Thus, seasonal income has a 
strong effect on seasonal poverty, even though year-round income is also 
an important determinant. 
An incidental but important finding arising from the estimation of the 
seasonal consumption equation (4.1) relates to the levels of per capita 
income estimated by using the instrumental variables. For the estimation 
of the consumption equation, the instrumental variable method had to 
be used to estimate the income variables.9 The instrumental variables 
used relate to the local production environment, including agroclimatic 
characteristics. The estimated per capita year-round monthly income, 
averaged over the households, was about 30 percent lower in Rangpur 
than in the rest of the country for both 2000 and 2005, which is nearly 
the same as the actual observed income disparity between the regions.10 
It is thus remarkable that the economic disadvantage of the households 
in the Rangpur region can be captured by their adverse economic and 
agroecological environment, even when their household-specific endow-
ments are not considered.
Household Coping Strategies 
The Pattern of Coping Mechanisms
With limited ability to smooth consumption in the face of income sea-
sonality, poor households adopt many coping strategies to meet seasonal 
deprivation. Given the severity of seasonal hunger in Rangpur, an analysis 
Table 4.5 Simulated Seasonal Poverty Effects Using the Estimates of Consumption 
Equation Reported in Table 4.4
Income variable Moderate poverty Extreme poverty
Log per capita year-round income 
(Tk per month)
–0.064**
(0.010)
–0.061**
(0.010)
Ratio of monthly seasonal income 
to monthly year-round income
–0.095**
(0.039)
–0.096**
(0.039)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Household Income and Expenditure Survey data, 2002 and 2005, 
rural samples.
Note: Based on upazila-level fixed-effect regression with panel data. Regressions include other household 
variables (for example, household head’s gender, age, education, and land and nonland assets) and community-
level variables (for example, prices of consumer goods and daily wage). Income variables are treated as 
endogenous and so instrumented. Instrumental variables are community infrastructure (for example, distance to 
district- and thana-level headquarters, and presence of schools, banks, nongovernmental organizations, and 
safety net  programs) and agroclimatic characteristics (for example, rainfall, land elevation, and average number 
of sunny months). Figures in parentheses are robust/bootstrapped standard errors. * and ** refer to a statistical 
significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively.
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of the coping strategies of poor households in that region is of particular 
interest in understanding household behavior under extreme conditions 
of seasonal stress. Such an understanding is also important in the design 
of appropriate policy interventions.
Based on the data of the InM baseline survey, table 4.6 provides a 
summary of coping mechanisms adopted by the poor during the monga 
of 2006 in various districts of the greater Rangpur region. These data 
represent approximately the bottom 60 percent of households in the 
region, nearly all of which experienced some form of food deprivation 
during monga. The information on coping mechanisms was gathered 
through the responses to a set of survey questions that referred to the 
monga period only. Thus, although 36 percent of the households in the 
Rangpur region had membership in microcredit programs at the time of 
the survey, less than 6 percent reported taking loans from formal sources, 
mostly consisting of microcredit, during the monga period (table 4.6). 
It can be seen that about 65 percent of the poor households in the 
greater Rangpur region managed to adopt one or more coping methods to 
mitigate the adversity of monga. That means that 35 percent did not, or 
could not, resort to any coping strategy. The coping measures vary consid-
erably among the households. About 30 percent received some support 
(mostly food) during the lean season from government and nongovern-
ment sources (safety net programs). Less than 6 percent obtained loans 
from formal sources (mainly microcredit), and about 12 percent from 
informal sources.11 It is worth noting that a large majority (36 percent) 
sought seasonal out-migration to cope with monga. About 16 percent also 
resorted to the sale of assets or the advance sale of labor and crops. 
The coping mechanisms may also be in part area specific, as can be 
seen from the considerable variations among the five administrative dis-
tricts in the Rangpur region. The variations are quite marked in the 
incidence of seasonal migration, which is the major coping mechanism 
for the entire region. As will be seen from the discussion on this topic in 
chapter 6 in this book, the determinants of seasonal migration can be 
quite context specific, involving a range of household-level and area 
characteristics as well as labor market networks. Another noticeable 
aspect of these interdistrict variations is that the access to formal means 
of coping, including both formal loans and a safety-net type of support, 
is much higher in the Nilphamari district compared with all other 
 districts, and Nilphamari was also found to have the least incidence 
of starvation (see table 3.5 in chapter 3 in this book). This raises the 
 question of appropriate area targeting of programs, a problem that will 
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Table 4.6 Distribution of Households by Coping Measure during Monga in the Districts of Rangpur Region
percent
Coping measures Kurigram district Gaibandha district Nilphamari district Lalmonirhat district Rangpur district Greater Rangpur region
Coping households 63.93 65.34 68.99 72.38 56.35 65.25
 Informal coping 49.63 50.40 44.26 63.06 40.96 48.91
 Advance labor sale 1.60 1.96 6.28 10.50 5.70 4.36
 Advance crop sale 0.45 0.23 0.00 1.09 1.59 0.54
 Asset sale 12.11 17.03 0.00 18.50 10.51 11.35
 Migration 41.82 37.96 24.75 50.37 27.44 35.99
 Informal loan 4.73 7.46 25.28 17.34 11.69 12.38
 Formal coping 31.00 35.58 47.12 27.70 31.87 35.42
  Government and
   nongovernment 
 support 29.17 32.55 41.59 22.96 26.97 31.67
 Formal loan 2.28 4.26 9.90 7.46 7.21 5.79
Noncoping households 36.07 34.66 31.01 27.62 43.65 34.75
Number of observations 120,426 128,987 102,866 56,772 71,867 480,918
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Institute of Microfinance baseline survey data, 2006.
Note: Sum of percentage figures is more than 100 because households adopt multiple coping mechanisms. Most of the formal loans are microcredit.
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be more closely looked at in subsequent chapters of this book. Another 
noticeable aspect of these estimates is that the proportion of households 
resorting to no means of coping is highest in Rangpur, which is among 
the two most monga-affected districts in the region (see table 3.5 in 
chapter 3 in this book). This proportion suggests that a lower adoption 
of coping measures on the whole may indicate more, and not less, need 
for such measures. 
Table 4.7 shows the distribution of households by coping mechanisms 
when the households are categorized by their food deprivation status dur-
ing monga. This gives some idea about the effectiveness of these coping 
mechanisms in reducing the incidence of starvation. Among the house-
holds who either starve or ration meals during the monga period, a large 
percentage (more than 30 percent) did not adopt any coping, which sug-
gests that they probably did not have access to any coping mechanism. 
For example, the proportion of households resorting to asset sale was the 
lowest among households experiencing starvation, perhaps because they 
had very little assets to sell. Another possible explanation is that the cop-
ing options available to the very poor households are likely to be only the 
so-called erosive ones that undermine future livelihood. These house-
holds are often found to be prepared to endure a consid erable degree of 
hunger before resorting to such desperate measures (de Waal 1989). 
Table 4.7 Distribution of Households by Coping Measures According to 
Food Deprivation Status during Monga
percent
Coping measures Starvation Meal rationing Full meals
Coping households 66.36 66.34 63.42
 Informal coping 50.32 48.08 44.13
 Advance labor sale 4.52 4.22 4.18
 Advance crop sale 0.48 0.59 0.58
 Advance asset sale 4.52 9.57 6.89
 Migration 37.46 35.23 28.67
 Informal loan 12.26 12.24 15.23
 Formal coping 36.53 34.31 35.59
Support from 
safety net programs 33.41 30.26 28.63
 Formal loan 4.94 6.21 10.20
Noncoping households 33.64 35.66 8.58
Number of observations 227,307 232,225 21,386
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Institute of Microfinance data, 2006.
Note: Sum of percentage figures is more than 100 because households adopt multiple coping mechanisms.
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It is true that among the households who had three meals a day during 
the monga season, a relatively larger proportion (about 39 percent) did 
not adopt any coping; but many of these households would not probably 
need to adopt any coping measure to mitigate seasonal deprivation. In 
any case, this category of households accounts for only 4 to 5 percent of 
all the households surveyed. The overall picture that emerges from these 
estimates therefore is that the vast majority of the poor households in 
Rangpur adopt some monga coping mechanism and are still unable to 
avoid food deprivation of one form or another during monga. 
Factors That Determine the Choice of Coping Mechanisms
It is not easy to determine what factors influence a household’s decision 
to select a coping strategy to reduce the severity of seasonal starvation. 
For example, not adopting a coping mechanism may reflect that the 
households either did not need any coping mechanism or had no means 
to adopt any. Again, among the coping mechanisms, some are adopted 
only under extreme distress at the risk of erosion of future income, such 
as the sale of assets or informal borrowing from moneylenders at high 
rates of interest. In contrast, other coping mechanisms such as access to 
institutional credit or government and nongovernment support pro-
grams may be clearly welfare augmenting, but the choice here may lie 
less with the beneficiary households than with the institutions that pro-
vide such support. 
From data on the coping patterns of households discussed earlier, four 
major categories of households can be identified by coping strategy: 
informal (27 percent), formal (19 percent), both formal and informal 
(20 percent), and none (34 percent). One can assume that decision mak-
ing by the households relating to these four categories of coping is con-
ditioned by their endowments of physical and human capital along with 
community characteristics. If we assume further that these four catego-
ries of choice are mutually exclusive, a multinomial logit model of the 
determinants of such choice can be estimated.
The results of this multinomial logit model are presented in table 4.8, 
showing the effects of various factors on household decisions regarding 
the choice of one of the three options of coping as opposed to not coping. 
The essence of this framework is to determine how these factors influ-
ence the choice of coping options compared with not coping. 
The results show that some of the socioeconomic factors are impor-
tant determinants of this choice structure. For example, age of house-
hold head, a measure of experience, increases the probability of adopting 
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Table 4.8 Estimates of Marginal MNL Effect of Coping Measures Adopted 
 during Monga
Explanatory variables Informal coping Formal coping Both
Age of household head –0.003** 0.003** 0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00001)
Self-employed head –0.013** –0.004** –0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dependency ratio 0.142** –0.102** 0.106**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Log of landholdings 0.011** –0.011** –0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household that has agricultural 
equipment
0.033** –0.027** 0.057**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household that has transport 
 equipment
–0.020** 0.029** –0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household that has savings –0.031** 0.059** 0.044**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household that has a cow –0.013** 0.009** 0.027**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Village that has access to safety 
net program
–0.026** 0.053** 0.045**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Presence of char land 0.058** –0.047** 0.131**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Presence of microfinance institutions 0.032** –0.004 –0.106**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Percentage of high land in district –0.374** 0.353** 0.055**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Long-term average yearly rainfall in 
district (mm)
0.007** –0.002** 0.001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
N 129,965 91,513 94,775
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Institute of Microfinance baseline survey data, 2006.
Note: Noncoping households (N = 164,665) constitute the base category. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* and ** refer to a statistical significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively; mm =  millimeter; 
MNL = multinomial logit.
either a formal or a combination of formal and informal methods but 
negatively affects the adoption of an informal coping method. The self-
employed are less likely to adopt any method compared with those who 
are wage employed. Those who have a large number of dependents in 
their families are more likely to adopt an informal method—separately 
or along with a formal method—than those who have fewer dependents. 
The size of landholding has a negative effect on either strategy of coping, 
that is, formal alone or formal and informal combined. This may reflect 
the fact that even among the poor households, those with more land 
may be averse to adopting a distress type of informal mechanism, while 
Household Vulnerability and Coping Strategies       81
they are also less likely to be included in the various safety net programs. 
Other assets and savings can also be seen to substantially influence the 
coping decision, although in various ways.
When a village has access to a safety net program, households living in 
such a village are more likely to adopt a formal method over an informal 
method to cope with monga. This suggests that the beneficiaries of safety 
net programs are better able than other poor households to avoid adopt-
ing any informal mechanism under distress. However, the presence of 
microfinance institutions in the village seems to work in the opposite 
direction by making the households more likely to adopt either of the 
coping strategies.
Households living in a village that has char land (land fragments within 
rivers) are more vulnerable and more likely to adopt all measures available 
to cope with monga. Better agroclimatic conditions, such as a high percent-
age of highland, have a favorable effect on adopting a formal rather than 
an informal method of coping. Rainfall seems to have the opposite effect. 
Without going into a detailed discussion of the possible implications 
of all the estimates presented in table 4.8, we can draw some broad con-
clusions. An important finding from these estimates is that there are sig-
nificant variations in the way household coping decisions are made, even 
though the households are all generally poor and happen to live in the 
ecologically vulnerable and economically depressed region of Rangpur. 
Such decisions are significantly influenced by household-specific factors 
combined with socioeconomic and policy variables, resulting in the ques-
tion: How effective are these various coping mechanisms in redressing the 
seasonality of hunger? The evidence so far suggests that the vast majority 
of the poor households in Rangpur remain monga stricken even after 
adopting one or the other coping strategy. For policy making, it is there-
fore important to know how to facilitate the coping mechanisms that 
have relatively more beneficial effects. 
It is not, however, easy to determine the effectiveness of various coping 
mechanisms in mitigating seasonal hunger simply by looking at the data 
as discussed in this section. Because the adoption of various coping 
mechanisms and the outcomes in terms of the household food depriva-
tion status are likely to be jointly determined by the same set of underly-
ing factors, there is a problem in separating cause from effect. This 
problem will be addressed more rigorously in the later chapters of this 
book, which discuss to what extent seasonal migration, microcredit, 
safety net programs, and other government policies and programs can 
address the problem of seasonal poverty and food deprivation. 
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Concluding Remarks
The analyses in this chapter shed light on several features of food depriva-
tion and its seasonality as observed among rural households in Bangladesh. 
Seasonal hunger, or monga, in Rangpur can be seen as part of endemic 
extreme poverty and an extension of year-round food deprivation. The 
households that undergo starvation during monga are also likely to expe-
rience food deprivation, although in a milder from, in non-monga seasons. 
And those who are exposed to starvation during a monga season expect 
to suffer hardship in the next monga season as well. 
The statistical estimates of vulnerability are found to track the actual 
incidence of extreme poverty quite well, suggesting that such poverty, 
whether seasonal or year round, is determined by structural factors and is 
therefore largely predictable. But the estimates also suggest that there is 
considerable volatility in income and consumption, reflecting risks to 
rural livelihoods. Because of such risks, many rural households that 
are not otherwise vulnerable may be pushed into extreme poverty at 
any given time. 
The results of the statistical exercises suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between seasonal income and seasonal consumption, includ-
ing food consumption. Thus, the seasonality of poverty and food depriva-
tion can result from marked income seasonality combined with the 
failure of poor households to smooth consumption year round. The 
analysis of how the poor households in Rangpur cope with seasonal 
hunger provides further insights into the livelihood strategies of the 
poor. The vast majority of the poor households are found to adopt a 
variety of monga coping mechanisms; some of these may be welfare 
enhancing (such as access to social security provided by the government 
and nongovernmental organizations), but others are adopted only under 
distress at the risk of undermining future livelihood. In spite of such 
widespread adoption of coping mechanisms, most of the poor house-
holds cannot avoid experiencing some form of food deprivation during 
the monga season. 
The implications for public policies are threefold: there is a need for 
(a) combining seasonally targeted policies with those aimed at removing 
the underlying structural causes of endemic poverty, (b) reducing income 
seasonality through agricultural and rural diversification and enhancing 
the ability of poor households to insure against seasonality, and (c) help-
ing poor households cope with seasonal hunger so that they can avoid 
taking extreme coping measures under distress. 
Household Vulnerability and Coping Strategies       83
Annex 4A: Estimation of Rural Households’ Vulnerability to 
Extreme Poverty in the Monga and Non-monga Seasons in 
Rangpur and the Rest of Bangladesh
Vulnerability of a household is formally defined by the future probability 
of having a shortfall from a measure of well-being such as the poverty line 
consumption expenditure. In practice, it is often measured by the cumu-
lative distribution function of consumption shortfalls, normalized by the 
variance of the error term of the consumption equation. More formally, 
if cit represents the consumption level of household i during time t against 
the poverty line zit, its vulnerability (V) is given by
 Vit = Pr[cit < zit] = Pr[ln(cit) < ln(zit)], (4A.1)
and the index of such vulnerability is given by
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where X is a vector of household and community characteristics used in 
the consumption equation, βˆ is an estimate of the vector of parameters 
influencing consumption, θˆ is the estimate of the variance of the error 
term of the consumption equation, f it(.) is the cumulative normal distri-
bution function, and xit is given by
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Here, it is assumed that ln(cit) is normally distributed in a large sample 
with a mean of Xit βˆ  and a variance of Xitθˆ . Further details of this formu-
lation can be found in Chaudhuri (2003) and Khandker (2006). 
In using the data on household consumption expenditure, one can 
calculate the food vulnerability index of a household as defined by equa-
tion (4A.2), which gives its probability of being in extreme poverty based 
on its current characteristics. First, this requires the estimation of a house-
hold consumption function, based on all household-level and local area 
characteristics. Next, the squared residuals are regressed against the same 
household-level and area characteristics to get the estimated variance. 
Finally, the vulnerability index is computed as the right-hand side of 
equation (4A.2). It may be noted that the vulnerability index, thus calcu-
lated, varies from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates nonvulnerability and 1 indi-
cates maximum vulnerability. From this broad spectrum of probabilities, 
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vulnerable households are identified by setting a cutoff value of the 
index, which requires some judgment. Following a common practice, the 
cut-off value is set at 0.5 in the present exercise. A household is consid-
ered to be vulnerable if its vulnerability index is higher than 0.5 and 
nonvulnerable otherwise. 
The data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, as 
discussed in chapter 3 in this book, can be used to estimate the household 
consumption function and the implied vulnerability index. For this esti-
mation, household per capita consumption expenditure (log form) is 
regressed against the household-level and village characteristics that can 
be obtained from the HIES data. The estimates are made separately for 
Rangpur and the rest of the country, and in each case, separately for the 
monga (seasonal hunger) season and for all other (non-monga) seasons 
combined. However, the variance of the error term is estimated by pulling 
together the estimates for both monga and non-monga seasons, implying 
that no distinction is made between the seasons in this regard. 
The HIES of 2000 and 2005 can provide panel data for the two years 
at the upazila (subdistrict) level (because the upazila is the sampling 
unit for the survey) so that a fixed-effects regression model can be 
applied for estimating the consumption function. The use of the model 
makes it possible to eliminate any unobserved time-invariant common 
effects at the upazila level. The use of such upazila-level fixed-effects 
models in other contexts is further discussed in this chapter and in chap-
ter 5 in this book.
Notes
 1. Here we rely on the assumption of a perfect substitutability model of income 
and consumption with an active labor market to justify the instrumental vari-
able method (cf. Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986). 
 2. An upazila is a subdistrict consisting of 10–12 unions, while a union consists 
of 10–12 villages. In 2005, some upazilas were newly created and could not 
be matched with the 2000 data. Merging data at the upazila level over the 
two years results in a common set of 184 upazilas included in the upazila-
level panel.
 3. The ideal panel should be at the household level, meaning the same  households 
were interviewed in different seasons over two years. To apply the upazila-
level fixed-effects method, we first multiply an upazila dummy by a seasonal 
dummy to create an upazila-seasonal dummy. Because we have two seasons 
(monga and non-monga), the difference between these  upazila- seasonal 
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 dummies cancels out the seasonal-specific unobserved effect within an upazila 
(msj). Because these upazila-seasonal dummies are also observed in two years, 
the  difference between them in two years cancels out upazila-specific fixed 
effects (hj).
 4. As noted in chapter 3 of this book, there are four distinct agricultural seasons, 
but here the three non-monga seasons are collapsed into one. 
 5. The estimation of seasonal income from crop production was discussed in 
chapter 3 of this book. Nonseasonal crops such as sugar and tobacco, which 
are rather minor crops in Bangladesh, are not included in the estimates of 
seasonal crop income. 
 6. This particular interpretation of the value of the estimated coefficients of the 
income seasonality variable is derived from the semilogarithmic form of the 
equation in which the value of the coefficient represents the proportionate 
change in the dependent variable with respect to a unitary change in the 
explanatory variable.
 7. The inclusion of a dummy for the monga season and another for the interac-
tion of the monga dummy with a Rangpur dummy yielded no significant 
regression coefficients. This suggested that there were no significant effects of 
any income seasonality other than what was captured by the seasonality of 
crop income either for the entire country or for Rangpur in particular. For 
details of these exercises, see Khandker (2012). 
 8. This finding contradicts the findings of Paxson (1993) for Thailand and those 
of Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) for India. 
 9. The use of the instrumental variable method was also justified by the 
Hausman F test for endogeneity; see table 4.4.
 10. See table 3.6 in chapter 3 in this book. For the estimates of instrumented 
incomes, see Khandker (2012).
 11. The majority of informal loans (about 50 percent) are from relatives, friends, 
and neighbors. The rest of the lenders consist of informal moneylenders, land-
lords, shopkeepers, employers, and input suppliers.
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C H A P T E R  5
Effects of Policies and Programs
Some Preliminary Findings
In the previous chapters, we observed that the seasonality of poverty and 
food deprivation is a major concern among rural households across all 
regions in Bangladesh, but it is much more pronounced in Rangpur than 
in other regions. What can be done to mitigate seasonal deprivation as 
persistent and widespread as in Rangpur? The analyses of the underlying 
causes point to some policy approaches. The basic hypothesis is that 
because seasonal poverty adversely interacts with chronic poverty and 
because it represents aggregate shocks to which certain households are 
more vulnerable than others, the mitigating policies must be broad based 
as well as targeted. Thus, such broad-based policies could be, for example, 
infrastructural development programs that help promote income diversi-
fication and overall income growth. In contrast, targeted policies such as 
Food for Work (FFW) or other kinds of public food distribution or cash 
transfers could focus on the vulnerable households, particularly during 
the lean season. Other policies for creating income-earning opportunities 
for the poor, such as through the provision of microcredit, could both be 
targeted and have a broader and longer-term effect on poverty. 
In this chapter, we examine some evidence of how policies and pro-
grams may help mitigate seasonal poverty and hunger. For this analysis, we 
use the data sources discussed in chapters 3 and 4 of this book—namely, 
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(a) the 2000 and 2005 rounds of the official Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) and (b) the Institute of Microfinance’s base-
line survey of 2006 conducted in the Rangpur region. We also address 
related questions of why policies differ by region and what role is played 
by economic geography. Because seasonal hunger (or monga, as it is called 
in Rangpur) is determined by the interactions of the economic and agro-
ecological factors that characterize a rural economy, we need to under-
stand how certain regions such as Rangpur differ from other regions in 
access to public policies and programs. Previous chapters already observed 
that, compared with other regions, households in Rangpur are found to 
have less access to nonfarm sources of income, including remittances, and 
they are also disadvantaged by less access to formal credit, electricity, and 
other infrastructural facilities. 
How Agroclimatic Factors Affect Public Policies and Poverty
The agroclimatic endowments and location factors characterizing a 
region may affect income, consumption, and poverty in more than one 
way. Besides having a direct effect on the livelihoods of the local people, 
these factors may perpetuate a region’s economic disadvantage by indi-
rect ways as well. The reason is these factors determine agricultural and 
other opportunities of a region, thereby affecting both public and private 
investments (Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993). Thus, the 
fact that Rangpur has poorer agroclimatic endowments than do other 
regions may explain why investments in, say, roads, markets, irrigation, 
and banks are lower in Rangpur, which in turn adversely affect the inci-
dence of poverty and its seasonality.
Figure 5.1 shows how the same agroclimatic endowments affect 
income, consumption, and poverty through various pathways and can thus 
perpetuate the disadvantage of an agroecologically vulnerable region like 
Rangpur. Figure 5.1 also shows that those agroclimatic factors affect 
income, consumption, and poverty directly as well as indirectly through 
influencing public investment and policies as well as private investment. 
Public investments also have an indirect reinforcing effect by influencing 
the returns to private investments. This indirect effect also creates a prob-
lem of estimating the effect of public policies and programs independently 
of the direct and indirect effects of the agroclimatic factors; we shall 
return to this problem of estimating policy effect in the next section.
It is important for policy makers to know the biases created by 
 agroclimatic factors in the placement of public programs, such as for 
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 infrastructure development, service delivery, and poverty alleviation. The 
hypothesis is that the placement of these programs is not random but is 
influenced by agroclimatic and other local area endowments, which also 
affect the economic opportunities in a given locality, for example, an 
upazila (subdistrict) or a village. The better-endowed upazilas or villages 
are sometimes the likely targets (for example, public investments in roads 
may seek areas with better terrain and higher economic potential), 
whereas other public programs, such as those providing social safety nets 
for the poor, may target poorly endowed areas. Furthermore, local agrocli-
matic characteristics are also likely to be correlated with other potentially 
unobserved community features that could affect program placement, 
such as local political influence; in such a case, the distance of the village 
from the upazilas or district headquarters may be a good proxy variable 
(Binswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig 1993). 
As discussed in chapter 4 of this book, the HIES data of 2000 and 
2005 can provide upazila-level annual panel data for the two years. Thus, 
an upazila-level fixed-effects regression model was found appropriate for 
explaining the variation in the placement of policies and programs over 
this period. It may be noted that the use of the panel data makes it pos-
sible to estimate the effects of the observed upazila-level local character-
istics (along with household characteristics) while eliminating those of 
the unobserved ones. For the estimation of the model, a distinction has to 
be made between the time-varying and time-invariant area characteristics 
(the latter interact with the year dummy so that their effects are not 
eliminated by differencing between the years).1 
agroclimatic
endowments 
public infrastructure
investment and other
policies  
income,
consumption,
and poverty  
private
investment  
Figure 5.1 Pathways of How Agroclimatic Endowments Affect
Public  Policies and Poverty 
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Table 5.1 presents these estimates. These results may be interpreted in 
many potential ways because the effects of the local area endowments— 
agroclimatic or otherwise—are found to vary substantially across differ-
ent policy interventions. For example, the risk of flood potential had a 
statistically significant detrimental effect on the  expansion of schools 
and financial institutions, but not on the expansion of electrification or 
Food for Work programs. Medium-high land areas experienced higher 
growth of electricity coverage but lower rates of expansion in the other 
interventions. Areas with excess rains attracted more schools but were 
disadvantaged with respect to expansion of the other interventions. 
As expected, a significant adverse relation was found between expan-
sion in electrification and the remoteness of the village from the district 
 headquarters. 
Although we do not go into detailed interpretations of the above 
results, there is enough support for the hypothesis that program place-
ment is not random, but it may be biased against agroecologically disad-
vantaged regions like Rangpur. This bias may explain in part why such 
regions cannot easily escape the trap of persistent seasonal and chronic 
poverty. A twofold policy approach may be needed to overcome such a 
poverty trap. First, the adverse effects of agroecological vulnerability may 
be mitigated to some extent by public policy measures, such as for flood 
protection or introduction of crop production technologies that are par-
ticularly suitable for such regions. Second, policy makers need to make a 
conscious effort to target the disadvantaged regions in the placement of 
programs for infrastructure development or for the provision of public 
services, including social safety nets. 
Estimates of the Effect of Policies and Programs 
Having established that agroclimatic factors matter in policy and program 
placements, we now estimate how income seasonality and poverty are 
affected by public policies and programs net of the effects of agroclimatic 
endowments. The aim is to determine the mechanisms through which a 
range of infrastructure and credit policies have affected growth in house-
hold income and its seasonal shares, and also whether these policies have 
led to a significant reduction of seasonal and chronic poverty. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the joint determination of pro-
gram placement and the outcomes of interest, such as household income 
and consumption, causes an estimation problem. To resolve this estima-
tion bias, we again use the upazila-level panel data obtained from the 
Table 5.1 Agroclimatic Effects on Placement of Programs and Policies
Household 
has  electricity
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Village has a 
 primary school
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Village has an agri-
cultural bank
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Village has Grameen 
Bank
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Village has 
FFW program 
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Year (0 = 2000, 1 = 2005) 0.240**
(0.082)
−0.323
(0.280)
0.459
(0.343)
1.301**
(0.356)
0.446
(0.425)
Village distance to district headquarters (km) −0.003**
(0.001)
−0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.005)
Average monthly rainfall during the season (mm) −0.00002
(0.0001)
−0.00002
(0.0001)
−0.00003
(0.0002)
0.00002
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
Number of sunny months per year × year −0.015*
(0.009)
0.096**
(0.30)
0.019
(0.035)
−0.056
(0.038)
−0.045
(0.045)
Proportion of high land × year −0.169**
(0.073)
−0.693**
(0.250)
−0.356
(0.304)
−0.543*
(0.318)
−0.652*
(0.377)
Proportion of medium-high land × year 0.167**
(0.081)
−0.493*
(0.277)
−0.953**
(0.338)
−0.896**
(0.351)
−0.502
(0.418)
Proportion of flood-prone area × year 0.060
(0.048)
−0.469**
(0.163)
−0.417**
(0.200)
−0.435**
(0.207)
0.095
(0.25)
Excess rain per month (mm) × year −0.00004*
(0.00002)
0.002**
(0.0007)
0.0002
(0.001)
−0.002*
(0.001)
−0.002
(0.002)
R2 0.038 0.168 0.045 0.079 0.261
Source: Khandker 2009. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * and ** refer to a statistical significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively. Number of observations is 7,640.
FFW = Food for Work; km = kilometer; mm = millimeter.91  
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HIES of 2000 and 2005 to estimate a fixed-effects regression model. 
Household outcome variables are estimated by using household charac-
teristics, such as their human and physical capital endowments along with 
access to public policies and programs, as explanatory variables, but 
excluding time-invariant agroclimatic area characteristics. This approach 
is equivalent to running a reduced-form equation in which income, con-
sumption, or poverty is expressed as a function of all price and nonprice 
exogenous policy variables, such as public infrastructural and credit-
related investments (for details, see Khandker 2009).
The regression results of consumption, income, and poverty equations 
showing the effect of public policies and programs are presented in 
table 5.2. The income and consumption equations are estimated in semi-
logarithmic form (that is, income and consumption are in the log form), 
whereas poverty estimates are derived from the probability of consump-
tion’s falling below the respective poverty thresholds of consumption. 
The results relating to the effects of household characteristics (such as the 
age of the household head or the ownership of land and other assets), 
though important, are not reported here because they are not of primary 
interest for this analysis. Overall, the results are fairly robust both in the 
statistical significance of the estimates and in the implied effect of policy 
interventions.
As noted in chapter 3 of this book, the definition of moderate poverty 
is based on the official poverty line, which includes the cost of a mini-
mum food basket—also called the food poverty line—and an allowance 
for nonfood expenditures. Extreme poverty, in contrast, is defined by the 
household’s total consumption expenditure on food and nonfood falling 
short of the food poverty line. 
The results indicate a strong positive effect of human capital invest-
ments on household welfare. Each additional year of education for the 
head of household can be seen to increase total per capita expenditure 
by 2.4 percent and food consumption by 1.1 percent, thus reducing 
 moderate poverty (by 2.5 percentage points) and extreme poverty 
(by 3.0 percentage points). Moreover, although per capita income is 
increased, its seasonality is reduced, presumably because education helps 
income diversification. Another finding is that those villages with a pri-
mary school are likely to have extreme poverty reduced by 4.3  percentage 
points. Although the presence of primary schools does not contribute to 
the educational attainments of the current workforce, it may be an indi-
cator of the general educational level of the locality. 
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Table 5.2 Effects of Policies and Programs on Household Income, Consumption, and Poverty
Selected explanatory variables
Income estimates Consumption estimates Poverty estimates
Per capita 
total income
 Crop income 
share
Total 
consumption
Food 
consumption
Moderate 
poverty
Extreme 
poverty
Household head’s education (years) 0.025**
(0.003)
−0.001**
(0.004)
0.024**
(0.001)
0.011**
(0.001)
−0.025**
(0.001)
−0.030**
(0.002)
Household with electricity (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.228**
(0.021)
−0.008**
(0.003)
0.163**
(0.013)
0.081**
(0.011)
−0.146**
(0.011)
−0.184**
(0.014)
Proportion of irrigated land in village −0.035
(0.046)
0.031**
(0.007)
−0.011
(0.026)
0.031**
(0.014)
0.013
(0.031)
0.016
(0.038)
Village with any primary school (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.009
(0.045)
−0.003
(0.007)
0.036
(0.027)
0.074**
(0.024)
−0.036
(0.027)
−0.043
(0.033)
Village with Grameen Bank (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.011
(0.035)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.044**
(0.020)
−0.001
(0.017)
−0.045**
(0.021)
−0.053**
(0.025)
Village with FFW program (1 = yes, 0 = no) −0.023
(0.027)
−0.010**
(0.004)
0.069**
(0.016)
0.075**
(0.014)
−0.073**
(0.017)
−0.081**
(0.019)
Village with VGF program (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.066**
(0.024)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.027*
(0.014)
0.044**
(0.013)
−0.029*
(0.015)
−0.034
(0.018)
R2 0.253 0.165 0.371 0.249 — —
Number of observations 7,640 7,640 7,640 7,640 7,640 7,640
Source: Khandker 2009.
Note: Estimated from a fixed-effects regression model using upazila-level panel data of 2000 and 2005. Regressions include other household variables (for example, household head’s 
gender, age, education, and land and nonland assets) and time-varying community-level variables (for example, prices of consumer goods and daily wage). Income and consumption are 
in the log form. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * and ** refer to a statistical significance of 10% and 5% or better, respectively. Crop income refers to seasonal crops. 
FFW = Food for Work, VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding.
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The results above, along with those regarding the effects of land and 
nonland assets (not shown in table 5.2) suggest that a lack of human and 
physical capital is a major source of both structural and seasonal poverty. 
Between land and nonland assets, the latter have stronger positive 
effects on consumption and negative effects on poverty. For example, a 
1.0  percent increase in the size of a landholding reduces extreme pov-
erty by 3.2 percentage points, whereas a similar increase in nonland 
assets reduces extreme poverty by 12.8 percentage points. Nonland 
assets also help reduce income seasonality. Therefore, a policy that stipu-
lates asset transfers to the poor as a way to mitigate monga is likely to 
have more beneficial effects if it focuses on transfer of assets other than 
land. This outcome should also be true for programs like microcredit 
that encourage asset accumulation by the poor. 
The estimates in table 5.2 also show that electrification has the 
expected substantial positive effects on consumption and, hence, negative 
effects on poverty and seasonal food deprivation. Households with elec-
tricity are likely to have their per capita total consumption increased by 
16.3 percent, moderate poverty reduced by 14.6 percentage points, and 
extreme poverty by 18.4 percentage points. Electricity connection pro-
vides opportunities for expansion of both farm and nonfarm income, 
which ultimately helps increase consumption and thus reduces poverty 
and seasonal deprivation. 
The provision of irrigated land in the village is found to enhance food 
consumption by 3.1 percent. However, it also increases the share of 
income from crop production, thus contributing to income seasonality. 
This result is expected because the contribution of irrigation is realized 
through increased crop production. This is a reminder of the fact that 
income seasonality by itself does not lead to adverse outcomes like sea-
sonal hunger; much will depend on whether the seasonality of income 
arises from improved crop production technology that contributes to the 
overall prosperity of the local economy or from lack of diversification of 
the rural economy in an economically depressed locality.
Public investments on physical infrastructure, such as rural electrifica-
tion and irrigation, can thus have substantive payoffs in poverty reduc-
tion. Rural road expansion is another public investment that may have 
beneficial effects on poverty. However, the HIES data do not provide 
information on rural roads. But given that the expansion of rural electri-
fication or access to Grameen Bank is likely to follow rural road expan-
sion, the effects of these interventions may capture in part the effect of 
roads. 
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Another important finding is that although the presence of agricultural 
banks does not seem to have any significant effect on consumption and 
poverty (not shown in table 5.2), microcredit programs can have signifi-
cant beneficial effects. Thus, Grameen Bank’s presence in the village is 
found to increase total consumption (by 4.4 percent) and hence reduce 
both moderate poverty (by 4.5 percentage points) and extreme poverty 
(by 5.3 percentage points). These estimates are similar to those of 
Khandker (2005), who estimated the effect of microcredit on  village-level 
poverty using household-level panel data. 
Among the social safety-net programs, the FFW program contributed 
substantially to overall per capita total consumption (by 6.9 percent) and 
food consumption (by 7.5 percent), with a consequent reduction of mod-
erate poverty (by 7.3 percentage points) and extreme poverty (by 
8.1 percentage points). Moreover, the extent of income seasonality is also 
reduced. Thus, the FFW program seems to be appropriate for addressing 
seasonality in both income and consumption as well as for containing 
seasonal and overall poverty. The Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) pro-
gram also increases per capita total consumption and food consumption 
by 2.7 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. This increase in turn reduces 
moderate poverty and extreme poverty by 2.9 and 3.4 percentage points, 
respectively.2 
Do some of these programs have a particularly beneficial effect on 
consumption and poverty during the lean season? To demonstrate 
whether this was the case, the study obtained regression results by using 
a monga dummy variable that interacts with program variables, such as 
Grameen Bank, FFW, and VGF (results are not shown here). The results 
support that access to Grameen Bank and FFW during the monga season 
contributes substantially to both food expenditure and total consumption 
per capita. Even though these beneficial outcomes are estimated on an 
annual basis, the results suggest that access to these interventions during 
the monga season can have an added beneficial effect. 
The implications of the findings discussed above can be put into a 
policy framework as shown in table 5.3. 
Seasonal Hunger in Rangpur: Determining Factors 
and Policy Effects 
The findings in the previous section do not directly address the problem 
of monga in Rangpur. Can the public programs and policies discussed 
earlier be expected to work as well in Rangpur as in other parts of the 
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country? Answering this question is important for designing policies for 
mitigating monga. For example, if microcredit indeed helps reduce the 
severity of food deprivation, the microcredit programs need to be 
strengthened in lagging regions like Rangpur. This section uses the 
Institute of Microfinance baseline survey data to determine what factors 
underlie the phenomenon of monga and what policies and programs 
could be effective in reducing its extent and severity. 
Using the reported food deprivation status of the households during 
monga, we can construct an ordering of outcome as follows: 1 = house-
hold suffers starvation during monga, 2 = household rations meals during 
Table 5.3 Policy Framework to Reduce Poverty 
Policy variable Action
Effect or outcome
Extreme 
poverty
Moderate 
poverty
Household head’s 
education (mean = 
2.76 years)
Increase years of 
schooling of household 
head by one year
Reduction by 
3 percentage 
points
Reduction by 
2.5 percentage 
points
Household with 
electricity (mean = 
24 percentage points)
Increase electricity access 
of household by 
10 percentage points 
Reduction by 
0.9 percentage 
point
Reduction by 
1.4 percentage 
points
Proportion of irrigated 
land in the village 
(mean = 61 percentage 
points)
Increase proportion 
of irrigated land 
in the village by 
10 percentage points
— —
Village with any primary 
school (mean = 
89 percentage points)
Increase number of 
villages having 
primary school by 
10 percentage points
— —
Village with Grameen 
Bank (mean = 18 
percentage points)
Increase number of 
villages having 
Grameen Bank by 
10 percentage points
Reduction by 
0.5 percentage 
point
Reduction by 
0.5 percentage 
point
Village with VGF 
program (mean = 
62 percentage points)
Increase number of 
villages having 
VGF program by 
10 percentage points
Reduction by 
0.3 percentage 
point
Reduction by 
0.3 percentage 
point
Village with FFW 
program (mean = 
40 percentage points)
Increase number of 
villages having 
FFW program by 
10 percentage points
Reduction by 
0.8 percentage 
point
Reduction by 
0.7 percentage 
point
Source: Based on the regression results reported in table 5.2. 
Note: — = not statistically significant effect; FFW = Food for Work; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding.
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monga, and 3 = household has full meals during monga. This ordering 
represents a measure of severity of seasonal food deprivation. Because 
this outcome variable is an ordered variable (meaning outcome 3 is better 
than outcome 2, and outcome 2 is better than outcome 1), an ordered 
logit model is suitable for estimation purposes.3 
If i denotes the individual ordered values of an outcome (for example, 
starvation, meal rationing, and so forth), then the probability of a given 
observation in an ordered logit model is given by 
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(5.1)
where k0 is defined as −∞ and kk is defined as +∞, x is a set of explanatory 
variables (including policy variables, such as microcredit or safety-net 
programs), and b is the parameter to be estimated. However, for the pur-
pose of our analysis, we are interested more in the change in the probabil-
ity of an outcome with respect to a change in explanatory variables 
(marginal effect) than in the probability itself. 
The estimation of the above ordered logit model with cross-sectional 
data involves the problem of endogeneity of policy interventions, such as 
microcredit and safety-net programs. However, we have used the fixed-
effects method with the union-level data to control for any unobserved 
union-level heterogeneity (a union is the lowest administrative unit, 
below upazila or subdistrict, and contains about 10 to 12 villages). The 
estimated equation also included district-level rainfall information as an 
additional control. Nonetheless, because we cannot control for program 
endogeneity (owing to lack of suitable instrumental variables or panel 
data at the household level), we investigated the correlation of the resid-
uals of the estimates of equation (5.1) with the respective policy vari-
ables. For each of the policy variables representing the presence of 
Grameen Bank and the VGF program, the correlation was found to be 
negative but statistically insignificant. That is, if any bias remains because 
of endogeneity of village-level program placement, the effects of policy 
variables using the union-level fixed-effects method are, at worst, under-
estimated.
Table 5.4 presents ordered logit estimates (the first column) and the 
derived estimates of marginal effects of the explanatory variables for the 
three outcomes considered (in the second, third, and fourth columns). As 
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Table 5.4 Determinants of Food Consumption Status During Monga in Greater Rangpur
Explanatory variables
Ordered logit 
estimates of 
food deprivation
Marginal effects on Means of 
explanatory 
variablesStarvation
Meal
 rationing
Full
 meals
Household head’s age (years) −0.006**
(0.0003)
0.002**
(0.0001)
−0.002**
(0.0001)
−0.0001**
(0.00001)
39.98
(12.68)
Dependency ratio −0.017
(0.017)
0.004
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.0003
(0.0003)
0.63
(0.21)
Log of land asset (decimal) 0.241**
(0.003)
−0.060**
(0.001)
0.056**
(0.001)
0.005**
(0.0001)
8.20
(12.59)
Household head who is self-employed 0.143**
(0.011)
−0.036**
(0.003)
0.033**
(0.003)
0.003**
(0.0002)
0.16
(0.37)
Household head who is wage employed −0.099**
(0.008)
0.025**
(0.002)
−0.023**
(0.002)
−0.002**
(0.0002)
0.54
(0.50)
Household with agricultural asset 0.208**
(0.008)
−0.052**
(0.002)
0.048**
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.0002)
0.49
(0.50)
Household with nonagricultural asset 0.156**
(0.011)
−0.039**
(0.003)
0.036**
(0.002)
0.003**
(0.0002)
0.13
(0.34)
Household with cash savings 0.148**
(0.007)
−0.037**
(0.002)
0.034**
(0.002)
0.003**
(0.0002)
0.34
(0.47)
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Household with a cow 0.126**
(0.008)
−0.031**
(0.002)
0.029**
(0.002)
0.003**
(0.0002)
0.26
(0.44)
Village with safety-net programs 0.074**
(0.011)
−0.018**
(0.003)
0.017**
(0.003)
0.001**
(0.0002)
0.10
(0.16)
Village with microcredit programs 0.384**
(0.022)
−0.095**
(0.005)
0.089**
(0.005)
0.006**
(0.00003)
0.97
(0.18)
Average yearly rainfall in district (mm) 0.073**
(0.007)
−0.018**
(0.002)
0.017**
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.0001)
198.54
(6.62)
Pseudo R2 0.206
Log likelihood −322,393.4
Mean value of an outcome 0.473 0.483 0.044
Number of observations 480,918
Source: Institute of Microfinance survey, 2006.
Note: Regression additionally includes union dummies to control for unobserved union-level effects. The estimates in the first column (that is, the ordered logit estimates of food 
deprivation) are the estimated right-hand side of equation (5.1), from which the coefficients of the subsequent columns are derived; these coefficients give marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variables. Figures in parentheses are standard errors except for the last column, where they are standard deviations. ** refer to a statistical 
significance of 5 percent or better; mm = millimeter.
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the results show, the probability of starvation during monga is higher for 
households headed by older rather than younger individuals. As expected, 
landholding reduces the probability of starvation by raising the chances 
of either consumption rationing or full meals. The probability of starva-
tion is lower with self-employment and higher with wage employment, 
suggesting that self-employed households are better off than wage-
employed households as a whole. Again, as expected, households with 
more assets (either agricultural or nonagricultural) and cash savings are 
likely to be better able to avoid starvation during monga. 
The results also largely support the earlier findings obtained from the 
analysis of the HIES data. There is, for example, a further confirmation of 
the finding suggesting that the probability of hunger is very much context 
specific and is partially determined by agroclimatic and location factors. 
Thus, favorable rainfall is found to help reduce the incidence of hunger. 
More important, the results confirm that even after netting out the influ-
ence of unobserved agroclimatic and location factors, most of the policies 
identified here do indeed help reduce seasonal hunger among the poor 
households in Rangpur. 
A transfer of land or nonagricultural asset is likely to reduce seasonal 
hunger. A 10 percent increase in the household’s landholding, for exam-
ple, reduces the probability of starvation by almost 6 percent. Similarly, 
an income transfer during the monga season, which is equivalent to hav-
ing cash savings, is expected to reduce the extent of hunger during 
monga. The case of transferring an asset, such as a cow, is similar. Providing 
livestock is a form of poverty intervention recently undertaken by some 
nongovernmental organizations in the monga-prone areas in Rangpur. 
Microcredit programs are also found to reduce the incidence of seasonal 
hunger. For example, the households in villages with microcredit pro-
grams have about a 10 percent lower chance of undergoing starvation. In 
contrast, the presence of a safety-net program in the village is expected 
to reduce the incidence of starvation by about 2 percent. 
Concluding Remarks
The results of the statistical exercises reported in this chapter show that 
policies and programs matter in alleviating food deprivation and its sea-
sonality. It is generally agreed that economic growth is necessary to 
reduce poverty and food insecurity by large numbers and in a sustained 
manner. But as discussed in the previous chapters, economic growth 
alone—not even when it leads to poverty reduction—is sufficient to 
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 combat the problem of food insecurity and seasonal hunger. Both global 
experience and that of Bangladesh discussed in the previous chapters 
testify to that fact. For that reason, it is important to look for a set of 
policies that can effectively address the interlocking problems of poverty, 
food insecurity, and seasonality. 
Because of data limitations, the effects of only a limited range of policy 
interventions could be examined here. Nevertheless, the results show the 
effectiveness of policies, in varying degrees, in a number of areas: improv-
ing the production environment (such as through provision of electricity 
or irrigation); enhancing the human capital and asset base of households; 
and providing targeted safety nets, including microcredit. Most of these 
interventions are found to be effective even in reducing the extreme 
forms of food deprivation like starvation during monga in Rangpur. 
The results are particularly important in shedding some light on the 
effectiveness of microcredit, given the ongoing debates surrounding the 
subject. The results for Rangpur show that the likelihood of poor house-
holds experiencing starvation during monga is reduced by 10 percent by 
the presence of microcredit programs in a village, whereas the results 
derived from the countrywide surveys show that the incidence of extreme 
poverty is reduced by more than 5 percentage points among households 
living in a village with a branch of Grameen Bank. The safety-net pro-
grams are also found to have favorable effects both on countrywide 
prevalence of extreme poverty and on the incidence of starvation during 
monga in Rangpur, although in the latter case, the effect is found to be 
rather small. For the safety-net programs to have any substantial effect on 
seasonal hunger, their coverage and the size of the benefits transferred 
need to be enhanced while sharpening their focus toward the most vul-
nerable individuals or households. 
The areas with adverse economic geography and agroecological vul-
nerability, such as Rangpur, are doubly disadvantaged because public 
investments and other development programs may neglect these areas, 
which in turn may also discourage private investments. An underdevel-
oped region like Rangpur needs an area development plan that would 
promote investments in infrastructure and human capital and thus pro-
vide greater and more diversified income-earning opportunities. 
Although the estimated effect of none of the interventions seems large 
enough, their combined effects clearly could make a big difference. We 
may therefore conclude that if the policies had been integrated and coor-
dinated, the monga situation in Rangpur could have been much better, as 
in other regions of Bangladesh. Policy makers need to be aware that 
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monga is not only a seasonal phenomenon but also an outcome of 
extreme and endemic poverty. The range of policies therefore needs to 
include those aimed at addressing the structural factors underlying 
endemic poverty along with seasonally sensitive policies, including short-
term safety-net measures. 
Notes
 1. It may be noted that the distance of the village from the district headquarters 
can change because of the creation of new districts. 
 2. The VGF program, administered by the government, provides food to a select 
number of households in a community that is affected by disasters or during 
a period when acquiring food is difficult for beneficiary households. Priority 
is given to households that are low income, lack agricultural land or other 
productive assets, include day laborers, or are headed by women. In a normal 
year, a distressed household receives two to three months of food rations, with 
no work or labor participation required.
 3. We considered estimating a binomial logit or probit equation separately for 
household starvation and for general household food deprivation (by combin-
ing starvation and meal rationing). However, a test for IIA (independence of 
irrelevant alternatives) rejects both null hypotheses that (a) starvation and 
meal rationing can be combined (against full meals) and (b) meal rationing 
and full meals can be combined (against starvation). So we supposed that 
these categories are independent or mutually exclusive and decided to esti-
mate an ordered logit model, assuming an underlying order among these three 
categories. 
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The Role of Seasonal Migration
Seasonal migration is a widely practiced household strategy for coping 
with agricultural seasonality in various parts of the developing world.1 
Seasonal migration needs to be distinguished from long-term or perma-
nent migration. For our analysis, we look at short-term migration of 
household workers, which is often repetitive, related to the annual agri-
cultural cycle. These characteristics of seasonal migrants also exclude 
workers who may decide to migrate during the lean months but do so on 
a long-term basis and not as part of an annual cycle. Seasonal migration 
has thus been aptly called “seasonal labor circulation” in the African con-
text (Chambers, Longhurst, and Pacey 1981, 210–14).
As discussed in chapter 4 in this volume, seasonal migration was found 
to be the single most important coping mechanism adopted in response 
to monga (seasonal hunger) by poor households in the Rangpur region. 
Of the nearly half million poor households covered by the Institute of 
Microfinance (InM) baseline survey of 2006, about 35 percent reported 
having resorted to migration during the monga season. The InM follow-
up survey of 2008 found considerable out-migration among the workers 
of the region in the non-monga seasons as well; furthermore, most of the 
migration was found to be seasonal or temporary. 
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National-level data also clearly show the exceptionally high levels of 
interdistrict out-migration from the Rangpur region. The findings of the 
official Agricultural Sample Survey 2005 are particularly revealing. Of all 
the country’s agricultural workers who worked in agricultural and nonag-
ricultural jobs outside their home districts, those originating from the five 
districts in Rangpur accounted for nearly one-half and one-quarter, 
respectively, although the region accounted for only 11 percent of the 
country’s population (see BBS 2010, 268).2 Although the nature of 
migration is unknown, most of the migration captured in such a survey is 
likely to be temporary or seasonal. It may also be noted that, compared 
with other regions, overseas migration is relatively rare in the Rangpur 
region. Temporary overseas migration from Bangladesh, especially to 
countries in the Middle East, has increasingly become an important fea-
ture of the country’s economy; workers’ remittances currently account 
for about 10 percent of gross national income.3
This chapter examines the issue of seasonal migration within the 
 context of mitigating seasonal food deprivation. In doing so, we mainly 
use the huge data set of the 2006 InM baseline survey of 480,918 poor 
households in the Rangpur region. We ask the following questions: Is 
seasonal migration a viable strategy to mitigate seasonal hardships? Does 
seasonal starvation prompt seasonal migration? Who migrates, and what 
are the determinants of seasonal migration? What effect does it have 
on consumption-smoothing behavior and on overall household food 
 security?
Understanding the Phenomenon of Seasonal Migration
Most of the literature on internal migration focuses on permanent rural-
to-urban migration; much less is known about temporary migration as a 
coping strategy to mitigate seasonal hunger and poverty. However, the 
standard theory of internal migration remains a valid framework of analy-
sis, namely, that an individual’s decision to migrate is a utility maximiza-
tion process involving the perceived benefits and costs arising from 
migration. In other words, migration is the result of individuals and 
households weighing the utility that is attainable under different migra-
tion regimes against that of not migrating. 
It follows that incentives for migration may arise from both household-
specific conditions and variations in economic opportunities across regions. 
Thus, much of the internal migration—whether from rural to urban areas 
or from one region of the country to another—is explained by higher labor 
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demand, often reflected in higher wage rates, in the destination areas than 
in the local areas. In the absence of suitable employment or livelihood 
opportunities in the local areas, internal migration is most often a viable 
option with expectations of higher wages, better employment alterna-
tives, and factors that maximize family employment in the destination 
areas (Srivastava 2005). 
Although the utility-maximizing behavior may provide an overall 
framework for explaining migration, households’ actual decision making 
regarding migration will depend on how they perceive the benefits and 
costs. Besides labor market conditions in the sending and receiving areas, 
household-specific characteristics also matter. For seasonal and temporary 
migration, the availability of an extra family worker (usually male) may 
help, because the remaining adult members can care for the family. The 
decision to migrate also depends on knowledge about jobs in the destina-
tion market and the ease of transition to a distant environment, both of 
which depend in turn on the extent of social networks that the house-
holds can access.4 There are also potential costs of migration related to 
transport and relocation. The willingness to migrate will thus depend on 
whether the earning possibilities elsewhere relative to those available 
locally are regarded as adequate in relation to the cost of moving.
Another important element in the decision to migrate is the percep-
tion of risks. Uncertainties may exist regarding the income-earning oppor-
tunities in the destination areas, which may be reduced to some extent 
depending on a household’s networking ability. Poor households, particu-
larly those depending on income from agricultural wage labor, also face 
considerable uncertainty regarding their employment prospects in the 
local market during the lean season. As discussed in the earlier chapters 
in this volume, a household’s perception regarding future risk of seasonal 
hunger can be an important factor in its choice of coping strategies, 
including seasonal migration. As an alternative to the income-maximizing 
model of migration, it has even been suggested that migration could be a 
household strategy to minimize risk to income and consumption in an 
imperfect market (Stark and Taylor 1989).
The proximate causes of the high prevalence of seasonal migration in 
Rangpur are clear. The relatively high incidence of landlessness in the 
region combined with lack of opportunities in nonfarm employment cre-
ates a large pool of landless agricultural workers.5 They are the workers 
who are worst hit by the seasonal dip in the demand for agricultural labor. 
As noted earlier, wage employment in the farm sector drops sharply dur-
ing the monga season in Rangpur (see figure 3.15 in chapter 3 in this 
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volume). In the absence of enough demand for wage labor in the nonfarm 
sector, these workers have little alternative but to seek employment 
 elsewhere. Apart from the seasonal factors, the generally high incidence 
of poverty in the region and the persistently large gap in the wage rates 
of agricultural labor between the region and the rest of the country create 
conditions favorable to interregional migration.
Is seasonal migration as observed among the poor households in 
Rangpur a strategy to maximize income or to avoid starvation? Because 
the decision to migrate is made by weighing the perceived benefits 
against costs, it is difficult to distinguish conceptually between distress-
pushed or income-pulled migration. Thus, seasonal migration can be seen 
as both a strategy to augment income and a means of minimizing seasonal 
hardships. However, some judgment may still be made regarding the 
relative strengths of the push-pull forces. The fact that so many poor 
households opt for seasonal migration during the monga season suggests 
that it is a major means of coping with seasonal food deprivation. 
It is also possible to gain insights from the perceptions of the house-
holds themselves. In the InM 2008 follow-up survey, about three-fourths 
of the households with migrant workers cited the prospect of hunger as 
the cause of migration, whereas the rest mainly mentioned earning 
opportunities elsewhere as the reason. The same survey showed that most 
out-migration in Rangpur takes place in the monga season and thus seems 
to be induced by lack of local employment rather than peak-season labor 
demand in labor-receiving regions. The seasonal migration in Rangpur is 
thus unlike what is sometimes called “labor circulation” in the context of 
some African countries, where the timing of labor demand in the sending 
and receiving regions complement each other (see Chambers, Longhurst, 
and Pacey 1981, 212). 
It does not follow, however, that those who are most vulnerable to 
food insecurity will necessarily decide to migrate. They may lack not only 
the means to cover the financial costs of migration but also the access to 
the networks that minimize the risk related to migration outcome. In 
contrast, the relatively better off among the poor households may have 
sufficient means and access to labor market networks to be able to over-
come the barriers to migration; they may thus decide to migrate for a 
better chance of maximizing their family’s well-being. Consequently, no 
clear-cut way exists to profile the households that will resort to seasonal 
migration. By the same token, it is not easy to distinguish between the 
cause and the effect of migration by simply comparing the migrating and 
nonmigrating households with respect to their household characteristics 
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and their well-being indicators, like the food deprivation status. These 
issues will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Although households base decisions about migration on their cost-
benefit calculations, large-scale seasonal out-migration affects the local 
economy in other ways as well. The seasonal slack in the local labor mar-
kets will be reduced. In addition, migrants’ remittances may help stimu-
late the local economy (Afsar 2005; Deshingkar 2005; Oberai, Prasad, and 
Sardana 1989). Thus, nonmigrant households also stand to gain. 
Patterns of Migration in Rangpur during Monga
The InM baseline survey data on 480,918 households drawn from the 
five districts of the Rangpur region can be used to analyze the pattern 
and effect of seasonal migration.6  These households represented roughly 
the bottom 60 percent of the rural households in the region. Although 
some 36 percent of the households were found to have adopted seasonal 
migration as a coping strategy during the monga of 2006, there were 
considerable variations among the five districts (see table 4.6 in chapter 4 
in this volume). The notable aspect of these variations is the scant sys-
tematic relationship between the rate of seasonal migration and the 
extent of seasonal food deprivation. Although Nilphamari district had 
the lowest incidence of starvation (26 percent) as well as the lowest rate 
of migration (25 percent), the Rangpur district also had a relatively low 
rate of migration (27 percent) in spite of having one of the worst records 
for the incidence of starvation (56 percent). The explanation may lie in 
the fact that many potential migrants in the Rangpur district may be able 
to find off-farm employment in the nearby regional city of Rangpur 
without having to move from their home. Lalmonirhat district had the 
highest rate of migration (50 percent), but it had an incidence of starva-
tion similar to the regional average. 
It may be interesting to see how the migration pattern varies depend-
ing on the other coping mechanisms that households adopt (see 
table 6.1). Among the survey households that did not adopt any other 
coping mechanisms (51 percent of the sample), 32 percent resorted to 
migration; about 16 percent of the sample households adopted migra-
tion as their only coping mechanism. The estimates also suggest that 
about 7 percent of the sample households adopted migration while also 
accessing support from social safety-net programs as their only other 
coping mechanism, whereas about 3 percent combined migration with 
borrowing only. 
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Table 6.1 Rate of Migration during Monga by Households’ Other Coping Mechanisms
percent
Households’ other coping 
mechanisms
Gaibandha 
district
Kurigram 
district
Lalmonirhat 
district
Nilphamari 
district
Rangpur 
district
Rangpur 
region
No other coping mechanism (51.2) 33.0 38.8 44.4 21.0 21.1 32.1
Asset or advance  labor or crop sale only (6.5) 39.8 49.8 57.0 41.4 38.3 45.7
Borrowing only (8.2) 45.1 50.8 58.0 25.5 34.4 37.8
Support from SNPs only (20.7) 40.5 40.0 39.6 23.8 28.5 34.5
Multiple coping mechanisms (13.4) 49.7 57.9 66.2 32.2 42.9 47.3
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010.
Note: Number of observations is 480,918. Figures in parentheses are sample shares in respective coping mechanism groups. SNP = social safety-net program.
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The migration rate was quite high (45.7 percent) among those house-
holds that resorted to the sale of assets or the advance sale of labor or 
crops as their only other coping mechanism. For these households, the 
decision to migrate seems to have been made under distress, but they 
constituted only a small share (6.5 percent) of all households. The migra-
tion rate was highest (47.3 percent) among the households that adopted 
multiple coping mechanisms (13.4 percent of the sample), making this 
group seem particularly vulnerable. This pattern is generally consistent 
across districts. Thus, migration is most prevalent among households that 
must adopt a wide range of coping strategies; but they still may be better 
off during monga than households with rather limited coping options. 
Overall, this pattern is a scenario of distress adaptation. 
How does the migration pattern vary by the food consumption status 
of the households? Table 6.2 shows a household’s migration rate by its 
food deprivation pattern during the monga period. It is not surprising 
that the migration rate is higher among household groups with a greater 
degree of seasonal hardship. For example, 28.7 percent of households 
that enjoy full meals migrate during the monga season, compared with 
35.2 percent among the meal-rationed and 37.5 percent among the 
starving households. This pattern holds for all districts except Rangpur, 
where the migration rate is highest among the households that have full 
meals during the monga period. Migration may possibly have helped 
these households avoid food deprivation during the monga season. We 
will investigate this speculation later in this chapter. 
Examining the relationship between food deprivation and migration 
from the opposite perspective raises questions: How does starvation status 
vary between the household groups with and without migrant workers? Is 
there a variation in this pattern between monga and non-monga periods? 
Table 6.3 provides possible answers to these questions by showing the 
distribution of households by food deprivation status during different 
periods broken out by migrant and nonmigrant households. Besides monga 
and non-monga periods, we can also classify the households according to 
their food deprivation status on an overall or year-round basis in the fol-
lowing way: starvation households experience starvation during any period 
of the year (that is, during either the monga or the non-monga period); 
meal-rationing households have to ration meals during at least one period 
but they avoid starvation in all periods; and the remaining households have 
full meals during both monga and non-monga periods.
Table 6.3 indicates that the incidence of starvation is higher among the 
migrant households than among the nonmigrant households. This outcome 
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Table 6.2 Migration by Households’ Food Consumption Status during Monga 
percent
Food consumption 
status during monga
Gaibandha
district
Kurigram
district
Lalmonirhat
district
Nilphamari 
district
Rangpur 
district
Rangpur 
region
Starvation (47.2) 39.6 41.7 52.5 25.3 25.5 37.5
Food rationing (48.3) 35.9 42.0 48.9 24.6 29.3 35.2
Full meals (4.4) 31.3 38.9 39.7 24.2 38.6 28.7
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are sample shares in respective food consumption groups. Number of observations is 480,918. 
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suggests perhaps that the prospect of seasonal hardship prompted the 
households to migrate. One could also hypothesize that had the house-
holds not migrated, their seasonal hardship would have been even worse. 
Support for this hypothesis will be explored later in this chapter. 
At this stage, it may be noted that merely by looking at the associa-
tion of seasonal deprivation and seasonal migration, one cannot easily 
determine what causes what, that is, the direction of causality. Does 
seasonal deprivation pull the trigger, or does seasonal migration deter-
mine the extent of seasonal starvation? Both are likely to be true to some 
extent. For policy-making purposes, it is important to determine if sea-
sonal migration reduces seasonal hardship. At any point in time, one can 
observe the confounding influences of all possible factors causing sea-
sonal migration as well as seasonal deprivation. So, the simultaneous 
effects of these factors on seasonal migration and seasonal hardship must 
be untangled to assess the effectiveness of seasonal migration as a 
monga-coping mechanism. But first, we consider the determinants of 
seasonal migration.
Determinants of Seasonal Migration 
As discussed, the decision to migrate will depend on the perceived ben-
efits that the household expects to derive from such migration. We 
observe from the InM baseline survey data whether any member of a 
household had migrated over the previous monga season. The decision to 
migrate (m) is a discrete binomial choice variable (1,0) that depends on 
the perceived net benefits that the household expects to derive from 
such migration. In other words, the perceived net utility (the algebraic 
sum of utilities from migration and nonmigration) must be positive for 
Table 6.3 Distribution of Migrant and Nonmigrant Households 
by Their Food Consumption Status in Different Periods
percentage of sample households
Period
Migrant households Nonmigrant households
Starvation
Meal 
rationing
Full 
meals Starvation
Meal 
rationing
Full 
meals
Monga period 49.2 47.3 3.5 46.2 48.8 5.0
Non-monga period 7.3 53.7 39.0 9.2 49.3 41.5
Year round 51.7 45.5 2.8 49.4 46.3 4.3
 Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2011. Year-round outcomes are defined in the text.
Note: Number of observations is 480,918.
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the household to migrate. This net perceived utility for household i can 
be expressed as
 u xi i i
* ,= +β ε  (6.1)
where ui is perceived utility, xi is a vector of household and community 
characteristics, b is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and e is the 
random error term. For migrant households, ui
* > 0. This perceived utility 
(ui*) is an unobserved or latent variable, and what we observe is a house-
hold’s migration decision, mi, so that, mi = 1 if ui
* > 0, and mi = 0 otherwise. 
Because of the binomial nature of the migration decision, a probit model 
is used to estimate it, which is given as
 
prob m t dt x
x
=( ) = ( ) = ( )
−∞
∫1 φ βΦb ,
 
(6.2)
where f and Φ are normal density distribution function and cumulative 
normal distribution function, respectively. 
Both household- and community-level factors are likely to influence 
the decision to migrate during the monga season. Among the household 
factors, we consider household assets of different types, dependency ratio, 
and age of the household head. The community-level variables include 
the village’s access to microfinance institutions and to safety-net pro-
grams, the village-level unemployment rate, and whether the village is 
located in char area.7 The community factors also include interactions of 
household land asset with three community-and district-level variables: 
whether the village is located in char area, district-level data on rainfall, 
and the proportion of high land.8 We also include union dummies to 
control for the role of unobserved area characteristics.9 However, we do 
not use food deprivation status as an explanatory variable because it is 
also likely to be an outcome of the decision to migrate.10
The results of equation (6.2) showing the effects of different factors on 
the probability of migration are reported in table 6.4. With an increase in 
the household head’s age, the probability of migration declines. Intuitively, 
this decline is expected because younger people are better able, more 
energetic, and more willing to take risks and are also more likely to be a 
working member alongside the household head. Similar findings were 
reported by Mora and Taylor (2005). A large number of dependents 
( captured by a high dependency ratio) make households more vulnerable 
to food deprivation, and thus, the migration rate is likely to rise as the 
dependency ratio rises. 
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Table 6.4 Major Determinants of Seasonal Migration during Monga
Explanatory variables 
Marginal effects on migration 
probability
Household characteristics
 Household head’s age (years) −0.006**
(0.001)
 Dependency ratio 0.081**
(0.020)
 Log of land asset (decimal) −0.086**
(0.028)
 Self-employed household head −0.034**
(0.008)
 Wage-employed household head 0.081**
(0.005)
 Agricultural asset 0.073**
(0.010)
 Nonagricultural asset −0.029**
(0.008)
 Cash savings 0.009*
(0.005)
 Livestock asset (cattle) 0.004
(0.004)
Village characteristics
 Access to a safety net program 0.007
(0.016)
 Access to microcredit programs −0.075**
(0.034)
 Village-level unemployment rate 0.074**
(0.036)
 Village located in char area 0.181**
(0.026)
Others
 Village located in char area ×
 log of land asset (decimal) 
−0.009*
(0.005)
 Proportion of high land in district ×
 log of land asset (decimal)
−0.006
(0.023)
 Average yearly rainfall in district (mm) ×
 log of land asset (decimal) 
−0.0005
(0.0003)
Pseudo R2 0.180
Number of observations 480,918
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2011.
Note: Regression additionally includes union dummies to control for unobserved effects of union. Figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. * and ** refer to a statistical significance of 10  percent and 5 percent 
or better, respectively; mm = millimeter.
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We find an inverse relationship between migration and landownership, 
suggesting that households with less landholding have a higher tendency 
to migrate. This finding is corroborated by a number of studies showing 
that as the value of family landholdings increases, the probability of 
migration decreases (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Garip 2006; 
Mora and Taylor 2005; Stark and Taylor 1989). We would expect this 
outcome if household landownership and land quality increase the pro-
ductivity of the family labor. 
The status of the household head’s employment also matters, as does 
the type of employment. As shown in chapter 3 in this volume, the 
demand for agricultural wage labor takes a sharp dip during the monga 
period. In contrast, self-employment in the farm sector is subject to a 
much milder seasonal decline, whereas employment in the nonfarm 
 sector—both self-employment and wage employment—remains almost 
stable year round (see figure 3.15 in chapter 3). Because agricultural 
wage laborers constitute the bulk of the rural labor force in the Rangpur 
region, their lack of employment and income-earning opportunities in 
the monga season seems to be the major reason for the migration flows. 
The results presented in table 6.4 appear to confirm this. Thus, those with 
wage employ ment have a high probability of migration, whereas self-
employment reduces the chance of migration. Similarly, household own-
ership of nonagricultural assets can have a negative effect on the chance 
of migration by providing opportunities for self-employment. 
For obvious reasons, overall village-level unemployment increases the 
rate of out-migration. For example, a 10 percent increase in the unem-
ployment rate increases the probability of migration by 0.7 percent. 
Living in char area increases vulnerability and insecurity, and thus 
increases the probability of making seasonal migration. Char area resi-
dents are 18 percent more likely to migrate during the monga period than 
their counterpart mainland population.
The social safety-net programs (such as old-age pensions and Vulnerable 
Group Feeding) do not have a significant effect on seasonal migration. In 
contrast, access to microcredit programs is found to have a strong nega-
tive effect on seasonal migration. The presence of microcredit programs 
in a village reduces the chance of seasonal migration by nearly 8 percent. 
This finding suggests that people participating in microcredit programs to 
generate off-farm income and employment are less likely to feel threat-
ened during the lean season and hence are less likely to migrate. 
Interestingly, this finding regarding the effect of microcredit on sea-
sonal migration apparently differs from that of a recent study based on a 
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randomized experiment conducted in the Rangpur region (Chowdhury, 
Mobarak, and Bryan 2009). By offering a cash or credit incentive for 
migration through random selection, the study found that the migration 
rate increased from 34 percent in control villages to 57 percent in treat-
ment villages. The food intakes of the migrant households were found to 
increase as a result of migration, and more interesting, the migration rate 
in treatment areas continued to be significantly higher even after the 
inducement was removed.
That study suggests that seasonal migration can be potentially benefi-
cial even for those who cannot migrate because of the cost and the risk 
involved (that is, spending money for migration but not finding suitable 
employment, while the family left behind is threatened by starvation). It 
is, therefore, no wonder that the response to the cash or credit incentive 
for migration can be high, particularly if some risk-reducing mechanism 
exists. These findings are not, however, necessarily inconsistent with ours. 
Although conventional microcredit used for income-generating activities 
that are not subject to seasonality may discourage migration, other forms 
of credit or financial assistance may help households overcome the barri-
ers to migration. The two types of credit can in fact be part of comple-
mentary strategies for mitigating seasonal hunger.
Does Seasonal Migration Help Mitigate Food Deprivation? 
As discussed earlier, seasonal migration is determined by a host of factors 
that are also likely to influence the extent of seasonal food deprivation. 
These factors include household and community characteristics (such as 
the household head’s age, household land and nonland assets, the demo-
graphic and occupational characteristics of the household, the availability 
of government and nongovernment safety-net mechanisms in the com-
munity, and local area agroclimatic characteristics). Together, these fac-
tors simultaneously affect a household’s income-earning prospects 
without migration, the decision to migrate, and the likely gain from 
migration. The empirical challenge is to separate these effects to assess 
the net gains accrued because of migration. 
To solve this problem of estimation, we use an endogenous switching 
regression method as proposed by Maddala (1983) to control for the 
endogeneity of the decision to migrate.11 The details of the estimation 
methodology are given in the annex of this chapter. We divide all sample 
households into migrant and nonmigrant groups and estimate equations 
for food deprivation status for each household group by using various 
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household and community characteristics. By switching the estimated 
parameters between the equations for the two groups, we can then also 
estimate the counterfactuals, that is, what would have been the food 
deprivation status of the migrants had they decided not to migrate (and 
similarly for the nonmigrants had they decided to migrate). However, to 
take care of the problem of endogeneity of the decision to migrate, we run 
the outcome equations after controlling for the selection biases distin-
guishing the two groups.12 The effect of migration can then be estimated 
by taking the differences of these “conditional” outcomes with and with-
out migration. Although this estimate can be made for both migrant and 
nonmigrant groups, for the latter group, the estimated effect of migration 
is of course in the nature of a counterfactual. 
Table 6.5 reports the estimates of potential benefits of migration using 
the counterfactual evaluation approach outlined above. The results 
clearly show that seasonal migration lowers a household’s hardship with 
regard to food deprivation for both migrant and nonmigrant households—
for the latter, in a counterfactual scenario. This outcome is true for both 
the monga and the non-monga period and for the year-round effect. For 
extreme hardship (starvation), the expected or potential benefit is higher 
for nonmigrant households than for migrant households. For example, 
migration is found to lower the prevalence of starvation during the 
Table 6.5 Effects of Seasonal Migration on Household Hardship
Household types by 
seasonal migration
Extreme hardship 
(starvation)
All hardships (starvation and 
food rationing)
Monga period
Migrants −0.081**
(0.0002)
−0.018**
(0.0001)
Nonmigrants −0.015**
(0.002)
−0.016**
(0.0004)
Non-monga period
Migrants −0.051**
(0.0001)
−0.031**
(0.0002)
Nonmigrants −0.040**
(0.0001)
−0.002**
(0.0001)
Year round
Migrants −0.051**
(0.0002)
−0.020**
(0.0001)
Nonmigrants −0.005**
(0.0001)
−0.028**
(0.0004)
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2011.
Notes: Year-round outcomes are defined in the text in the context of table 6.3. Figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. ** refers to a statistical significance of 5 percent or better.
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monga period by 8.1 percentage points for migrant households and 
potentially by 1.5 percentage points for nonmigrant households. However, 
when both starvation and food rationing are considered, the migrant 
households gain (a 1.8 percentage point reduction) only slightly over the 
nonmigrant households (a 1.6 percentage point reduction). As for the 
year-round hardships, the reduction in the extreme hardship of migrant 
households is over ten times that of the nonmigrant households, whereas 
it is less for general hardship. 
An apparently unexpected aspect of the results regarding the benefi-
cial effects of migration during the monga season is that these effects are 
in some cases found to be more pronounced in the non-monga season 
than in the monga season in averting food deprivation. If one considers 
that the prevalence of both forms of food deprivation is far lower in the 
non-monga season than in the monga season, the seasonal contrasts in 
the accrued benefits become all the more striking. 
Instead of being a puzzle, however, these results can in fact provide 
more insights into the phenomenon of seasonal migration in Rangpur. As 
discussed earlier, the lack of local employment opportunities, especially 
for wage labor, is the main driving force behind seasonal migration. But 
the immediate beneficial effects of such migration may be limited by lack 
of facilities for remitting money, particularly for migrants who find jobs 
in distant places.13 Rather, many of the gains to the household may be 
realized after the migrant worker returns with his or her earnings. One 
would also expect that these gains would be more visible in the immedi-
ate post-monga period. This interpretation of the results is particularly 
plausible because the InM baseline survey was carried out in the immedi-
ate post-monga season; information was collected for that season and the 
preceding monga season.14 The policy conclusion is that scope exists for 
enhancing the benefits of migration in mitigating monga by facilitating 
remittance facilities.
In the interpretation of these results, a few further points may be noted. 
First, because of the broad classification and the subjective nature of food 
deprivation status used in the InM survey, the significance of these results 
perhaps lies more in their qualitative rather than quantitative implications. 
Second, the counterfactual results show that migration could have bene-
fited the nonmigrant households as well, and the reduction of seasonal 
starvation would have been even higher for them compared with those 
who actually migrated. The question then remains why more people do 
not migrate to avoid starvation. The explanations are likely to lie in the 
barriers to migration, such as the costs and risks involved, lack of social 
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networking needed for such migration, and inadequate spatial integration 
of labor markets. Finally, the estimated benefits from seasonal migration 
reflect the household-level effect of migration under the existing labor 
market situation, and thus they do not fully capture the welfare gains of 
the local economy arising from migration on such a large scale. Nonmigrants 
stand to gain from the greater likelihood of finding employment locally 
and also from any beneficial effects of inward remittances.
Concluding Remarks
One of the major coping strategies observed in greater Rangpur during 
monga is seasonal migration. Among the poor households of the region 
covered in the 2006 InM baseline survey, about 173,000 opted for send-
ing one or more of their household members to work elsewhere during 
the monga season of that year.15 A sharp dip in local labor demand 
 coupled with the generally high levels of impoverishment seems to be the 
major driving force behind seasonal migration on such a large scale. 
More than half the households that opted for migration had to resort 
to other monga-coping mechanisms as well. The government social 
safety-net programs do not seem to have a strong role in keeping seasonal 
migration in check, perhaps because of their limited coverage and the 
inadequate support that is provided. The fact that many of the migrant 
households have to adopt multiple coping strategies, including borrowing, 
sale of assets, and advance sale of labor and crops, points to the particular 
vulnerability of these households. Even then, migration may give the 
households a better chance of reducing the extent of seasonal and year-
round hunger compared with those that have limited coping options and 
that lack the means to migrate. 
Seasonal migration is found to have a beneficial effect on household 
welfare by reducing the extent of seasonal food deprivation. More inter-
esting, access to outside jobs during the lean period can alleviate house-
holds’ food insecurity even to a larger extent than in other seasons, 
particularly immediately after monga when migrant workers return with 
their earnings. This finding suggests that the beneficial effect of migration 
in alleviating monga can be enhanced by improving the facilities for 
remitting money, such as through use of the recently introduced money 
transfers through mobile phones.
Our results also show (by simulating a counterfactual) that the non-
migrant households would have benefited too had they migrated, 
although the reduction of seasonal starvation would not have been as 
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high as that for migrant households. Evidently, not all monga-vulnerable 
households have the necessary networking ability or the financial means 
for migration. Policy measures may therefore be aimed at easing the bar-
riers to migration. Although access to microcredit appears to work as an 
alternative to seasonal migration for the households, special schemes for 
providing credit or cash incentives are found to encourage seasonal 
migration and increase household welfare. Facilitating migration through 
such schemes may enable households to avoid resorting to such extreme 
measures as borrowing from moneylenders or selling assets to bear the 
cost of migration.
Although seasonal migration can have beneficial effects on the migrat-
ing households as well as on the local economy as a whole, apparently it 
is not enough to mitigate seasonal hunger. Efforts to facilitate seasonal 
migration should not therefore divert attention from the need to invest 
more and create more employment opportunities in the areas of outmi-
gration, so that labor does not have to move on such a large scale. These 
policy approaches should not be regarded as alternatives but as a part of 
a coordinated strategy for eradicating seasonal hunger in vulnerable areas, 
such as Rangpur. 
Annex 6A: Endogenous Switching Regression Method 
for  Estimation of Gains from Seasonal Migration 
To estimate the effect of seasonal migration on food deprivation of the 
poor households in Rangpur, we use an endogenous switching regression 
method as proposed by Maddala (1983). This method can control for 
endogeneity of the decision to migrate so as to measure the one-way 
causal effect of migration on a household’s food deprivation status. We 
use the cross-sectional data from the Institute of Microfinance baseline 
survey of 2006 covering nearly half a million poor households in 
Rangpur. The huge size of the data set is particularly suitable for the 
implementation of this estimation model. This model is described 
below.
Let us assume that mi denotes household i’s decision to undertake 
seasonal migration (mi = 1 when a household migrates, 0 when it does 
not), which is determined by the following selection model:
 if g Zi + ui > 0, then mi = 1,  (6A.1)
 and if g Zi + ui ≤ 0, then mi = 0, (6A.2)
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where Zi is a vector of household and village characteristics that deter-
mines a household’s decision to migrate during the monga season; g  is the 
parameter to be estimated; and ui is the error term. Let us further assume 
that the outcome (for example, seasonal food deprivation) equations of 
migrant and nonmigrant households are given by
C1i = b1 X1i + e1i, when a household migrates (mi = 1) and (6A.3)
C0i = b0 X0i + e0i, when a household does not migrate (mi = 0), (6A.4)
where X1i and X0i are vectors of household and village characteristics that 
determine a household’s food consumption when the household migrates 
and when it does not, respectively; b1 and b0 are parameters to be esti-
mated; and e1 and e0 are the error terms. The outcome equations include 
all the X variables that were used in the probit equation for the decision 
to migrate, including the dummy variables for union (a collection of 
10–12 villages) to control for any local-level heterogeneity. 
The error terms ui, e1, and e0 are assumed to have a trivariate normal 
distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix
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where s u
2, s 1
2, and s 0
2, are the variances of ui, e1, and e0, respectively; and 
s1u, s0u, and s01 are covariances of e1 and ui, e0 and ui, and e0  and e1,  
respectively. The same signs of r1 and r0 indicate that the unobserved 
factors that influence a household’s probability of migrating also affect its 
seasonal food deprivation the same way, whereas opposite signs of r1 and 
r0 indicate that unobserved factors have opposite effects in the probabil-
ity of migration and the food deprivation status of the household. In our 
case, both r1 and r0 are found to have positive signs, which means that 
the unobserved factors influencing a household’s migration decision also 
adversely affect its food consumption status. And this correlation is much 
stronger for the migrant households, demonstrating that seasonal migra-
tion and seasonal food deprivation are strongly correlated.
The next step is to find the direct effects of migration on household 
outcomes. In a switching regression model, outcome equations are run 
after controlling for a household’s selection bias. Following the derivation 
of Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), we can construct the following terms:
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yc1_1i = E(y1i | s = 1, x1i) = x1i b1 + s1 r1f(g  Zi)/Φ (g  Zi)
 = Conditional expected value of outcome of a migrant household 
with migration;
yc0_1i = E(y0i | s = 1, x1i) = x1i b0 + s0 r0f(g  Zi)/Φ (g  Zi)
 = Conditional expected value of outcome of a migrant household 
without migration (counterfactual);
yc0_0i = E(y0i | s = 0, x0i) = x0i b0 + s0 r0f(g  Zi)/[1 – Φ (g  Zi)]
 = Conditional expected value of outcome of a nonmigrant household 
without migration; and
yc1_0i = E(y1i | s = 0, x0i) = x0i b1 + s1 r1f(g  Zi)/[1 – Φ (g  Zi)]
 = Conditional expected value of outcome of a nonmigrant household 
with migration (counterfactual).
Here, f and F are a normal density distribution function and a cumu-
lative normal distribution function, respectively. 
Using the calculations above, we construct the effects of seasonal 
migration on household outcomes in the following way:
yc_1i = yc1_1i  – yc0_1i =  Expected outcome of a migrant household −
expected outcome of a migrant household if it 
had not chosen to migrate (counterfactual)
  =  Gain in outcome of a migrant household from 
migration; and
yc_0i = yc1_0i  – yc0_0i =  Expected outcome of a nonmigrant household 
had it chosen to migrate (counterfactual) − 
expected outcome of a nonmigrant household 
  =  Gain in outcome of a nonmigrant household 
that would have accrued from migration. 
Notes
 1. For discussions on various kinds of internal migrations in the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, see, for example, Amin (1974) and Gould and Prothero 
(1975). 
 2. The population estimate is from the population census of 2001.
 3. Some pilot projects have been initiated recently to encourage overseas migra-
tion from the Rangpur region as part of efforts to alleviate monga.
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 4. For example, a study on Vietnam shows that, among other factors, social net-
works matter considerably in deciding who will migrate (see Brauw and 
Harigaya 2007). The same study also shows that seasonal migration plays an 
important role in the improvement of living standards. 
 5. The breakdown by district of various national-level censuses and surveys 
shows that the proportion of landless households and the proportion of the 
workforce engaged in agriculture are considerably higher in Rangpur com-
pared with the national average; see, for example, the figures cited in Elahi 
and Ara (2008, table 2.11). 
 6. Throughout this chapter, the term household migration is used to refer to the 
physical migration of one or more capable members, as opposed to that of the 
whole family. 
 7. Char areas are land formed from river sediment. Tens of millions of poor people 
throughout Bangladesh with no other place to move live in such areas.
 8. A high land area, according to the definition of the Bangladesh Agricultural 
Research Council, is where the floodwater level remains below 3 feet. 
 9. A union is a collection of 10–12 villages. We could have used a village-level 
fixed-effects method instead of a union-level fixed-effects estimate, in which 
case we would have lost the village-level explanatory variables. 
 10. Unfortunately, the InM baseline survey has no information about the areas to 
which these poor households migrate. Hence, there is no variable representing 
the demand side of the destination labor markets. 
 11. Alternatively, if we had appropriate instrumental variables to identify a migra-
tion equation (such as labor market conditions and networks related to the 
destination markets), we could follow a two-stage Heckman selection method 
to estimate the effect of seasonal migration. 
 12. For this calculation, the parameters of a selection model regarding the migra-
tion decision must be estimated first.
 13. This lack of facilities for remitting money may indeed be the case for a large 
majority of seasonal migrants from Rangpur, many of whom are found to 
travel to such distant places as the northeastern district of Sylhet. 
Unfortunately, the InM baseline survey has no information about the desti-
nations of seasonal migrants or about the way they remit money.
 14. Moreover, this interpretation does not preclude the role of the prospect of 
hunger behind the decision to migrate. Households that are most vulnerable 
to starvation during monga are also likely to experience food deprivation, 
although to a lesser degree, during other seasons.
 15. Although the InM baseline survey involved a complete enumeration of poor 
households in the survey villages, not all villages were covered.
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C H A P T E R  7
Effectiveness of Social 
Safety-Net Programs
All over the world, various social safety-net programs are used to 
 safeguard the economic security of poor and vulnerable groups. The 
 welfare impact of these programs largely depends on their effectiveness 
and on adequate coverage, which in turn, are determined by  administrative 
capacity, fund availability, and the design of the programs in relation to 
the needs of the vulnerable population. Although there is extensive lit-
erature on these various aspects of safety-net programs, not much is 
known about their effectiveness, particularly in mitigating seasonal pov-
erty and hunger. In Bangladesh, the role of the safety-net programs is well 
recognized by the government and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), given the high incidence of poverty, food insecurity, and the 
recurrence of climate-related shocks. In this chapter, we focus particularly 
on the seasonal dimensions of the possible welfare effects of safety-net 
programs.
The discussions and debates on social safety nets commonly revolve 
around several issues. There are the protection and promotion aspects of 
safety nets; the former aspect is concerned with preventing a decline in 
living conditions and averting the impact of shocks, while the latter is 
about lifting the vulnerable from endemic and persistent deprivation 
(Dréze and Sen 1989; Ravallion, van de Walle, and Gautam 1995). A 
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related argument is that social safety nets should be designed to address 
the causes of poverty, not simply its symptoms (Holzmann and Grosh 
2008). Another issue concerns targeting and the selection of beneficiaries, 
such as through universal social benefit systems, some actual or proxy 
criteria, or self-selection mechanisms (Ahmed et al. 2009; Narayan and 
Zaman 2009, chap. 9). Social protection and safety-net programs are also 
variously categorized by their objectives and delivery mechanisms: 
income transfers through cash, food-related programs, price subsidies, 
programs related to human capital development, public works programs, 
microcredit and informal insurance programs, and emergency assistance 
(Babu 2003). There are a priori legitimate concerns of public welfare 
behind these various types of programs, but their effectiveness in achiev-
ing the desired goals remains a matter of empirical assessment. 
As a globally recognized strategy for alleviating extreme poverty, safety-
net programs may be designed specifically for alleviating seasonal 
 hardships. In a recent study of four African countries, for example, 
Devereux (2009) examines how a variety of social protection experiments 
have had different degrees of success in tackling seasonal distress.1 Besides 
providing livelihood support generally, seasonally oriented safety-net pro-
grams can enhance the welfare of the poor by providing a less costly 
 consumption-smoothing mechanism relative to alternative desperate mea-
sures (for example, Chetty and Looney 2006). But this approach depends 
on the timing of such seasonal or short-term programs. For example, with 
regard to decisions about the timing of seasonal public works programs, 
such as Food for Work (FFW), there may be balancing considerations of 
providing employment during the slack season (which is usually the late 
rainy season for rain-fed rice cultivation) and  undertaking earthwork for 
infrastructure building (for which the dry season is more suitable). 
The interlocking of endemic poverty and its seasonality, as discussed in 
the previous chapters, also has a bearing on the effectiveness of safety-net 
programs. Compared with short-run emergency type programs, long-
term programs may be more oriented toward lifting households from 
endemic and persistent poverty (the promotion aspect of safety nets 
mentioned above), and eradicating such poverty is also an effective way 
of dealing with seasonal poverty in a sustainable way.2 That orientation 
should not, however, detract attention from the programs that have direct 
counterseasonal effect. It may often be more cost-effective to address 
seasonal deprivation directly through seasonally oriented programs than 
through assistance in building new year-round livelihood strategies. 
Moreover, by providing protection particularly at times of severe seasonal 
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distress, safety net programs can help the poor to better manage risks and 
thus make better livelihood choices (Holzmann and Grosh 2008). For 
poor households, seasonally oriented safety net programs can be a mech-
anism for both consumption smoothing and risk management. 
Salient Features of Social Safety Net Programs in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has a long history of extensive social safety net provisions. 
Safety net programs have proliferated over time, which reflects an 
increasing recognition of the welfare responsibilities of the state. 
Beyond providing a minimum level of protection against frequent 
natural calamities, these programs have come to be seen as part of a 
sustainable antipoverty strategy. Consequently, emphasis has shifted 
from food rations and postdisaster relief to programs incorporating 
mainstream social and developmental concerns. The erosion of infor-
mal safety nets caused by the decay of the extended family system 
must also be taken into account.
The characteristics of the major safety net programs in Bangladesh 
(those with the largest budgetary allocations as of 2009–10) are given 
in table 7.1.3 These programs may be divided into those that (a) pro-
vide allowances to people with special needs (for example, old age 
pensions or allowances for destitute women), (b) provide employment 
in public works (for example, FFW), (c) promote human development 
(for example, stipends to primary school students and Vulnerable 
Group Development (VGD) for poor women), and (d) provide food 
security or emergency assistance (for example, Vulnerable Group 
Feeding (VGF) and Test Relief). The programs may also be distin-
guished by their protection versus promotion characteristics, which in 
turn, are related to the criteria of entry and exit. The school stipend 
program and VGD are the only ones with a strategy for graduating the 
beneficiaries from their programs.
Another characteristic of the programs that is particularly relevant for 
this analysis is whether they are of a seasonal or temporary nature as 
distinct from the long-term or year-round programs. Of the nine pro-
grams listed in table 7.1, all except the first four provide seasonal or 
short-term benefits and account for nearly two-thirds of the total budget-
ary allocations for the nine programs taken together. The proportion may 
not be very different if allocations are considered for all government 
safety net programs (PPRC and UNDP 2011). The predominance of 
short-term programs does not, however, necessarily mean that there is 
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Table 7.1 Major Safety-Net Programs in Bangladesh, 2009–10 
Program
Beneficiary and 
coverage
Allocation 
(Tk, million) Requirement
Cash or in 
kind Details
Primary Education 
Stipend Project (PESP) 
Households; 
5.2 million rural 
poor students
5,748.4 Schooling Cash Formerly known as Food for Education (FFE); 
promotion of primary education for students 
of rural poor households
Old Age Allowance Old-age individuals 
unable to work; 
2.3 million 
8,100.0 No work 
requirement
Cash Reduction of vulnerability of old-age people 
having no pension income in poor 
households in nonmunicipal areas; Tk 250 
per month 
Allowances for Widowed, 
Deserted, and Destitute 
Women
Destitute women; 
0.9 million 
3,312.0 No work 
requirement
Cash Tk 250 per month
Vulnerable Group 
Development (VGD) 
Women capable of 
income-generating 
activities; 
0.75 million 
5,951.7 No work 
requirement; 
skill training 
Food grain Provision of skill training to poor women for 
undertaking income-generating activities; 
30 kg of wheat per month in 30-month cycles
Vulnerable Group Feeding 
(VGF)
Households; 
7.5 million in 2008–09
10,971.7 No work 
requirement 
Food grain Addressing of seasonal distress and 
postdisaster needs of the poor; coverage that 
can vary from year to year; 10 kg of rice per 
month for three months
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Food for Work (FFW) Individuals able to 
work; 3.6 million 
person-months 
(1 million 
beneficiaries) 
9,276.6 Work Food grain Reduction of food vulnerability of the poor 
through employment mostly in rural 
infrastructure development projects; 
seasonal program; payment based on 
workdays 
Test Relief Individuals able to 
work; 3.8 person-
months (5 million 
beneficiaries in 
2008–09) 
8,978.5 Work Food grain Reduction of food vulnerability and seasonal 
distress of the poor in rural areas through 
employment in activities such as cleaning of 
ponds and bushes and minor infrastructure 
repair 
Gratuitous Relief Households; 6.4 
million in 2008–09
1,652.2 No work 
requirement
Food grain Way that government provides immediate 
relief to disaster areas; 10 kg of wheat/rice per 
person given once 
Rural Employment and 
Road Maintenance 
Program (RERMP)
Women able to work; 
0.7 million person-
months; 0.5 million 
beneficiaries
1,850.0 Work Cash Rural public work program built on the 
experiences of the previous Road 
Maintenance Project (RMP); payment based 
on a daily rate basis 
Employment Generation 
Program for the Poorest 
(EGPP) 
Individuals able to 
work; 4.5 million 
person-months (2.0 
million beneficiaries)
10,761.1 Work Cash A 100-day employment guarantee scheme in 
the lean seasons initiated in 2008–09: 60 days 
in October–December and 40 days in 
March–May; wage rate of Tk 100 per day 
Sources: PPRC and UNDP 2011; various government documents. Allocations are according to the Revised Budget of 2009–10. 
Note: kg = kilogram; person-month = equivalent of one person working for 30 days.
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enough scope for seasonal targeting of safety nets. Except for VGF, the 
other seasonal programs involve some type of public works, mostly earth-
work. Unfortunately, the lean season preceding the harvesting of aman 
(the late-monsoon rice crop), which coincides with the late rainy season, 
is not often suitable for earthwork; as a result, the safety-net programs 
involving public works are often undertaken in the dry season after the 
harvesting of the aman crop. 
The above dilemma in the timing for the safety-net programs based 
on public works is evident from the design of the newly introduced 
 100-day employment guarantee scheme, Employment Generation 
Program for the Poorest (table 7.1). This scheme has a declared objective 
of providing employment in the lean seasons for 60 days during October 
to December and for 40 days during March to May. The latter period 
falls within the dry season and is also an agricultural lean period (preced-
ing the boro rice harvest), although it lacks the same intensity of distress 
observed during the pre-aman lean season. The former period, however, 
only partly coincides with the monga (seasonal hunger) period toward 
the end of the monsoon rains and the regular annual floods; otherwise, 
it coincides with the aman harvesting season when there is usually no 
dearth of employment. 
In the year-round programs, the benefits are to be paid at regular inter-
vals. It is not known whether this actually happens. If there are irregu-
larities in payments, such as those caused by bureaucratic delays, the 
effect on seasonality may go either way in mitigating seasonality. Because 
these programs are not directly aimed at having a counterseasonal effect, 
they should at least ensure that payments are not delayed during the 
seasons of stress. Deliberately adding a seasonal dimension to the pro-
grams, for example, in terms of the larger amounts of benefits provided 
during the lean seasons, could be a further step. 
The coverage of the social safety-net system is fairly large in 
Bangladesh and has expanded rapidly in recent years. The VGF pro-
gram alone, for example, had 7.5 million beneficiaries in 2009–10 who 
received short-term food rations under the program (table 7.1). The 
program’s implementation mainly in rural areas suggests that nearly 
one-quarter of all rural households benefited from the program in that 
time frame.4 One problem, however, is that the benefits may be dis-
tributed too thinly to have much effect on the levels of poverty. The 
other problem is that the actual number of beneficiaries and the 
amounts of benefits may be much smaller than shown on paper 
because of leakages of various kinds. 
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The information regarding the coverage of safety nets is also available 
from the data of the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES). 
According to the HIES data of 2005 and 2010, the number of households 
countrywide benefiting from at least one safety-net program increased 
from 13 percent to nearly 25 percent between those years. Among rural 
households, the coverage rate is even higher.5 The increase in the esti-
mated coverage may to some extent be explained by the fact that in 
2010, the HIES collected information on a larger number of programs 
than in 2005, but most of the additional programs included in the 2010 
HIES were either insignificant in coverage or had gained in importance 
only in the intervening periods. 
With the increasing coverage and diversification of safety-net pro-
grams, total public spending on these programs has also increased in 
recent years. The total budgetary allocation for safety nets increased from 
nearly 1 percent of gross domestic product in the 1990s to about 2 per-
cent in 2009–10.6 Even then, the amount of benefits received per benefi-
ciary household remains very small. For example, according to the data 
from the 2010 HIES, the monthly benefits in taka received per benefi-
ciary household are only about 7 percent of the national poverty line (in 
terms of household monthly consumption expenditure) of that year.7 
Moreover, the estimated monthly amount of benefits refers to the periods 
of program participation only. Although the same beneficiary households 
are found to participate in a number of safety-net programs in a year, the 
HIES data cannot show much about the average annualized value of the 
benefits per household.8 There are, however, certain specialized subpro-
grams, such as those within the purview of the VGD, that transfer more 
substantial amounts of benefits (Ahmed et al. 2009). 
The increased public spending on safety nets has resulted mainly from 
the multiplication of programs and not from increases in the amounts of 
real benefits per beneficiary in each program. There are currently as many 
as 30 major safety-net programs and nearly as many minor ones (PPRC 
and UNDP 2011). New programs have been devised partly in response 
to the genuine needs of poor people at risk, but political competition 
resulting in a kind of populist tokenism has also been a factor. A program, 
once introduced, has rarely been rolled back, even if the benefits are so 
thinly distributed as to barely justify the cost of administration. 
Another area of concern is that a sizable share of the benefits goes to 
the nonpoor, and there are many forms of leakages resulting in the ben-
eficiaries receiving less than that shown on paper. The safety-net  programs 
based on public works have a self-targeting mechanism because of the 
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kind of employment offered, but even these programs suffer from 
 problems of underpayment of wages, overreporting of work done, and the 
existence of so-called ghost workers. According to the 2005 HEIS data, 
more than 40 percent of the beneficiaries of safety-net programs were 
nonpoor (that is, they belonged to the top three quintiles) (Narayan and 
Zaman 2009). Similar results were obtained from the 2000 HIES as well 
(World Bank and ADB 2003, 78–79). Given the resource constraint faced 
by the government in the provision of safety nets, these targeting errors 
along with resource leakages pose a serious problem.
A weak link in channeling safety-net resources to the poor appears to 
be the process by which the government allocates resources across 
regions. For example, the data from the 2005 HIES show that although 
the coverage of safety-net programs varies significantly by region, the 
variations are not in accordance with the regions’ poverty levels (Narayan 
and Zaman 2009, 282). The low coverage of relatively poor regions also 
translates into low coverage among the poor. Studies based on data from 
the earlier rounds of HIES in 1995 and 2000 provide an even more 
revealing analysis of the targeting differentials in terms of poor and non-
poor participants. To the extent that the programs have pro-poor target-
ing (that is, the poor benefit more than the nonpoor), this outcome is 
found to be due to the pro-poor targeting within rather than across 
 villages (Ravallion 2000; World Bank and ADB 2003). It is noteworthy 
that in all these programs, while beneficiary selection is fairly decentral-
ized, the allocations are made at higher administrative levels. 
The Special Case of Monga in Rangpur
Until a few years ago, the Rangpur region had not received any special 
attention in the allocation of safety-net resources (or in other public pov-
erty alleviation measures). This is hardly surprising, given the general lack 
of sensitivity in these allocations with respect to poverty prevalence, as 
discussed earlier. But increased public awareness of monga, helped in part 
by media activism, seems to have changed the situation to some extent. 
The objective of monga eradication has become part of the government’s 
strategy for dealing with food insecurity; this objective has featured 
prominently in the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper pre-
pared in 2005 and in the most recent Five-Year Plan (2010–15). 
The data from the 2010 HIES suggest that the increased public  attention 
given to monga may have begun to be translated into increased safety-net 
coverage in Rangpur. Thus, the proportion of households covered by at least 
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one safety-net program was found to be about 34 percent in the Rangpur 
region compared with the previously cited national-level figure of 25 per-
cent (BBS 2011, 74–75).9 However, the incidence of multiple membership 
seems to be lower in Rangpur, and the average monthly benefits per benefi-
ciary household are also lower (by about 20 percent) compared with those 
for the country as a whole.10 In fact, the Rangpur region still falls slightly 
behind the rest of the country in the coverage of programs with year-round 
benefits, such as allowances for old people and destitute women. However, 
the higher overall safety-net coverage in Rangpur seems to be largely 
explained by programs with extremely small short-term or one-time bene-
fits (mainly, Gratuitous Relief). The expanded coverage of safety nets in 
Rangpur may thus have been driven in part by the kind of populist tokenism 
discussed earlier.
The programs that have responded most proactively to the call for 
monga mitigation are those administered by NGOs and microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), often with support from foreign donors and some-
times in partnership with the government. Most of these programs pro-
vide livelihood support to the ultrapoor through a variety of means, such 
as through asset transfer, cash for work, skill training, health care provi-
sion, and flexible microcredit on easy terms outside the regular microcre-
dit programs. Some of the programs were introduced specifically for the 
monga-prone areas, such as the Chars Livelihood Programme, which is 
implemented jointly by NGOs and the local government in the char 
(reclaimed river islands) areas of Rangpur and some adjacent districts. 
Other such projects, designed as countrywide programs to help the ultra-
poor, are now specially targeting hunger-prone areas such as Rangpur. 
One example is the IGVGD–TUP (Income Gerneration for Vulnerable 
Group Development–Targeting the Ultra-Poor Programme), which is a 
partnership among the government, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), and the United Nations World Food Programme 
(Matin and Hulme 2003).11 
Similarly, the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) introduced an 
Ultra-Poor Program to be implemented by its partner NGOs and MFIs 
alongside their regular microcredit programs. As mentioned in the intro-
ductory chapter, PKSF subsequently started a special microcredit pro-
gram specifically targeted to the monga-affected extreme poor of the 
Rangpur region. The effect of this program will, however, be discussed 
separately in chapter 8 in this volume. The rest of this chapter examines 
the patterns of access to safety nets and their effect on the basis of data 
from the Institute of Microfinance (InM) baseline survey.
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InM Survey Findings on Social Safety Nets in Rangpur 
The discussions in the earlier chapters clearly show that the social safety-
net support is quite inadequate to mitigate the extreme situation of 
poverty and deprivation that exists in the Rangpur region, particularly 
during the monga period. The data from the InM baseline survey of 2006 
can be further analyzed to provide insight into the role of the safety nets 
with respect to their coverage, targeting, timing, and effect. The informa-
tion on safety nets was gathered in this survey according to two aspects: 
(a) whether the households were cardholder members of particular gov-
ernment safety-net programs (namely, VGD or VGF, Old Age Allowance, 
and FFW or Test Relief) regardless of whether they actually received any 
benefits during that monga season; and (b) whether the households 
received support, such as cash, food, clothing, building materials for 
houses, or livestock, during monga from the government or NGOs. 
As discussed in chapter 4 in this volume, nearly one-third of the house-
holds reported receiving some support from government and nongovern-
mental sources during the monga season (see table 4.6 in chapter 4 in this 
volume and table 7.2). This coverage may be compared with that of 
15 percent among rural households as found in the 2005 HIES. In making 
this comparison, however, one should remember that the estimate of 
coverage in the InM survey, which covered households approximately in 
the bottom three quintiles, would not be representative of all rural house-
holds. Even then, the coverage among the sample households seems to be 
on the higher side compared with the national estimate. This means that 
by the time of the InM survey, Rangpur had already started to attract 
Table 7.2 Distribution of Poor Households by Participation in Government 
Safety-Net Program and Incidence of Starvation during Monga in 
Greater Rangpur Region, 2006
percent 
Safety-net 
programs
Gaibandha 
district
Kurigram 
district 
Lalmonirhat 
district 
Nilphamari 
district 
Rangpur 
district
Rangpur 
region
VGD and VGF 5.84 1.69 11.32 1.67 11.84 6.30
Old Age Allowance 1.71 1.22 3.20 1.88 2.62 2.05
FFW and Test Relief 1.45 1.49 0 4.52 2.23 1.63
Starvation during 
monga 57.62 48.47 47.95 26.16 56.34 47.27
Number of 
observations 120,426 128,987 102,866 56,772 71,867 480,918
Source: Institute of Microfinance baseline survey, 2006.
Note: FFW = Food for Work; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding.
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attention for the placement of safety nets. The important question is what 
amount of such support per beneficiary household is adequate to make 
any significant effect. 
The above figure of safety-net coverage among survey households 
includes the beneficiaries of the NGO support programs, which have 
proliferated in the region in recent years. As for some of the main 
 government-run safety-net programs mentioned above, these programs 
together covered only about 10 percent of the survey households. For 
these programs, this estimate of coverage would appear to be unusually 
low when compared with the national average for all rural households, 
such as estimated from the 2005 HIES, or as suggested by the allocations 
in the national budgets (Narayan and Zaman 2009; World Bank and ADB 
2003). Thus, as of 2006, Rangpur seems to have remained disadvantaged 
in the placement of some of the major safety-net programs, as well as 
being specially targeted as an area vulnerable to food insecurity. Although 
some safety-net programs, especially those of NGOs, may have responded 
early to the call for the monga mitigation campaign, many major govern-
ment programs failed to do so.
The coverage of the government’s safety-net programs was not found to 
be equitably distributed even within the Rangpur region (table 7.2). Thus, 
the coverage of all the programs was less than the regional average in the 
Gaibandha district, although it was one of the districts worst affected by 
monga. Again, the severity of monga in both Kurigram and Lalmonirhat 
districts was about the same as in the region as a whole; yet less than 
2 percent of the households in Kurigram were cardholders of VGD or VGF 
compared with the regional average of more than 6 percent, while 
Lalmonirhat had the highest coverage of these programs (11 percent). 
Among the districts, Nilphamari had the lowest incidence of starvation 
during monga but had the highest proportion of households benefiting 
from FFW or Test Relief (the public works programs that are meant to be 
offered on the basis of need assessment for a particular area). However, 
for the Rangpur district, the relatively severe incidence of monga was 
matched by higher-than-average coverage of the programs, but this 
advantage might be due to its proximity to the regional city of Rangpur. 
These anomalies in area distribution of the programs should not, how-
ever, detract attention from the fact that the coverage of the programs 
was generally far from adequate, given the extent of the seasonal distress. 
According to the observed extent of food deprivation during monga, a 
large number of extremely vulnerable households appear to have been 
left out of the social safety-net system. 
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Membership in the government safety-net programs mentioned above 
does not necessarily guarantee receipt of support during the monga sea-
son. The data available from the InM baseline survey do not directly 
provide information regarding this receipt. But we can get some idea by 
looking at whether the households with membership in those selected 
government programs actually received support from any government or 
NGO programs during the monga season (table 7.3). For this analysis, the 
safety-net programs are grouped as short term (FFW and Test Relief) and 
long term (VGD and VGF and Old Age Allowance). This grouping is not 
entirely satisfactory, however, because VGF is actually a short-term pro-
gram but is lumped together in the InM survey with VGD, which is a 
long-term program.
The estimates in table 7.3 show that, among the households receiving 
support during monga (31.6 percent), only about one-third were mem-
bers of the government-run safety-net programs noted above, suggesting 
that the remaining households received support from the programs run 
by NGOs (and other relatively minor government programs). Moreover, 
about one-third of the members of the long-term or year-round govern-
ment programs and one-half of the members of short-term programs did 
not receive safety-net support from any sources during monga. This 
means that even higher proportions of these households did not receive 
support during monga from those selected government programs in 
which they reported participation, because some of them are likely to 
have received support from other sources, mainly NGOs. The suggestion 
is that not all short-term programs are targeted to the monga season and 
that the payments of benefits even under the year-round programs may 
sometimes skip the monga season. The programs do not thus appear to 
be seasonally sensitive.
Next, this section examines how the meal consumption status of 
households varies by membership in the safety-net programs (table 7.4). 
No distinction is made between short-term and long-term programs or 
between those households that actually received support during monga 
and those that did not.12 Moreover, such a comparison of the meal con-
sumption status cannot convey much about the effect of the safety-net 
programs, because the selection of beneficiaries for the programs cannot 
be assumed to be independent of household characteristics. These 
 endogeneity issues regarding impact estimation will be addressed later in 
this chapter. For the time being, it can be noted that the proportion of 
households experiencing starvation during monga is found to be higher 
among participant households (about 50 percent) compared with their 
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Table 7.3 Distribution of Households by Membership in Selected Government Safety-Net Programs 
and Actual Receipt of Support during Monga 
Whether or not support 
received during monga
Members of long-term 
programs only (%)
Members of short-term 
programs only (%)
Members of both 
types of programs (%) Nonmembers (%) All (%)
Number of 
observations
Support received 
during monga 5.3 0.7 0.1 25.5 31.6 328,601
Support not received 
during monga 2.7 0.8 0 67.9 71.4 152,317
Total 8.0 1.5 0.1 90.4 100.0 480,918
Number of 
observations 38,476 7,143 695 434,604 480,918
Source: Khandker, Khaleque, and Samad 2011.
Note: Long-term programs are Vulnerable Group Development, Vulnerable Group Feeding, and Old Age Allowance, whereas Test Relief and Food for Work are short-term programs. 
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Table 7.4 Meal Consumption Status during Monga and Non-monga Periods among Members and Nonmembers of Selected 
Government Safety-Net Programs
Period
Starvation Meal rationing Full meal
Members Nonmembers Members Nonmembers Members Nonmembers
Monga 49.9 46.1 46.1 49.3 4.0 4.6
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.0006)**
Non-monga 7.3 9.2 53.6 49.6 39.2 41.3
(0.0009)** (0.002)** (0.002)**
Source: Institute of Microfinance baseline survey, 2006.
Note: The safety-net programs include those in table 7.2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the difference. ** refers to a significance level of 5 percent of better.
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 counterpart nonparticipants (about 46 percent). Thus, whatever may be 
the extent of the beneficial effect of these programs, they seem to target 
the relatively more vulnerable among the generally poor households.13 
This is at least one positive aspect of these programs despite their inad-
equate coverage and inequitable area targeting discussed earlier. 
Further insights regarding safety-net support can be gained by looking 
at the patterns of monga coping mechanisms adopted by the households. 
Table 7.5 shows the distribution of households by type of coping mech-
anism for households that received safety-net support and those that did 
not. Unlike the previous tables, here the recipients of safety-net support 
include those who actually received such support during the monga 
period from the government or NGOs. The striking feature of these 
estimates is that the beneficiaries of safety nets adopted each of the cop-
ing mechanisms in larger proportions compared with the rest of the 
households. It is clear that because of the small support from safety nets, 
the vulnerable households had to combine other coping methods to 
mitigate monga. 
Seasonal migration was by far the most commonly adopted coping 
mechanism among both groups of households: 39 percent among the 
beneficiaries of safety nets and 35 percent among the others. Safety nets 
may in fact help seasonal migration by providing some support to the 
households in the absence of their working members. However, the more 
remarkable aspect of these estimates is that the incidence of the so-called 
Table 7.5 Coping Mechanisms Adopted during Monga by Recipients and 
Nonrecipients of Safety-Net Benefits
percent
Coping mechanism
Among recipients of 
safety-net benefits
Among nonrecipients of 
safety-net benefits
Advance sale of labor 6.0 3.6
Advance sale of crop 0.5 0.5
Sale of asset 14.5 9.9
Out-migration 38.6 34.8
Borrowing from informal 
sources 15.9 10.7
Borrowing from formal 
or semi-formal sources 6.5 5.5
Any coping mechanism 57.2 49.1
Number of observations 152,317 328,601
Source: Khandker, Khaleque, and Samad 2011. 
Note: Safety-net benefits are those actually received during monga from the government or from nongovernment 
organizations.
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erosive coping mechanisms, such as asset sale or advance labor sale, was 
also higher among the beneficiaries of safety nets compared with others. 
This suggests that the extent of safety-net support was not adequate 
enough even to avoid the coping mechanisms that are adopted only 
under severe distress. In the absence of such support, the situation of the 
households could have been, of course, even more desperate. This finding 
also suggests that the households that received the safety-net benefits 
seem to be relatively more vulnerable among the entire sample of poor 
households. This corroborates the earlier finding regarding the targeting 
of the government safety-net programs.
Determinants of Access to Safety Nets
This section examines various factors that might determine whether or 
not a household would receive safety-net benefits. One important crite-
rion used to identify the extreme poor in Bangladesh is the size of land-
holding—namely, households that have fewer than 50 decimals (half an 
acre) of land are the extreme poor. When this criterion is applied to the 
InM baseline survey, more than 98 percent of the sample households are 
included. However, with regard to receiving the benefits of the safety-net 
programs during the monga period, less than one-third of the sample 
households actually received such benefits. This may have less to do with 
targeting efficiency than with the fact that safety-net resources are mea-
ger; there is simply not enough to provide for all who deserve them. 
Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to examine whether, even among the 
extreme poor, some households are more likely than others to access 
safety-net benefits.
Because of the binomial nature of whether or not a household received 
safety-net benefits (s), the probability of receiving such benefits may be 
estimated by a probit model as given by
                prob dt
x
( ) ( )s t x( )= = =
−∞
∫1 φ ββ Φ , (7.1)
where f and Φ are the normal density distribution function and cumula-
tive normal distribution function, respectively; x is a vector of household 
and community characteristics; and b is the vector of parameters that 
needs to be determined. Both household and village characteristics 
are likely to affect the receipt of safety-net benefits during the monga 
season. 
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Among the determining factors at the household level, we consider 
household assets of different types, such as dependency ratio, age of the 
household head, nature of employment, and so on. The community-level 
variables include village access to microcredit and the village-level unem-
ployment rate.14 Moreover, some area characteristics are included that 
can affect households’ vulnerability to monga and the outreach of safety-
net resources to them, namely, the average yearly rainfall at the upazila 
level and the proportion of high land in the upazila, as well as if the vil-
lage is in a char area.15 Finally, we control for local (union level) unob-
served area characteristics that may influence the probability of receiving 
safety-net benefits during the monga season.
The probit results of equation (7.1) are reported in table 7.6. The table 
also presents the descriptive statistics of the major explanatory variables 
used in the regression. In the interpretation of the implications of the 
results, a few caveats should be kept in mind. The exercise is based on the 
information on all safety-net support received during monga, whether 
from the government or NGOs. Lumping together all the safety-net pro-
grams is problematic in that the various programs are targeted to house-
holds with varying characteristics because of the specific objectives of the 
programs. Moreover, the targeting of government programs may be influ-
enced by factors that may not apply to NGO programs. Also, there is 
likely to be some degree of randomness in beneficiary selection when the 
coverage of the programs falls far short of the numbers of households in 
need of support. It is remarkable that in spite of these caveats, the statis-
tical exercise yields a number of results that are both meaningful and 
statistically significant. 
Household-level variables such as the age and employment status of 
the household head and the ownership of nonagricultural assets are 
found to matter in terms of accessing social safety-net support. For 
example, a household with a self-employed head is less likely to receive 
safety-net benefits, while wage employment has the opposite effect. The 
self-employment status of the household head reduces the probability of 
receiving safety-net benefits during monga by about 10 percent. With 
regard to ownership of assets, owning nonagricultural assets lowers the 
likelihood of receiving safety-net benefits by 3 percent. As discussed in 
earlier chapters, the households with a wage-employed head are gener-
ally more vulnerable to starvation during monga compared with those 
with a self-employed head, and self-employment, particularly in the 
nonfarm sector, can have beneficial counterseasonal effects on the liveli-
hoods of the poor.16 The above results thus suggest that the targeting of 
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Table 7.6 Probit Estimates of Receipt of Safety-Net Support during Monga
Explanatory variables Marginal effects
Mean of explanatory 
variables
Age of household head (years) 0.021**
(0.001)
40.0
(12.7)
Age of household head squared −0.0002**
(0.00001)
40.0
(12.7)
Dependency ratio 0.031
(0.024)
0.63
(0.21)
Log of land asset (decimal) 0.296
(0.182)
8.20
(12.59)
Self-employed household head −0.103**
(0.007)
0.16
(0.37)
Wage-employed household head 0.012**
(0.005)
0.54
(0.50)
Household with agricultural asset −0.017
(0.013)
0.49
(0.50)
Household with nonagricultural asset −0.030**
(0.013)
0.13
(0.34)
Household with cash savings 0.049**
(0.010)
0.34
(0.47)
Household with livestock 0.015
(0.010)
0.26
(0.44)
Village with microcredit programs −0.003
(0.030)
0.97
(0.18)
Village-level unemployment rate 0.115**
(0.033)
0.30
(0.24)
Proportion of high lands in upazila 0.465**
(0.137)
0.81
(0.08)
Average annual rainfall in upazila (mm) 0.018**
(0.002)
198.55
(6.62)
Village located in char area −0.005
(0.024)
0.19
(0.39)
Proportion of high lands in upazila × Log land 
asset (decimals) 
−0.017**
(0.007)
—
Average annual rainfall in upazila (mm) × Log 
land asset (decimals) 
−0.006**
(0.001)
—
Village located in char area × Log land asset 
(decimals) 
−0.009**
(0.001)
—
Pseudo R2 0.050
Log likelihood −285,258.5
Number of observations 480,918
Source: Khandker, Khaleque, and Samad 2011.
Notes: Regression additionally includes union dummies to control for unobserved union-level effects. Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations for the column of mean of variables and standard errors for the column of 
marginal effects. ** refers to a statistical significance of 5 percent or better; mm = millimeter; — = not applicable. 
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the safety-net programs was generally in conformity with the risks of 
food insecurity during monga.
In terms of area characteristics, households from a village with a high 
unemployment rate are found more likely to receive support than those 
from a village with a low unemployment rate. The results are, however, 
less encouraging when one views targeting with respect to other area 
characteristics. Thus, areas with higher rainfall as well as areas with more 
high lands (both characteristics indicate better agricultural opportunities) 
are likely to receive more benefits compared with other areas. Also, the 
vulnerability of households living in the adverse agroecological conditions 
of the char land does not seem to influence decisions about targeting of 
support during monga. However, once the safety-net programs are in 
place—whether in high land areas, areas with high rainfall, or char land—
the chance of receiving safety-net benefits decreases with an increase in 
the size of land owned by a household (as can be seen from the regression 
coefficients of the interaction of land asset with the respective area 
 characteristic). These findings, therefore, further confirm that safety-net 
programs perform rather poorly in targeting vulnerable areas, but once 
the villages have access to such programs, the relatively more vulnerable 
among the poor households are likely to benefit more. 
Evaluating the Effect of Social Safety Nets on Seasonal Hunger 
The findings so far give some idea about the relative situation of house-
holds that received safety-net benefits compared with those that did not 
and about the possible determining factors in accessing such benefits. 
However, these findings cannot indicate the extent to which safety-net 
programs were effective in lowering food deprivation for the households 
that received the benefits. For a determination of the effect of safety-net 
programs, it is important to control for a host of other factors (both 
observed and unobserved) that determine households’ food deprivation. 
Moreover, among the sample households, access to safety-net benefits is 
not randomly given, but depends on many factors, including both house-
hold and area characteristics. These same factors are also important in 
determining a household’s situation regarding food deprivation. The esti-
mation of the program effect must therefore tackle the problem of joint 
dependence of households’ food deprivation and access to safety nets on 
the same factors, both observed and unobserved. 
To solve the problem of estimating the net effect of the safety-net 
benefits after controlling for simultaneous determination of receiving 
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such benefits, we use an endogenous switching regression method as 
proposed by Maddala (1983) and extended by Lokshin and Sajaia 
(2004).17 The details of this estimation methodology were discussed in 
chapter 6 in this volume, while the effect of migration on households’ 
food deprivation was estimated and need not be repeated here (see 
annex to chapter 6). 
Essentially, all sample households are divided into those that received 
safety-net benefits during monga and those that did not, and then equa-
tions are estimated for food deprivation status for each household group 
by using various household and community characteristics. By switching 
the estimated parameters between the equations for the two groups, we 
can then estimate the counterfactuals, that is, what would have been the 
food deprivation status of the beneficiary households if they had no 
access to safety nets (and, similarly for the nonbeneficiaries if they could 
have accessed safety net benefits)? However, as a control for the endo-
geneity of access to safety-nets, the outcome equations are run after 
controlling for the selection biases distinguishing the two groups.18 The 
effect of safety nets can then be estimated by differencing these “condi-
tional” outcomes with and without the receipt of the benefits. This can 
be done for both beneficiary and nonbeneficiary groups, but for the lat-
ter group, the estimated effect of safety nets is, of course, in the nature 
of a counterfactual. 
Table 7.7 reports the estimates of the potential benefits of safety-net 
programs. The benefits are shown in terms of the reduction in the prob-
ability of experiencing different extents of food deprivation, in the monga 
and the non-monga periods and year round. As in the previous chapters, 
the year-round or overall food deprivation status is defined in the follow-
ing way: starvation means experiencing starvation during any period of 
the year (that is, during either the monga or the non-monga period); meal 
rationing means having to ration meals during at least one period, but 
avoiding starvation in all periods; and the rest of the households have full 
meals during both monga and non-monga periods. 
The results clearly show that safety-net benefits lower the seasonal 
hardship for both recipient and nonrecipient households. The ex pect ed 
reduction in starvation during monga for recipient households is 
4.4  percentage points (which are actually accrued to them), and for 
 non-recipient households, it is 2.5 percentage points (which would have 
accrued to them had they received safety-net benefits). Moreover, gen-
eral food deprivation (for example, starvation or food rationing) during 
the monga period declines by 3.9 percentage points for the recipient 
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 households and 5.2 percentage points for nonrecipient households as a 
result of receiving safety-net benefits. 
A noteworthy aspect of the results is that the accrued benefit to 
recipient households is higher than that for nonrecipient households with 
regard to avoiding extreme hardship or starvation. But for general food 
deprivation, nonrecipients would likely have benefited more had they 
received such benefits. This points to the underlying differences between 
the recipient and nonrecipient households. However, regardless of the 
household types, benefits of safety-net programs on seasonal food depri-
vation have been unequivocally established in this exercise. 
In extending the analysis to estimation of the potential effects on non-
monga outcomes, we find that the receipt of safety-net benefits during the 
monga season has a beneficial effect for other seasons as well. This finding 
could have alternative explanations. Although the exercise is based on 
safety-net benefits received during the monga season only, there may be a 
positive spillover effect during other seasons. More plausibly, the positive 
non-monga effect may arise from the fact that the households that receive 
safety-net benefits during monga are also more likely than others to 
Table 7.7 Effect of Receipt of Support during Monga on Household Food 
Deprivation 
Household type
Extreme hardship 
(starvation)
All hardships (starvation 
or food rationing)
During monga period
Recipients of support during monga −0.044**
(0.0002)
−0.039**
(0.0001)
Nonrecipients of support during 
monga
−0.025**
(0.0001)
−0.052**
(0.00003)
During non-monga period
Recipients of support during monga −0.044**
(0.0002)
−0.030**
(0.0001)
Nonrecipients of support during 
monga
−0.032**
(0.0001)
−0.011**
(0.0002)
Year round or overall
Recipients of support during monga −0.038**
(0.0002)
−0.015**
(0.0002)
Nonrecipients of support during 
monga
−0.024**
(0.0001)
−0.045**
(0.00003)
Source: Khandker, Khaleque, and Samad 2011.
Note: Results are based on the switching regression method discussed in the text. The year-round/overall 
status is as defined in the earlier discussions. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. ** refers to a 
statistical significance of 5 percent or bettter. The number of observations is 480,918.
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receive such benefits in non-monga seasons. This is  obviously the case for 
the cardholder members of the year-round programs. Whatever may be 
the case, the results show that safety-net programs can have beneficial 
effects on both transitory and year-round food deprivation. 
Concluding Remarks
Bangladesh has a fairly large and elaborate social safety-net system aimed 
at safeguarding the economic security of the poor and vulnerable groups. 
This chapter has examined in particular the seasonal dimensions of the 
effect of safety-net programs. 
An important consideration in this respect is an appropriate balance 
between short-term seasonally oriented programs and long-term or year-
round programs Although a predominant part of the existing safety-net 
system in Bangladesh consists of short-term programs, this does not mean 
that the system has an effective counterseasonal impact. For decisions 
about the timing of seasonal public works programs, such as FFW, there 
may be balancing considerations of providing employment during the 
pre-aman lean season (which partly coincides with the late rainy season 
and annual floods) and undertaking earthwork for infrastructure building 
(for which the dry season is more suitable). But more disconcerting is the 
survey finding from Rangpur that the payments of benefits even under 
the year-round programs may sometimes skip the monga season, thus 
betraying a lack of sensitivity to seasonal distress.
Another area of concern is that, along with various forms of resource 
leakages, a sizable share of the benefits goes to the nonpoor. Yet another 
weak link in channeling safety-net resources to the poor appears to be the 
process used by the government to allocate resources across regions, 
which corresponds poorly with the regional variations in poverty levels. 
To the extent that the programs have pro-poor targeting (that is, the poor 
benefit more than the nonpoor), this outcome is found to be due to pro-
poor targeting within rather than across villages. The analysis of survey 
data from Rangpur confirms that safety-net programs perform rather 
poorly in targeting vulnerable areas. However, when villages have access 
to such programs, the relatively more vulnerable among the poor house-
holds are likely to benefit more. 
Further insights into targeting and the effect of safety nets among the 
poor households in Rangpur can be gained when the households are 
divided into those that received safety-net benefits during the monga 
season and those that did not. Compared with nonbeneficiaries, the 
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 beneficiary households were worse off in experiencing starvation during 
monga and had to resort more often to various coping mechanisms, 
including those adopted only under extreme distress. Thus, although the 
more vulnerable among the poor may have been targeted, the amount of 
support was clearly inadequate to lift these households out of extreme 
seasonal distress. Moreover, judged simply by the observed extent of food 
deprivation during monga, a large number of extremely vulnerable 
households were apparently overlooked by the social safety-net system. 
Political competition, driven by the creation of public awareness, 
seems to have played a role in shaping the government’s social safety-net 
system. Despite the general lack of sensitivity in the safety-net allocations 
with respect to poverty prevalence, the increased public attention given 
to monga in recent years may have translated into increased safety-net 
coverage in the Rangpur region. However, this increase in coverage may 
be explained in part by programs with extremely small short-term or one-
time benefits. This aspect may reflect a kind of populist tokenism in the 
provision of safety-net benefits.
In spite of the limitations, the safety-net programs do have a positive 
effect on mitigating monga, as found in the statistical exercises. Moreover, 
there are both seasonal and year-round beneficial effects. It may be cor-
rect to argue therefore that these programs need to be expanded in cover-
age, made more cost-effective, and designed to be more sensitive to 
seasonal needs. 
Notes
 1. These programs include a “productivity enhancing safety net” in Ghana in the 
1980s designed to promote household food security and reduce seasonal 
hunger gap; Food for Work and Vulnerable Group Feeding programs in 
Namibia in the 1990s; emergency cash transfers in Malawi in the mid-2000s 
in response to localized crop failures; and the “household extension packages” 
and cash transfers to cover a hunger gap of four to six months in Ethiopia in 
the mid-2000s (see also Devereux, Vatila, and Swan 2008). 
 2. There are differing opinions regarding how far social safety-net programs can 
be effective in alleviating not only transitory poverty but also persistent pov-
erty; see, for example, Devereux (2002) and Ravallion, van de Walle, and 
Gautam (1995). 
 3. Another major safety-net program with relatively large budget allocations is 
Open Market Sales under which rice is sold to the urban poor at subsidized 
prices, but the program is not included here because of its urban orientation. 
148       Seasonal Hunger and Public Policies
 4. This amount is based on the estimated total population of 146 million of 
which 75 percent was rural with an average household size of 4.5 persons. 
 5. According to the 2005 HIES, the coverage rate was 15 percent of households 
in rural areas compared with 5 percent in urban areas (Narayan and Zaman 
2009, 280).
 6. This estimate excludes programs that cannot appropriately be called safety 
nets, although these are designated so in the government budget. The univer-
sal stipend program for female secondary students is an example (see PPRC 
and UNDP 2011, annex 4 and other annexes).
 7. Amounts are estimated from the data reported in BBS (2011, 74).
 8. According to 2010 HIES data, the proportions of beneficiary households in 
the thirty listed safety-net programs add up to nearly three times the propor-
tion of households receiving benefits from at least one program, suggesting 
widespread prevalence of multiple program membership (see BBS 2011, 75). 
 9. Because a new administrative division has recently been created from the 
Rangpur region, the published results of the 2010 HIES, unlike those of the 
previous rounds, have separate information on this region in the regional 
breakdowns of the results. 
 10. As discussed earlier, the comparison of net monthly benefits received during 
the program period is not very meaningful without information regarding the 
duration of the year for which the benefits were received.
 11. TUP is a BRAC program, and IGVGD is a particular variety of VGD program 
with emphasis on training for income generation.
 12. This is not an entirely satisfactory comparison because the nonparticipants 
include those who received safety-net benefits from programs other than 
those listed here.
 13. This result would be so if it is assumed that at worst, there would be no per-
ceptible program effect on household food consumption status.
 14. Village-level unemployment rate has been defined by the proportion of 
households in the village whose heads are unemployed. 
 15. Upazila is a subdistrict. The high land is defined by the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Research Council in relation to the annual flood water level. 
Char areas are islands and land fragments formed by river sediments, which 
are then inhabited by destitute people who have no other place to live. 
 16. See chapter 5 in this volume for the findings regarding the determining fac-
tors behind food deprivation during monga in Rangpur; see also figure 3.15 
in chapter 3 in this volume for the patterns of seasonality of various types of 
employment.
 17. Alternatively, if appropriate instrumental variables could be identified that 
would directly affect households’ receipt of safety-net benefits, but not the 
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outcomes regarding food deprivation, a two-stage Heckman selection method 
could be used to estimate the effect of the safety nets. 
 18. For this exercise, the parameters of a selection model regarding participation 
in safety-net programs must first be estimated. The results of the entire exer-
cise show that the outcome variable (a household’s starvation status) is 
indeed affected by the endogeneity bias; hence, there is justification for con-
trolling for the unobserved factors that influence a household’s probability of 
receiving safety-net benefits in the first place. 
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Microfinance to Tackle Seasonality 
There is an increasing debate on the role of microfinance in development: 
Is microfinance a financial service or a social safety-net program? Those 
who believe microfinance is a business model offering financial services 
on a commercial basis do not want to give prominence to the social 
safety-net aspects of microfinance. Those who see the role of  microfinance 
as being important in consumption smoothing and extreme poverty 
reduction argue that microfinance is a part of social protection strategies. 
Whatever the merits of this debate, microfinance has carved out its own 
market through a strategy that mitigates the moral hazards of lending by 
adopting innovative methods, such as group-based lending.1 Microfinance 
is no doubt a financial service. Yet by simply targeting the poor— 
especially women, who are often excluded from regular financial institu-
tions because of insufficient physical collateral—microfinance serves the 
underserved poor. Therefore, it has a role to play in poverty reduction by 
releasing a borrowing constraint in household resource allocation. 
However, findings from several countries do not support the expected 
poverty reduction aspect of microfinance. But several other studies from a 
number of countries, including Bangladesh, demonstrate that microfinance 
reduces poverty. For example, a seven-year study carried out in Bangladesh 
suggests that even if gains from microfinance are not necessarily large, 
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microcredit reduces extreme poverty more than moderate poverty 
(Khandker 2005). 
Microfinance also helps stabilize income and consumption fluctua-
tions, thereby playing a social safety-net service. For example, even if 
microfinance does not lend much to agriculture, the poor with micro-
credit support initiate income-earning activities mostly in the rural non-
farm sectors, which are subject to the same covariate risk affecting 
agricultural production. Research shows that households unable to 
smooth consumption because of income seasonality are more likely to 
participate in microcredit programs, which promote income-earning 
activities in rural nonfarm sectors that are less vulnerable to seasonality 
than those in the farming sector. In this way, borrowers are helped in 
smoothing consumption and thus reducing vulnerability to seasonal con-
sumption. Pitt and Khandker (2002, 21) find that production credit helps 
smooth seasonal consumption by financing new productive activities 
whose “income flows and time demands do not seasonally co-vary with 
income generated by existing activities of households.” Microfinance is 
seen to help households absorb shocks, such as the death of a family 
member or a natural disaster resulting in plummeting income and con-
sumption. Microfinance therefore acts as a social protection scheme as 
well as a scheme for providing financial services to the poor. 
This chapter focuses on the role of microfinance in addressing season-
ality of income and poverty, including seasonal food deprivation. In recent 
years, microfinance has been criticized for not reaching a large percent-
age of the ultrapoor (Datta 2004; Webb, Coates, and Houser 2002).2 In 
Bangladesh, despite the country’s overwhelmingly large proportion of 
ultrapoor, microfinance reaches not more than 20 percent of that popu-
lation (Khandker 1998, 2005). Similarly, microfinance has limited cover-
age in ecologically vulnerable areas, such as the northwest region of 
Bangladesh (Khandker 2009), where the incidence of poverty is high, 
much higher than in other regions.3 
Questions then arise: Why don’t the ultrapoor participate in microfi-
nance? Why is a small share of the microfinance portfolio in areas such as 
the northwest region, which features pronounced income seasonality? 
Does income seasonality reinforce extreme poverty and, as a result, the 
limited coverage of microfinance in the seasonally pronounced northwest 
region? Is a microfinance program different from what is currently avail-
able needed to tackle both income seasonality and extreme poverty?
Addressing extreme poverty or pronounced seasonality of income is a 
formidable task for any institution, let alone a microfinance institution. 
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When poverty is already rampant, pronounced seasonality of income and 
consumption only makes poverty worse. Therefore, tackling both season-
ality and poverty with a single intervention, such as microfinance, is a 
major challenge for policy makers. Yet a large body of literature shows 
that the observed seasonality in consumption is driven mainly by the 
seasonal variation in income and that lack of access to credit impedes 
consumption smoothing, often among the poor (Chaudhuri and Paxson 
2002; Paxson 1993; Rosenzweig 1988; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). 
However, if the risk is idiosyncratic (that is, specific to certain house-
holds), then local risk pooling or insurance is feasible, which becomes 
limited in the event of an aggregate shock (Townsend 1995). The devel-
opment literature indicates that better access to institutional finance is a 
useful approach for better allocation of resources under seasonality of 
agriculture (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993).
If lack of access to credit causes households not to smooth consump-
tion or allocate resources efficiently, then both seasonal and extreme 
poverty are caused, in part, by a lack of access to institutional credit. 
Introducing a microfinance program that targets the extreme poor and 
that is designed to tackle pronounced income seasonality is perhaps a 
way to make a dent in both seasonal and chronic poverty. 
In recent years, with donor assistance and under government pressure, 
some microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh have introduced a 
variety of programs to better handle seasonality and extreme poverty. 
In 2002, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), 
Bangladesh’s leading nongovernmental organization (NGO), launched a 
multidimensional microcredit program targeting the ultrapoor (Emran, 
Robano, and Smith 2009; Matin and Hulme 2003).4 BRAC’s ultrapoor 
program emphasizes both human and physical capital development 
through transferring assets and other means, such as skills-based training, 
before the ultrapoor graduate to become members of its regular micro-
finance program. Similar programs introduced by Grameen Bank target 
the ultrapoor, such as beggars. Many MFIs, including Grameen Bank, 
have introduced seasonal loans as part of their regular microfinance 
programs to address seasonality of income. 
In 2006, the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), the country’s 
premier wholesale MFI, introduced a major microfinance program—the 
Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication (PRIME).5 PRIME’s objec-
tive is to deal exclusively with the extreme poor, who are highly vulner-
able to seasonal poverty, especially in the Rangpur region. PRIME offers 
the ultrapoor microcredit and other services on flexible terms. 
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This chapter addresses whether a program such as PRIME can achieve 
the goal of reducing both extreme poverty and seasonal poverty. More 
specifically, this chapter (a) evaluates the extent to which PRIME’s flex-
ible microfinance program is effective in reaching the ultrapoor and 
seasonally poor, (b) quantifies program benefits with respect to mitigat-
ing extreme and seasonal poverty, and (c) assesses the relative effective-
ness of PRIME vis-à-vis regular microfinance in reducing extreme and 
seasonal poverty.
Why Choose PRIME to Tackle Seasonality 
of Income and Poverty? 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4 in this volume, those who suffer most 
from seasonal deprivation are mainly the extreme poor, who have few 
assets and scarce savings with which to smooth consumption during lean 
periods. Because they lack access to credit markets, they are unable to 
borrow against future income. Without well-functioning credit markets, 
households frequently attempt to smooth consumption during monga by 
drawing on informal credit market arrangements, known locally as 
dadan. Under these arrangements, laborers sell labor or farmers sell crops 
in advance on terms that are often severe. Households also employ tra-
ditional self-insurance methods of coping, such as use of buffer stock 
(livestock and grain storage), and mutual insurance, such as interfamily 
transfers. But for many households, these traditional methods of smooth-
ing consumption are inadequate and inefficient. 
As discussed in chapter 7 in this volume, government institutions use 
short-term measures, such as cash transfers, Food for Work programs, food 
coupons, and public works to manage monga. These safety-net measures 
have limited effects, which occur when variations in consumption are only 
transitory and idiosyncratic across households. But because monga is wide-
spread and partly caused by structural factors, such as low productivity 
and lack of diversification of local economies, safety-net interventions are 
found to have limited success in containing monga on a sustained basis. 
In addition, regular microfinance with group-based lending with a 
weekly repayment schedule as practiced by MFIs in Bangladesh appears 
to have limited scope in mitigating monga or seasonality of poverty on a 
sustained basis for several reasons. First, microfinance has an inherent bias 
against the ultrapoor, who are normally hit hard by seasonality of income 
and consumption. Second, the weekly repayment schedule conflicts with 
seasonality of income and employment, which also inhibits the ultrapoor’s 
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participation in microfinance. Third, activities generating seasonality of 
income often limit the ability of microcredit agencies to support new 
loans during lean seasons. Finally, group-based lending works well when 
income variations are idiosyncratic so that group members assist or insure 
each other through difficult times. But when seasonality is systematic, 
affecting everyone in a group, the ability of mutual insurance to provide 
help is severely curtailed, and the group as a whole has a greater incentive 
to collude on a strategy of default. Thus, regular microfinance is not well 
suited to addressing seasonality of income and poverty effectively. It is 
little wonder that microfinance has been less effective in reaching the 
extreme poor who are more seasonally poor and vulnerable than others 
living in a vulnerable region such as Rangpur. 
To alleviate some of these concerns, the PKSF and its partners intro-
duced PRIME as a pilot project in 2006 to address seasonal deprivation 
and ultrapoverty in Rangpur. Unlike regular microfinance, PRIME is a 
flexible microfinance program that includes both production and con-
sumption loans and that specifically targets the ultrapoor. Unlike regular 
microfinance, PRIME has a flexible repayment schedule; a production 
loan can be used for consumption if needed; the interest rate is not more 
than 10 percent (compared with 20 percent for regular microfinance); 
and no fixed savings or weekly meetings are stipulated. 
The target beneficiaries of PRIME are the ultrapoor, identified on the 
basis of a village census taken before the program intervention using the 
following criteria: (a) households have strictly fewer than 50 decimals of 
land, (b) household per capita monthly income does not exceed Tk 1,500 
(US$25), and (c) one household member is a daily wage worker. The 
preprogram intervention data collected by the PKSF in 2006 reveals that, 
in listing the households for PRIME intervention, eligibility conditions 
were strictly enforced. PRIME is therefore worthy of a rigorous impact 
evaluation, which must determine whether the intervention is effective 
in mitigating seasonal deprivation and extreme poverty. 
Table 8.1 shows the growth of membership, borrowers, and savings 
mobilized. Over a period of one and one-half years, PRIME mobilized 
460,000 members, of which 90 percent were borrowers. About Tk 
344.6 million was disbursed during October–December 2009, almost 15 
percent of which was mobilized. PRIME achieved remarkable success in 
mobilizing the ultrapoor to engage in income-generating activities through 
microfinance in flexible terms. 
In addition to flexible microfinance, PRIME offers year-round services 
to support income-generating activities, skills-based training, remittances, 
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and primary health care (Khalily and Latif 2010). During the monga sea-
son, PRIME also provides emergency loans for consumption smoothing 
and cash for work related to local infrastructure development. However, 
PRIME does not offer consumption credit without either subsequent or 
prior production credit. Figure 8.1 shows the distribution of program 
inputs to PRIME participants in 2009. PRIME offers a number of services 
other than mobilizing loans and savings. As figure 8.1 shows, although half 
the PRIME members sought lending services (48.9 percent), its program 
activities included health services (40.7 percent) followed by skills-based 
training (7.5 percent), emergency loan services (2.2 percent), and remit-
tance services (0.6 percent). 
Important to the identification of appropriate policies is an under-
standing of the extent of the seasonal nature of poverty vis-à-vis chronic 
poverty. Although transient or seasonal poverty may be addressed by 
offering credit and bolstering safety nets that stabilize income and con-
sumption, the roots of chronic poverty are deeper and must be addressed 
through long-term investments in human and physical capital (for exam-
ple, Jalan and Ravallion 2000). Therefore, the evaluation of PRIME must 
examine whether the provision of credit, along with other nonfinancial 
services, is capable of addressing both the human and the physical capital 
Table 8.1 Distribution of PRIME Membership, Borrowers, Disbursement, 
and Savings
Time period Membership
Disbursement 
(Tk, million)
Savings 
(Tk, million )
Savings 
(% of disbursement)
Up to June 2008 160,324
(71.73)
459.59 66.78 14.53
July–September 
2008
189,555
(76.09)
115.92 21.31 18.38
October–December 
2008
221,249
(79.52)
186.24 24.23 13.01
January–March 
2009
301,788
(84.98)
343.20 33.73 9.83
April–June 
2009
359,441
(87.39)
278.29 49.49 17.78
July–September 
2009
403,512
(88.77)
246.71 43.27 17.54
October–December 
2009
459,496
(90.14)
344.62 50.94 14.78
Source: PKSF.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage of borrowers among members. PRIME = Programmed Initiatives 
for Monga Eradication.
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needs of the ultrapoor for mitigating seasonal and extreme poverty in a 
sustainable way.
Does PRIME Handle Seasonality Better Than 
Regular Microfinance? 
Between December 2008 and February 2009, the Institute of Microfinance 
(InM) administered a detailed survey that sampled target households to 
assess the effect of PRIME. A multistage cluster sampling technique was 
used to draw a random sample of 4,589 households from 16 upazilas 
(subdistricts that each comprise 10–12 unions), 61 unions (a union is a 
collection of 10–12 villages), and 271 villages from the total area that 
received the intervention. Interestingly, not all selected households that 
were eligible for the PRIME intervention participated in the second inter-
view (two years after program intervention began). Moreover, some ran-
domly sampled households from PRIME catchment villages participated 
in regular microfinance. 
In addition to this sample survey of households, InM carried out a 
similar survey in areas of three districts that were targeted for the PRIME 
intervention by 2010 but had not received it by 2008–09. Of 11 upazilas 
in three districts, 4 were selected as control upazilas. Of the 40 villages in 
Figure 8.1 Distribution of Program Inputs to PRIME Participants, 2009
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM follow-up survey 2008. 
Note: PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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these four upazilas not yet covered under PRIME, 27 were selected, from 
which 618 PRIME-eligible households were randomly drawn on the basis 
of the village census. Thus, the total sample of households selected for the 
study was 5,207, of which 1,520 participated in PRIME, 1,718 partici-
pated in regular microfinance, and 1,968 did not participate in any pro-
gram (for details, see Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010).
Table 8.2 shows the distribution of the 5,207 households by program 
participation status and by district in the greater Rangpur region. The 
sample distribution was further disaggregated by PRIME and non-PRIME 
areas. Three groups were identified by program participation status: 
PRIME-only, regular microfinance only, and nonparticipants (in PRIME, 
non-PRIME, or control villages).6 In all areas, 33.0 percent of target 
households were regular microcredit program participants, 29.2 percent 
were PRIME participants, and 37.8 percent were nonparticipants. In 
PRIME areas, the shares of PRIME participants, regular microfinance par-
ticipants, and nonparticipants were 33.2, 33.8, and 33.0 percent, respec-
tively. In non-PRIME villages, 26.5 percent of the ultrapoor participated 
in regular microfinance, whereas 73.5 percent were nonparticipants. 
Although Lalmonirhat received the earliest PRIME treatment, 
Kurigram had the highest percentage of PRIME participants, followed by 
Nilphamari, Lalmonirhat, Rangpur, and Gaibandha (table 8.2). 
Interestingly, Lalmonirhat has high participation in regular microfinance 
programs (36.9 percent), second only to Gaibandha. 
Table 8.3 presents descriptive statistics of major outcomes by program 
participation status for the 2008–09 survey of 5,207 households. Of par-
ticular importance are the poverty and seasonal deprivation measures. 
Two measures of poverty (moderate and extreme) are calculated and 
presented in table 8.3 using the year-round consumption data. The extent 
of both dimensions of poverty is about the same for all three categories of 
households. For example, the share of moderate poverty is 86.1 percent 
among the regular microfinance participants, compared with 87.1 percent 
among PRIME participants and 89.2 percent among nonparticipants. 
By contrast, among regular microcredit programs, 67.6 percent are 
extremely poor, compared with 67.5 percent among PRIME participants 
and 72.7 percent among nonparticipants; that is, among the targeted 
ultrapoor, participants in both regular and PRIME microcredit programs 
are slightly better off than nonparticipants. 
As table 8.3 shows, the year-round subjective measure of food depriva-
tion (either starvation or meal rationing) is 94.5 percent for all house-
holds, compared with 69.5 percent of extreme poverty among the same 
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Table 8.2 Household Participation Rates in Major Monga Intervention Programs
percent
Program type Gaibandha district Kurigram district Lalmonirhat district Nilphamari district Rangpur district All districts
PRIME area
PRIME 28.7 39.7 31.9 36.3 29.9 33.2
Regular microfinance 37.2 30.0 36.9 25.5 35.5 33.8
Nonparticipants 34.1 30.3 31.2 38.2 34.6 33.0
Number of observations 1,257 1,135 1,015 490 692 4,589
Non-PRIME area
PRIME 0 — — 0 0 0
Regular microfinance 6.3 — — 31.2 25.8 26.5
Nonparticipants 93.7 — — 68.8 74.2 73.5
Number of observations 64 0 0 314 240 618
All areas
PRIME 27.3 39.7 31.9 22.2 22.3 29.2
Regular microfinance 35.7 30.0 36.8 27.7 33.0 33.0
Nonparticipants 37.0 30.3 31.3 50.1 44.7 37.8
Number of observations 1,321 1,135 1,015 804 932 5,207
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010.
Note: PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication; — = not applicable.
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Table 8.3 Household-Level Outcome Indicators by Program Participation
Outcome indicator PRIME Regular MFIs Nonparticipants Whole sample
Year-round outcomes
Male employment (hours/month) 168.0 183.6 154.0 167.9
Female employment (hours/month) 41.1 33.8 30.9 34.9
Total employment (hours/month) 209.2 217.4 184.9 202.8
Per capita income (Tk/month) 963.6 1,005.9 841.6 931.4
Current savings (Tk) 90.8 192.7 53.3 110.2
Per capita food expenditure (Tk/month) 654.7 656.3 638.5 649.1
Per capita total expenditure (Tk/month) 810.3 831.7 771.4 802.6
Moderate poverty head count 0.871 0.861 0.892 0.876
Extreme poverty head count 0.675 0.676 0.727 0.695
Household with year-round starvation 0.435 0.464 0.491 0.466
Household with year-round starvation or meal rationing 0.941 0.933 0.958 0.945
Seasonal outcomes
Employment during monga period (days/month) 24.3 25.1 20.9 23.3
Employment during non-monga period (days/month) 27.1 27.6 23.5 25.9
Per capita food expenditure during monga (Tk/month) 510.2 516.1 498.3 507.6
Per capita food expenditure during non-monga (Tk/month) 702.9 703.1 685.3 696.3
Household had starvation during monga 0.428 0.453 0.483 0.457
Household had starvation or meal rationing during monga 0.938 0.924 0.954 0.940
Household had starvation during non-monga 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.021
Household had starvation or meal rationing during non-monga 0.733 0.739 0.820 0.768
Number of observations 1,520 1,717 1,970 5,207
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010. 
Note: MFI = microfinance institution; PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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households. A high correlation between these two measures of depriva-
tion suggests that most households that are extremely poor are likely to 
starve or skip meals at certain times, on either a daily or a weekly basis. 
Does PRIME Reach the Seasonal and Extreme Poor?
According to the InM survey, about 62 percent of the ultrapoor in the 
northwest region’s five districts participate in some form of microfinance. 
Of these, 29 percent are PRIME participants, whereas 33 percent par-
ticipate in regular microfinance. However, the annual growth rate of 
participation among the ultrapoor is much lower for regular microfinance 
(3.3 percent) than for PRIME (11.2 percent) (figure 8.2).7 
Figure 8.2 shows the microcredit program participation rates in areas 
with PRIME and without PRIME. Participation in regular microfinance 
gradually increases over time in both PRIME and non-PRIME areas, but 
participation in regular microfinance is much higher in PRIME areas 
compared with non-PRIME areas. PRIME was introduced in areas that 
already had a higher rate of participation in regular microfinance among 
the ultrapoor. This finding is not surprising, given that PKSF’s partner 
organizations, which introduced PRIME, were providers of regular 
Figure 8.2 Cumulative Rate of Microcredit Program Participation by Year
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM follow-up survey 2008.
Note: MFI = microfinance institution; PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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Figure 8.3 Microcredit Program Participation by Landholdings
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM follow-up survey 2008. 
Note: MFI = microfinance institution; PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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microfinance before PRIME was introduced by PKSF. Because PKSF pro-
vides grants and loans on better, more flexible terms for PRIME than for 
regular microfinance, the partner organizations understandably intro-
duced PRIME initially in areas of their current operation. Higher partici-
pation rates of the ultrapoor with PRIME may also reflect greater demand 
for PRIME services by the ultrapoor. The PRIME program is perhaps bet-
ter designed than regular microfinance to reach the ultrapoor. 
If we consider the distribution of ultrapoor participation by landholding, 
we find that the participation rate among the landless (fewer than 5 deci-
mals in landholdings) is slightly higher for PRIME than for regular microfi-
nance (figure 8.3). Also, the participation rate among the ultrapoor in 
regular microfinance is higher in PRIME than non-PRIME areas. For both 
types of microfinance, the participation rate is about 25 percent to 30 per-
cent among the households with more than 50 decimals in landholdings—
the official threshold for eligibility in most MFIs in Bangladesh.8 For PRIME, 
the eligibility criteria are defined not only by landholdings (ownership of 
fewer than 50 decimals) but also by household members’ selling of labor for 
wages or household monthly incomes of less than Tk 1,500 (US$25). 
The group with fewer than 50 decimals of landholdings represents 
the bulk of microfinance participants (more than 93 percent of PRIME 
and regular microfinance in PRIME areas) (figure 8.4). It appears that 
PRIME is a well-targeted program that effectively reaches the ultrapoor 
defined by landholdings.9
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Figure 8.4 Distribution of Total Microcredit Participation by Landholdings
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM follow-up survey 2008. 
Note: MFI = microfinance institution; PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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Is PRIME also a well-designed program for reaching the seasonally 
poor who suffer from occasional starvation or experience meal rationing 
during the lean season? Because the baseline information on seasonal 
food deprivation was collected before PRIME was introduced, we can 
examine how households varied in program participation by their pre-
PRIME participation status of food deprivation. Observation of house-
hold participation in PRIME and MFIs by meal consumption patterns 
during the monga period shows that, regardless of its meal-consumption 
pattern, a household is twice as likely to join PRIME as a regular micro-
finance program, which may be attributable to PRIME’s focus on address-
ing immediate household needs during the lean season (figure 8.5).10
Although PRIME is a better tool than regular microfinance in reaching 
both the extreme poor and the seasonal poor, it is unclear whether the 
basic nature of seasonality in rural credit operation still exists with 
PRIME as well as with regular microfinance. To examine this basic fact, 
we present the seasonal loan disbursement of regular microfinance vis-à-
vis PRIME supported by PKSF. Figure 8.6 shows the seasonal pattern of 
loans disbursed by the PKSF partners under regular microfinance, 
whereas figure 8.7 presents the seasonal distribution of loans advanced 
under PRIME administered only in Rangpur. 
Figure 8.6 clearly shows a pronounced seasonality in microcredit 
operation of regular microfinance programs under PKSF. That is, the 
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Figure 8.5 Microcredit Program Participation Rate by Preintervention Food 
Consumption Status
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM follow-up survey 2008.
Note: MFI = microfinance institution; PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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Figure 8.6 Seasonal Pattern of Microcredit Disbursements under Regular Rural 
Microcredit Programs
Source: Estimated from unpublished data of Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF). 
Note: The seasons are boro (March–May), aus (June−August), monga (September−November), and aman 
(December−February). Figure shows five-year average from 2004/05 to 2008/09.
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amount of disbursement is lowest during the monga season compared 
with other regions. This pattern is common for all areas of Bangladesh, 
including the Rangpur region. Interestingly, with the introduction of 
PRIME, the same seasonal patterns of actual loan disbursements (as 
shown in figure 8.7) indicate that PRIME is no different from regular 
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Figure 8.7 Seasonal Pattern of PRIME Disbursements, Rangpur Region
Source: Estimated from unpublished data of PKSF. 
Note: The seasons are boro (March−May), aus (June−August), monga (September−November), and aman 
(December−February). Figure shows disbursement between March 2010 and February 2011. 
PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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microcredit in financing income-generating activities and it is not spe-
cially oriented toward meeting consumption loans (in which case, the 
seasonal pattern of PRIME operation would have been reversed). The 
fewer disbursements in the monga season may reflect fewer opportunities 
for starting income-generating activities in that season. The fact that there 
are fewer rather than more disbursements under PRIME during monga 
may reflect either demand-side (borrowers are not interested in taking 
out consumption loans) or supply-side (MFIs may ration disbursements 
because of their apprehension that loans may be used for consumption) 
lending. Whatever the case, PRIME has not proved to be primarily a 
vehicle for addressing seasonality of regular microcredit programs. Even 
with this limited scope of rural credit operation in rural areas, it is worth 
pursuing the relative effects of PRIME intervention vis-à-vis regular 
microcredit intervention in mitigating seasonal and chronic poverty. 
What Determines Microcredit Program Participation?
Given the distribution of the three types of households presented in 
table 8.2 (PRIME, regular microfinance, and nonparticipants), we would 
like to identify the factors that determine the choice of participation in 
each of these mutually exclusive categories (1 = PRIME, 2 = regular 
microfinance, and 3 = nonparticipants). This determination is made by 
fitting a maximum-likelihood multinomial logit (MNL) model.11 
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The objective is to discover what factors (denoted by x) besides pro-
gram availability help the ultrapoor decide to participate in one of the 
microfinance programs. The MNL results suggest that the explanatory 
variables (for example, age and gender of household head, education, 
landholdings, and other assets) are important in a household’s decision to 
participate in one of the programs (table 8.4). 
Participants in both PRIME and regular microfinance are relatively 
young. Education generally has a pronounced negative effect on partici-
pation in regular microfinance. However, educated males participate 
more in regular microfinance, whereas educated females do not partici-
pate in PRIME. Although land and nonland assets matter for participation 
in regular microfinance, they are irrelevant to PRIME participation. The 
Table 8.4 Determinants of Program Participation (MNL Estimates Using 
Cross-Sectional Data) 
Explanatory variable PRIME Regular microfinance
Education of household head (years) −0.0003
(0.0003)
−0.013**
(0.005)
Maximum education of adult males (years) 0.0003
(0.0003)
0.011**
(0.005)
Maximum education of adult females (years) −0.001**
(0.0004)
0.001
(0.004)
Log land (decimals) 0.0001
(0.001)
0.012*
(0.007)
Log nonland assets (Tk) 0.001
(0.0008)
0.067**
(0.009)
Village has Grameen Bank −0.005**
(0.002)
0.087**
(0.023)
Village has other NGOs 0.005
(0.004)
0.302**
(0.047)
Village has PRIME 0.360**
(0.022)
−0.012
(0.020)
Village has safety-net programs −0.0005
(0.004)
0.068
(0.050)
Village is on char land −0.002
(0.002)
−0.128**
(0.022)
Proportion of high lands in thana −0.032**
(0.010)
0.225
(0.167)
Log likelihood −5,076.11
Number of observations 5,202
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010. 
Note: Coefficients are marginal impacts. Figures in parentheses are robust standard error. * and ** refer to a 
 statistical significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively; MNL = multinomial logit; NGO = 
 nongovernmental organization;  PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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participation rate in regular microfinance is much lower in villages with 
larger populations and villages with higher male wages, reflecting a nega-
tive effect of a large local economy. These factors do not matter for 
PRIME participation, suggesting that PRIME is more pro-ultrapoor than 
is regular microfinance. 
Village-level infrastructure, such as paved roads and electrification, 
positively influences a household’s decision to participate in a microfi-
nance program. However, better access to markets reduces the proba-
bility of PRIME participation among the ultrapoor, perhaps because of 
the availability of alternative employment opportunities. As expected, 
the presence of any type of microfinance program in a village influ-
ences the decision to participate. For example, the probability of par-
ticipating in regular microfinance is 8.7 percent among the ultrapoor 
owing to Grameen Bank’s presence, compared with 30.2 percent 
owing to the presence of NGOs. However, about 36 percent of the 
ultrapoor participate in PRIME because of a PRIME intervention. 
Thus, PRIME does better than regular microfinance in reaching the 
ultrapoor. Although Grameen Bank discourages participation in PRIME, 
NGO programs do not. 
Agroclimatic and location-specific factors influence returns to pub-
lic and private investments. It is little wonder that these factors affect 
the decision of the ultrapoor to join a microfinance program. Better 
agroclimatic conditions, such as more rainfall or greater extent of high 
lands, reduce the probability that the ultrapoor will join a microfi-
nance program, perhaps because of the better alternatives available. 
Similarly, the probability of microfinance participation, especially 
regular microfinance, is much lower in char (reclaimed river islands) 
villages. Thus, regular microfinance programs are not well represented 
in such areas.
Does PRIME Alleviate Seasonal and Chronic 
Food Deprivation? 
When randomized control data are unavailable, one alternative is to use 
a panel method at the household level to resolve the bias from unob-
served characteristics influencing both program participation and the 
outcomes of interest. Panel analysis also helps control for common 
 season-specific bias. For example, when we examine the incidence of 
starvation or meal rationing for a particular season, we may invariably 
introduce a common seasonal effect, such as seasonal preference that 
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affects both the participation decision and the consumption. It is possible 
that a common seasonal shock could induce all households in an area to 
behave a certain way, independent of unobserved household  heterogeneity, 
which would affect program participation. Household consumption may 
be completely independent of seasonal variations and still covary strongly 
with the lean season, simply because of common season-specific shocks. 
Resolving both sources of bias—unobserved household- and  village-level 
heterogeneity and common seasonal effects—requires  season-specific 
household panel data. 
We have preintervention baseline information for the target and non-
target households from the PRIME villages. However, the data have lim-
ited information on both explanatory variables and outcomes. Figure 8.8 
presents the distribution of seasonal outcomes in 2005 and 2008 with the 
pre- and postintervention data. 
In the baseline data, we have only subjective measures of food depriva-
tion by season as outcomes.12 In figure 8.8, we see that household welfare 
measured by food deprivation improves between 2005 and 2008. For 
example, the rate of occasional starvation during the lean (monga) season 
declined from 50.1 percent in 2005 to 45.2 percent in 2008, whereas the 
Figure 8.8 Progress in Seasonal and Chronic Food Deprivation, 2005 and 2008
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM baseline and follow-up surveys, 2006 and 2008.
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rate of occasional starvation during the non-monga season also decreased 
from 9.3 percent in 2005 to 2.3 percent in 2008. Year-round starvation 
similarly declined over this period. 
Assuming that outcomes before and after program intervention are only 
for change in program participation status, we may rely on the difference-
in-differences (DID) method that compares the difference of the changes in 
outcomes of PRIME participants with the changes of nonparticipants over 
2005 and 2008. Table 8.5 provides the calculations. However, we find that 
none of the differences of outcomes of program participants over the non-
participants is statistically significant. That is, there seem to be no statisti-
cally significant gains in the reduction in seasonal and chronic starvation by 
simply participating in a program such as PRIME. 
However, the simple DID analysis does not control for changes in 
other exogenous variables affecting program participation and seasonal 
and chronic outcomes. To control for those changes, we propose to use a 
fixed-effects (FE) method to estimate the program effect (see the annex 
of this chapter for details). The FE results are presented in table 8.6. We 
find that PRIME reduces seasonal starvation by 5.5 percentage points 
during the lean season, compared with a 3.9 percentage point reduction 
as a result of the participation in regular microfinance. 
Similarly, PRIME has a larger effect (7.2 percentage points) than 
regular microfinance programs (positive 3.5 percentage points which is 
statistically insignificant) on mitigating year-round starvation. But reg-
ular microfinance has a larger role than PRIME in mitigating food 
deprivation generally (that is, when starvation and meal rationing are 
combined). Because the incidence of meal rationing is much higher 
than that of occasional starvation, we conclude that regular microfi-
nance has a relatively larger effect on reducing food rationing than 
starvation.13 
Concluding Remarks 
Microfinance is often criticized for not adequately addressing both sea-
sonal and extreme poverty in Bangladesh and elsewhere. In response to 
such criticism, MFIs have introduced innovations in program design to 
address both concerns. In Bangladesh, one such program, designed and 
implemented by PKSF is the PRIME initiative. Begun in 2006, PRIME 
targets the northwest region’s ultrapoor, who are most vulnerable to sea-
sonality of income, employment, and consumption. The program  essentially 
offers microfinance services on flexible terms. For example, PRIME 
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Table 8.5 PRIME Effects Using Difference-in-Difference (DID) Technique
Outcome variable (meal consumption pattern)
Participants Nonparticipants
DID 
(effects)
2005
(YP
0)
2008
(YP
1)
2005
(YNP
0 )
2008
(YNP
1 )
Starvation during monga 0.475666 0.422936 0.507635 0.460542 −0.00564
Starvation or meal rationing during monga 0.475666 0.507339 0.458369 0.478111 0.011932
Starvation during non-monga 0.10101 0.019266 0.092193 0.023906 −0.01346
Starvation or meal rationing during non-monga 0.482094 0.695413 0.513973 0.742512 −0.01522
Year-round starvation 0.508257 0.429358 0.532546 0.471198 −0.01755
Year-round starvation or meal rationing 0.952294 0.933028 0.966878 0.943836 0.003775
Number of observations 1,492 3,025 1,492 3,025 4,517
Source: Authors’ calculation based on InM baseline and follow-up surveys, 2006 and 2008. 
Note: DID (difference-in-difference) = −( )− −( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Y Y Y YP P NP NP1 0 1 0 . All the differences are statistically insignificant. PRIME = Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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 provides consumption loans to address consumption seasonality, whereas 
regular MFIs offer seasonal production loans to deal with seasonality. 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of PRIME, relative to regular 
microfinance, in tackling seasonal and extreme poverty in Bangladesh’s 
northwest region. Our research suggests that microfinance generally has 
reached a large percentage of the ultrapoor and seasonal poor in recent 
years. It was found that about 62 percent of the ultrapoor participate in 
microfinance. In contrast, 59 percent of the ultrapoor who experience 
occasional starvation and 63 percent of the ultrapoor with meal rationing 
are beneficiaries of microfinance. The introduction of PRIME has only 
enhanced the ultrapoor’s participation in microfinance. However, PRIME 
program placement and participation are not randomly given but are 
determined by a host of factors, including prior availability of a regular 
microfinance program. 
Evaluating the program’s effect thus requires correction for the non-
random placement and participation of a microfinance program. An 
experimental evaluation design was beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Therefore, a quasi-experimental method was adopted to estimate the 
program’s effect. The household FE method yields encouraging results for 
program participation.
Both PRIME and MFIs are found to reduce seasonal deprivation. 
PRIME reduces seasonal deprivation by 5.5 percentage points, compared 
Table 8.6 Program Effects Using Fixed-Effects Method 
Meal consumption pattern
p-weighted FE
PRIME Regular microfinance
Starvation during monga −0.055**
(0.025)
0.039
(0.025)
Starvation or meal rationing during monga −0.002
(0.002)
−0.008**
(0.003)
Starvation during non-monga −0.009
(0.011)
−0.005
(0.011)
Starvation or meal rationing during non-monga −0.111**
(0.028)
−0.055*
(0.028)
Year-round starvation −0.072**
(0.025)
0.035
(0.023)
Year-round starvation or meal rationing −0.002
(0.002)
−0.004**
(0.002)
Number of observations 4,517
Source: Khandker, Khalily, and Samad 2010.
Note: Regression uses all explanatory variables listed in table 8.4. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
* and ** refer to a statistical significance of 10 percent and 5 percent or better, respectively. FE = fixed-effects; PRIME 
= Programmed Initiatives for Monga Eradication.
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with 3.9 percentage points with regular microfinance. However, PRIME 
is found to reduce seasonal deprivation more than year-round  deprivation. 
Yet the relative impact estimates of alternative programs (PRIME versus 
MFI) are not statistically significant.
Do the results suggest that PRIME is just like a regular microfinance 
program? It should be noted that, despite PRIME’s being a microfinance 
program, it is more popular than regular microfinance among the ultrapoor, 
perhaps because of its flexible design. This finding is evidenced by the 
higher PRIME participation rate among the ultrapoor in areas where both 
types of programs operate. Because PRIME has been in operation since only 
2006, it is perhaps too early to say whether it equals or  surpasses regular 
microfinance in tackling poverty and seasonality. It is also not possible to 
confirm whether PRIME or microfinance can simultaneously tackle sea-
sonality and chronic poverty in an efficient way on a broader level. 
Annex 8A: Household Fixed-Effects or 
Difference-in-Differences Method 
With panel data available, we write the outcome equation as follows:
 yijst = a + xijtb + pijtg + mij + hj + ms + xijst, (8A.1)
where y represents measures of starvation; x represents a vector of 
household and community characteristics affecting outcomes; p mea-
sures program participation status; t is year; and mij, hj, and ms are unob-
served household, village, and season-specific fixed characteristics, 
respectively. 
For the two-year period, if we take the difference of equation (8A.1) 
from the second to the first period, we eliminate the unobserved time- 
invarying household, village, and seasonal common fixed effects; that is,
 Δyijs = Δxijb + Δpijg + Δxijs, (8A.2)
where a fixed-effects method is used to estimate program effects on 
household outcomes. However, equation (8A.2) assumes that the selec-
tion bias is time invariant, in which case the changes in outcome for 
nonparticipants reveal the counterfactual outcome changes. Thus, the 
difference between the mean differences of participants and nonpartici-
pants is the impact estimate. More formally, the FE compares treatment 
and comparison groups with respect to outcome changes over time rela-
tive to the outcomes observed for a preintervention baseline. The FE 
method allows for conditional dependence in the levels arising from 
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 additive time-invariant latent heterogeneity, after controlling for changes 
in exogenous variables affecting outcomes. 
The household FE method may not produce consistent estimates if 
household-level unobservables are time varying. For example, the initial 
conditions may be important enough to influence the outcomes later such 
that the FE or difference-in-differences estimator is a biased estimate, 
because subsequent outcome changes are a function of initial conditions 
that also influenced program participation in the first place. In this case, 
the selection bias is not constant over time, introducing a violation of the 
assumptions of the FE method. It follows that  controlling for the initial 
heterogeneity is critical to the creditability of the FE method. 
Propensity-score matching is an obvious choice for cleaning out this 
initial heterogeneity before doing the differencing. If there is no observable 
heterogeneity in the differences (that is, it has been cleaned out by dif-
ferencing), then there is no gain from matching on top of FE. Combining 
PSM for selecting the comparison group with FE can reduce (though 
probably not eliminate) the bias found in other evaluation methods, 
including single-difference matching. Because PSM optimally balances 
observed covariates between the treatment and comparison groups, it is 
the method of choice for selecting the comparison group in panel data 
studies. Obviously, one requires preintervention baseline information for 
the participants and nonparticipants, which fortunately is available for the 
Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation credit intervention program.
Following Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), a weighted least-squares 
regression that weights nonparticipants according to their propensity 
score can yield a fully efficient estimator in the following regression:
 Δyijs = Δxijb + gT + Δxijs, (8A.3)
where T = treatment status. 
The weights to be used in the above regression are 1 for treated house-
holds and p/(1 – p) for control observations, where p is the estimated 
p-score using the PSM method in the preprogram baseline data.
Notes
 1. Besides covariate risk, rural lending is subject to problems of asymmetric 
information, incentive to repay, and enforcing loan contracts (Stiglitz 1990). 
Also, besides group-based lending, microfinance institutions adopt other inno-
vative aspects to reduce the default cost of lending. 
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 2. Although the terms ultrapoor, extreme poor, and hardcore poor are often used 
interchangeably, for targeting purposes, microfinance institutions specifically 
use the term ultrapoor on the basis of landholdings, income, and employment 
as defined in this chapter.
 3. In 2005, only 12 percent of villages in the northwest region of Bangladesh had 
a Grameen Bank, compared with 34 percent in other regions of the country. 
It should be noted that the northwest region is the worst hit with regard to 
the negative consequences of extreme seasonality of agriculture. 
 4. Evaluations of such programs indicate that BRAC’s ultrapoor program has 
desirable effects on the poor. 
 5. The term monga means seasonal food deprivation, as discussed in earlier 
 chapters.
 6. Although nonparticipants may include ineligible households from PRIME or 
control villages, they were not sampled in these surveys. 
 7. About 6.1 percent of PRIME participation came from those who had 
participated in regular microfinance. Of the 33 percent who participated 
in regular microfinance, about 14 percent participated before 2006 (the 
year PRIME was introduced); after 2006, the participation rate fell to 
19 percent.
 8. Only 6 percent of the participants were from this group in both types of 
programs.
 9. We cannot say the same for regular microfinance programs, because we have 
incomplete data on participation that may contain households that are ineli-
gible based on landholdings. 
 10. Households that were MFI members before the PRIME intervention (about 
15 percent of panel households) were excluded from this figure to capture 
the behavior of new participants. 
 11. Formally, an MNL model expresses the relative probability of observing a 
particular value k of outcome Y compared with observing a base value as 
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 12. However, we found earlier that the qualitative measures of deprivation are 
good approximations of quantitative measures of deprivation. 
 13. It is possible that because of their longer-term operation, regular microfi-
nance programs are more suited to handling the general hardship associated 
with meal rationing than PRIME is, which helps alleviate more acute forms 
of hardship (that is, starvation). We reran the same regression with two 
types of microfinance memberships: those started before PRIME and those 
after PRIME (that is, after 2006). We find that longer exposure to regular 
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microfinance has a greater effect on meal rationing than more recent regular 
microfinance, thus confirming our assumption.
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Overview, Policy Perspectives, 
and Emerging Issues
Seasonal hunger is often overlooked in discussions on food insecurity. Yet 
just as the problem of extreme poverty and food insecurity will likely 
remain persistent in large parts of the developing world, so too will its 
seasonal dimensions. In fact, it appears reasonable to argue that most of 
the world’s acute hunger and undernutrition occur in the annual hunger 
season—the time of year when the previous year’s harvest stocks have 
declined, food prices are high, wages are low, credit access is limited, and 
jobs are scarce. In economically depressed or ecologically vulnerable areas 
in particular, a crop failure or a poor harvest can easily magnify seasonal 
adversity into a disaster. Seasonal hunger has thus been aptly called the 
“father of famine,” and controlling seasonal hunger is a step toward avert-
ing famine. Seasonality issues will also need renewed attention because of 
the rising new threat to global food security and livelihoods of the poor 
from climate changes and the associated extreme weather conditions that 
may make seasonal shocks more frequent, severe, and unpredictable.
One reason the discourses on food insecurity neglect seasonal hunger 
is that the official data collection system that annualizes poverty esti-
mates does not include seasonality. A large percentage of the rural 
households that depend on agriculture for their livelihoods and are vul-
nerable to seasonal food insecurity may thus remain invisible to official 
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poverty statistics. As such, they may be disregarded by policy makers if 
the causes of seasonal hunger differ from those that affect year-round 
poverty. The lack of data also makes it difficult to monitor the effect of 
whatever policies and programs are undertaken to address seasonality. 
Another reason for inaction is a lack of understanding of the complex 
cycle of poverty and its seasonality, each potentially reinforcing the 
other. To make matters worse, regions prone to severe seasonal hunger 
often fail to attract the investments that are necessary to raise the local 
economy’s resilience through diversification and thus break the poverty-
seasonality cycle.
Bangladesh has recently achieved considerable progress in reducing 
poverty and improving the food security of its people. With the country’s 
sustained growth in food production and good record of disaster manage-
ment, famines have almost become a phenomenon of the past. Yet a 
large number of people in rural areas still must deal with the annual 
problem of seasonal hunger. More than 70 percent of the country’s nearly 
150 million people live in the rural areas of Bangladesh, where life 
revolves around its so-called rice economy. Although the rural economy 
has become increasingly diversified with the growth of nonfarm activities, 
nearly 60 percent of the rural workers (and about half the country’s 
entire workforce) are still employed in the agriculture sector. The country 
is also prone to floods and other natural disasters. In such a setting, one 
would expect to find regular occurrences of seasonality of income and 
consumption, which are only made worse by the natural calamities.
The Extent and Sources of Seasonal Hunger
Although seasonality of poverty and food deprivation is a common fea-
ture of rural livelihood in Bangladesh, it is more marked in the northwest 
region of Rangpur where the interlocking of seasonality and endemic 
poverty results in severe hunger. Rangpur is well known in the famine 
literature; it was among the worst-hit districts in the Great Bengal Famine 
of 1942−44 and was the epicenter of the 1974 famine in Bangladesh. The 
region has not only lagged other regions in poverty reduction, but also has 
remained particularly vulnerable to seasonal hunger, known locally as 
monga. Until recently, the phenomenon of monga was hardly mentioned, 
let alone given any special attention, in the government’s plans and pro-
grams. But partly because of increased media attention, the subject has 
caught public interest and is now featured prominently in the govern-
ment’s poverty reduction efforts. The various recent initiatives undertaken 
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to combat monga in Rangpur include (a) introducing new crop technol-
ogy, (b) providing public works and other safety nets, (c) facilitating out-
migration, (d) transferring assets to the poor along with providing 
skill-based training, and (e) introducing specially designed microcredit 
programs in addition to the regular ones. These policy interventions thus 
provide a test case of what works and what does not in combating sea-
sonal hunger. 
The baseline survey conducted by the Institute of Microfinance (InM) 
in 2006 covered nearly half a million poor households in the Rangpur 
region and has provided a unique wealth of information for analyzing the 
phenomenon of monga in the region. Both the extent and the seasonality 
of hunger become strikingly evident from the survey findings. Among the 
survey households, representing nearly the bottom 60 percent of all 
households, the incidence of starvation (that is, skipping meals from time 
to time) was found to rise from 10 percent in the non-monga seasons to 
a staggering 50 percent in the monga season. Moreover, nearly half the 
households had to ration food (that is, take half meals) during both the 
monga and non-monga periods. The households that undergo starvation 
during monga are also likely to experience food deprivation, though in a 
milder form, in non-monga seasons. And those that are exposed to starva-
tion during a monga season expect to suffer hardship in the next monga 
season as well. Seasonal hunger is thus found to be both an aggregate 
shock and an extension of year-round poverty and food deprivation. 
The severe and persistent seasonal hunger that is observed in Rangpur 
can hardly be caused unless there is a confluence of many adverse factors. 
These factors are generally a reflection of the agroecological vulnerability 
of the region along with its adverse economic geography. Some of the 
factors that put the region at a disadvantage compared with other regions 
of the country can be readily identified. Some proximate causes include 
(a) a generally high level of poverty, particularly extreme poverty; (b) low 
crop yields as a result of poor soil quality; (c) risk of floods and river ero-
sion; (d) a high proportion of households that are landless and depend on 
income from daily wages; (e) low wage rates for both male and female 
agricultural day laborers; (f) livelihood vulnerability of the people living 
in char areas, consisting of island-like land fragments reclaimed from 
 rivers; (g) low inflows of remittances from migrant family members; and 
(h) inadequate investments in infrastructure, including electricity, result-
ing in a lack of diversification of the rural economy.
The phenomenon of monga must also be understood in light of the 
famine history of the region. Although famine is epochal, monga is a 
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recurrent phenomenon, and yet famine can be seen as the extreme 
manifestation of the monga phenomenon. The explanation for famines 
with regard to a food entitlement failure can thus be relevant in explain-
ing seasonal hunger as well. For example, monga does not seem to be 
caused by a lack of food availability, but by the failure of the income-
earning opportunities for the poor during a particular time of year. 
Moreover, as in the case of past famines in this region, the landless agri-
cultural laborers are found to be most at risk. 
But unlike with famines, failure of income-earning opportunities need 
not be accompanied by food price inflation to cause monga. Consequently, 
monga may remain unnoticed as a form of silent hunger, because the 
abnormal increases in food prices are what usually create public uproar 
and attract the attention of policy makers. This also explains why the 
government’s interventions for food price stabilization as a means of 
ensuring food security have not worked to mitigate monga. However, 
poverty reduction generally, along with more integration of labor and 
food markets, is likely to have helped reduce the adverse effects of sea-
sonality to some extent. This factor may explain why, since 1974, seasonal 
hunger in Rangpur has never taken on the proportions of a famine in 
spite of the much more severe intensity of floods and crop damage than 
happened in that year. 
Although the seasonality in poverty and food deprivation is particu-
larly pronounced in Rangpur, it is in fact observed all over rural 
Bangladesh. This finding is confirmed by the analysis of the data from the 
various rounds of the official Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES). Incidentally, this research shows that the incorporation of sea-
sonal analysis in the official poverty statistics does not require additional 
data collection. The statistical exercises based on the HIES data show that 
seasonal food consumption is related to seasonal income at least as 
strongly as it is to year-round income. Seasonal poverty and hunger can 
thus be seen to result from the marked seasonality in agricultural income 
combined with the lack of poor households’ capacity to smooth con-
sumption year round, such as through savings, loans, or food storage. 
Combating seasonal hunger thus calls for reducing income seasonality 
through agricultural and rural diversification and enhancing the ability of 
poor households to insure against seasonality.
Poor households’ inability to smooth consumption in the face of 
income seasonality raises several issues—both policy related and behav-
ioral. Rural households use traditional risk management devices, such as 
local pooling of resources or mutual support provided by family or 
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friends. Such community-based insurance is feasible when the risks are 
idiosyncratic (that is, particular to households), but it has limited use in 
the event of aggregate shocks, like seasonal ones. Even if the rural poor 
would like to save for precautionary reasons, the lack of appropriate 
financial institutions could prevent them from doing so. The unpredict-
ability of the extent of seasonal stress may also explain inadequate self-
insurance by poor households, either through savings or storage of grains. 
But even in the case of a predictable decline in income, it is difficult for 
a poor household that lives near subsistence to consciously fend off future 
hardship, whether one regards it as a lack of self-control or a “present bias” 
in decision making. In other words, immediate needs may compromise 
poor households’ ability or willingness to smooth consumption. Therefore, 
seasonal hunger can be properly understood only in the context of the 
underlying endemic poverty.
The analysis of how poor households in Rangpur cope with seasonal 
hunger provides further insights into their livelihood strategies. The vast 
majority of them are found to adopt a variety of monga-coping mecha-
nisms, including accessing social safety-net support provided by the gov-
ernment and by nongovernmental organizations. Most of the informal 
coping mechanisms—such as borrowing from moneylenders, sale of 
assets, or advance sale of labor—are adopted only under extreme distress 
at the risk of further hardship and erosion of income in the future. In spite 
of such widespread adoption of coping mechanisms, most of the poor 
households cannot avoid experiencing food deprivation of varying inten-
sity during the monga season. The uncertainty regarding future seasonal 
distress also makes poor households opt for inefficient livelihood strate-
gies, thus perpetuating the cycle of endemic poverty and its seasonality. 
Overall, the picture is thus one of grossly inadequate coping abilities of 
the monga-vulnerable households in Rangpur. 
Seasonal Migration 
One of the major coping strategies observed in the Rangpur region during 
monga is seasonal migration. Among the poor households of the region 
covered in the InM baseline survey of 2006, about 173,000 opted to send 
one or more of their household members to work elsewhere during the 
monga season of that year. A sharp dip in local labor demand coupled 
with the generally high levels of impoverishment seem to be the major 
driving forces behind seasonal migration on such a large scale. Both 
community-level and household characteristics can be important in 
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determining the decision to migrate: households with younger working 
members, more wage workers compared with self-employed ones, more 
dependents, or fewer landholdings are more likely to migrate. Higher land 
productivity (reflected in better agroclimatic conditions) and lower 
 village-level unemployment reduce the probability of migration. 
Because of the simultaneity of factors affecting both a household’s 
migration decision and the extent of its food deprivation, one cannot 
easily determine the direction of causality. When statistical techniques 
are used to deal with this endogeneity problem, seasonal migration is 
found to have a beneficial effect on household welfare by reducing the 
extent of both seasonal and year-round food deprivation. Yet the benefits 
should not be exaggerated. More than half the households that opted for 
migration had to resort to other monga-coping mechanisms as well. The 
fact that many of the migrant households must adopt multiple coping 
strategies—including borrowing, sale of assets, or advance sale of labor—
points to their particular vulnerability. Even then, migration may give 
the households a better chance of reducing the extent of seasonal and 
year-round hunger compared with those who lack the necessary net-
working capability or financial means to migrate.
Although seasonal migration can have beneficial effects on the 
migrating households, as well as on the local economy as a whole, it is 
evidently not enough to mitigate seasonal hunger. Therefore, efforts for 
facilitating seasonal migration should not divert attention from the need 
to invest in the local economy and create more employment  opportunities, 
so that labor does not have to move on such a large scale. Interestingly, 
although access to microcredit seems to be an effective alternative to 
seasonal migration for households, special schemes for providing credit 
or cash incentives are found to encourage seasonal migration. There is 
also scope for promoting the kinds of migration that entail much larger 
gains to the households compared with seasonal migration. In spite of 
the widespread prevalence of seasonal migration in Rangpur, there is 
scarcely any out-migration from the region for overseas employment, or 
even for factory employment in the cities. Some initiatives have recently 
been undertaken for sending laborers from the region for overseas 
employment, though on a very limited scale. Another recently initiated 
project, supported by the World Bank, aims at providing training and 
housing facilities for female laborers from the Rangpur region for 
employment in the export-oriented garment factories located in the 
export processing zones.
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Social Safety Nets
Bangladesh has a fairly large and elaborate social safety-net system aimed 
at safeguarding the economic security of the poor and vulnerable groups. 
These programs can potentially act as a kind of social insurance against 
seasonal poverty, but their effect may be limited by inappropriate target-
ing, resource leakages, and limited coverage dictated by fund constraints. 
This research has examined in particular the seasonal dimensions of the 
effect of safety-net programs. 
An area of concern regarding the safety-net programs is that, along 
with various forms of resource leakages, a sizable share of the benefits 
goes to the nonpoor. Yet another weak link in channeling safety-net 
resources to the poor appears to be the process by which the government 
allocates resources across regions, which corresponds poorly with the 
regional variations in the poverty levels. In this regard, the analysis of 
survey data from Rangpur confirms the findings of other studies, namely, 
that safety-net programs target vulnerable areas rather poorly; but once 
villages have access to such programs, the relatively more vulnerable 
among the poor households are likely to benefit more. Even though the 
programs might have been well targeted within a village, the amount of 
support was found clearly inadequate to lift the beneficiary households 
out of extreme seasonal distress. Moreover, judged simply by the observed 
extent of food deprivation during monga, a large number of extremely 
vulnerable households must have been left out of the social safety-net 
system. 
An important consideration regarding the role of safety nets in com-
bating seasonal hunger is an appropriate balance between short-term 
seasonally oriented programs and long-term or year-round ones. In spite 
of the fact that a predominant part of the existing safety-net system in 
Bangladesh consists of short-term programs, the system does not neces-
sarily have a beneficial counterseasonal effect. In deciding about the 
timing of seasonal public works programs like Food for Work, the gov-
ernment agencies may need to balance considerations of providing 
employment during the pre-aman lean season (which coincides in part 
with the late rainy season and annual floods) and undertaking earthwork 
for infrastructure building (for which the dry season is more suitable). 
However, more disconcerting is the survey finding from Rangpur that 
the payments of benefits even under the year-round programs may 
sometimes skip the monga season, thus betraying a lack of sensitivity to 
seasonal distress.
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Political competition, driven by the creation of public awareness, seems 
to have played a role in shaping the government’s social safety-net system. 
In spite of the general lack of sensitivity in the safety-net allocations with 
respect to poverty prevalence, the increased public attention given to 
monga in recent years seems to have been translated into increased safety-
net coverage in the Rangpur region. However, this increase in coverage 
may be explained in part by programs with extremely small short-term or 
one-time benefits, which may reflect a kind of populist “tokenism” in the 
provision of such benefits. Overall, in spite of their limitations, the safety-
net programs have a positive effect on mitigating monga, as found in the 
statistical exercises that control for the problem of endogeneity of pro-
gram participation. Moreover, there are both seasonal and year-round 
beneficial effects. It will probably be correct to argue therefore that these 
programs need to be expanded in coverage, made more cost-effective, and 
designed to be more sensitive to the seasonal needs. 
Microcredit for the Ultrapoor
The information on access to microcredit as part of village-level area 
characteristics is available from the two main sources of data for this 
research, the HIES and the InM baseline survey of poor households in 
Rangpur conducted in 2006−07. These data could therefore be used to 
estimate the effect of microcredit on both poverty levels in general and 
seasonal hunger in particular. The effect of microcredit on both counts 
was found to be positive and substantial (after controlling for the possible 
biases in program placement to the extent possible). 
This research is, however, concerned less with the effect of regular 
microcredit than it is with the effect of a specially designed microcredit 
program for the ultrapoor in combating seasonal poverty. In fact, the InM 
baseline survey found coverage of regular microcredit programs among 
the poor households in Rangpur to be much too low compared with that 
in other regions of the country. This finding confirms the view that the 
ultrapoor households as well as the regional pockets of extreme poverty 
are bypassed by the regular microcredit programs. However, in 2006, as 
part of the new measures to combat monga, the Programmed Initiatives 
for Monga Eradication (PRIME) was introduced by the Palli Karma-
Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), the country’s premier wholesale microfi-
nance institution. An assessment of this program’s effect has been possible 
by use of the household panel data obtained from a follow-up survey of 
a subsample of the InM’s baseline survey. 
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As a specially designed microcredit program, PRIME’s objective is to 
deal exclusively with the extreme poor who are highly vulnerable to sea-
sonal poverty in the Rangpur region. Several of PRIME’s features distin-
guish it from regular microcredit programs: (a) interest rates are relatively 
low; (b) repayment is on more flexible terms; (c) loans can be used for 
consumption if so needed; (d) no fixed savings or weekly meetings are 
stipulated; and (e) loans are often combined with other benefits, like skills-
based training, provision of health services, and facilitation of migration.1
The regular microcredit programs have not reached the ultrapoor—
particularly those who are hit hard by seasonal poverty—for several rea-
sons. The ultrapoor are generally considered less creditworthy than the 
moderate poor because of their lower capacity to engage in income-
generating self-employment. The commonly practiced weekly repayment 
schedule is at odds with seasonality of income and employment. Many 
rural nonfarm activities are also linked to the agricultural cycle, often 
limiting the ability of microcredit agencies to support new loans during 
lean seasons. 
Moreover, group-based lending works well when income variations are 
idiosyncratic so that group members assist or insure one another through 
difficult times. But when seasonality is systematic, affecting everyone in a 
group, the ability of mutual insurance is severely curtailed, and the group 
as a whole has a greater incentive to collude on a strategy of default. The 
PRIME initiative therefore represents an experiment in designing micro-
credit programs in a way that suits the needs of the extreme poor who 
are vulnerable to seasonal poverty. This objective, of course, involves 
some subsidies, even if implicit—such as PKSF providing loans with eas-
ier terms to its partner microfinance institutions (MFIs) and probably also 
the MFIs themselves cross-subsidizing between PRIME and their regular 
microcredit programs. 
With regard to mobilization of the ultrapoor into microcredit, PRIME 
has been a success. Within less than two years of its initiation in 2006−07, 
about 62 percent of the poor households in the Rangpur region were 
found to participate in some form of microfinance. Of these, 29 percent 
were PRIME participants, whereas 33 percent participated in regular 
microfinance. It is clear that the MFIs successfully reached the ultrapoor 
in Rangpur under the PRIME initiative in parallel to their already-existing 
regular microcredit programs in the region. The experience so far is that 
both types of programs have also been successful in attaining a loan 
recovery rate almost as high (over 95 percent) as that found in other parts 
of the country. Furthermore, PRIME appears to be better designed than 
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regular microcredit programs in meeting the needs of the ultrapoor 
households. 
How effective is PRIME in alleviating seasonal and chronic food depri-
vation? The answer is found by performing statistical exercises of impact 
assessment based on the household panel data from the InM’s 2008 
 follow-up survey. The results show that PRIME reduces the probability 
of starvation during the monga season compared with a statistically insig-
nificant effect of regular microfinance programs. For the non-monga 
season as well, PRIME has a larger effect in reducing the probability of 
food deprivation generally (that is, starvation and meal rationing com-
bined) compared with regular microcredit programs. These results do not, 
however, tell us much about the longer-term effects of the two types of 
programs on asset accumulation and changes in households’ net worth. It 
is possible that regular microfinance programs have longer-term benefits 
through asset accumulation, whereas PRIME alleviates more immediate 
and severe types of hardship, like starvation. These findings also suggest 
that microcredit programs can be variously designed to reflect their two 
very different characteristics: (a) a banking operation for the poor requir-
ing financial viability and (b) a type of social safety-net program for the 
poor requiring subsidies or fund support.
Policy Effectiveness and Emerging Concerns
This research has shown that policies and programs matter in alleviating 
food deprivation and its seasonality. It is generally agreed that economic 
growth is necessary to reduce poverty and food insecurity for large 
numbers of households and in a sustained way. But economic growth 
alone—even when it leads to poverty reduction—may not be sufficient 
to deal with particular dimensions of food insecurity, such as seasonal 
hunger (child malnutrition is another such dimension). Both global 
experience and that of Bangladesh discussed in this book testify to that 
possibility. Therefore, it is important to look for a set of policies that can 
effectively address the interlocking problems of poverty, food insecurity, 
and seasonality. 
Because of data limitations, the effects of only a limited range of policy 
interventions could be examined in this book. Nevertheless, the results 
show the effectiveness of policies, in varying degrees, in a number of 
areas: improving the production environment (such as through provision 
of electricity or irrigation); enhancing the human capital and asset base of 
households; and providing targeted safety nets, including microcredit. 
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Most of these interventions are found to be effective in reducing both 
extreme poverty and its seasonality, but a well-coordinated strategy is 
needed. Such a strategy requires a threefold approach: (a) combining 
seasonally oriented policies with those that are aimed at removing the 
underlying structural causes of endemic poverty, (b) reducing income 
seasonality through agricultural and rural diversification and enhancing 
the ability of poor households to insure against seasonality, and (c) help-
ing the poor households cope with seasonal hunger so they can avoid 
using extreme coping measures under distress. 
The beneficial effect of the various initiatives undertaken to combat 
monga in Rangpur is already visible. In addition to media reports and 
official assertions, the evidence on this effect comes from the InM’s three-
phase follow-up surveys conducted in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (figure 9.1). 
These surveys, the results of which are yet to be fully analyzed, covered 
a subsample of households from the 2006 baseline survey and as such are 
representative of the bottom 60 percent of the population of the region. 
The most remarkable finding is the sharp decline in the incidence of 
starvation during monga, from about 50 percent to only 6 percent. 
However, most of those escaping starvation still experience the less severe 
form of food deprivation (that is, half meals or meal rationing), and only 
20 percent of households have full meals. Although these estimates indi-
cate remarkable progress in reducing the extent of monga, there is little 
room for complacence. 
Figure 9.1 Trends in Food Deprivation Status during Monga among Poor 
Households in the Rangpur Region, 2006−10 
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The factors contributing to the observed reduction in the severity of 
monga need a more detailed analysis than has been possible in this book. 
The various measures are found to alleviate seasonal hunger in varying 
degrees. Together, their effect seems to have been greater than the sepa-
rately estimated effect for each one, suggesting the existence of beneficial 
synergies and complementarities. Additionally, these findings need to be 
interpreted in two important contexts. First, the accelerated rate of over-
all poverty reduction in Bangladesh during this period—by nearly 2 per-
centage points annually according to the official head-count poverty 
estimates—is likely to have had a favorable effect on alleviating monga. 
Second, poverty reduction countrywide and the alleviation of monga in 
Rangpur have been possible in spite of the food price hikes of 2007−08, 
making these gains all the more remarkable. 
An important intervention, the effect of which has not been analyzed 
here, is the recent introduction of some new rice varieties in the Rangpur 
region specifically to mitigate monga. These short-duration, high-yielding 
rice varieties mature in about 115 days (instead of 165 days in the case 
of prevalent high-yielding rice varieties) and can be grown in the aman 
season. Because these varieties can be harvested from early October 
onward, demand for agricultural labor is created precisely during the lean 
period of October−November; moreover, farmers gain a chance to grow 
another crop, like potatoes, vegetables, wheat, or maize, before starting 
the rice crop cycle again. By 2011, about one-fifth of all aman land in the 
Rangpur region had been switched to these rice varieties.2 This success—
which is due to the combined efforts of agricultural research institutions, 
nongovernmental organizations, and government agricultural extension 
services—highlights the important role that agricultural research and 
development can play in mitigating seasonal hunger.
Although the recent gains in mitigating monga in Rangpur are com-
mendable, there are risks of slippage. The increasing vulnerability to 
looming ecological and environmental degradation is a major threat to 
these gains, many of which may be wiped out by a severe drought 
or flood. Similarly, river erosion is a constant threat to the livelihoods of 
people in Rangpur, whereas people in the char areas continue to eke out 
a living on the margin. To consolidate the gains made thus far, the monga-
mitigating strategy will increasingly need to incorporate ways to address 
the environmental challenge and to adapt to climate change. 
The recent initiatives in combating monga in Rangpur have been 
prompted by widespread public awareness, which in turn has been largely 
created by media reports and civic activism. It has been argued that the 
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incentives in democracy are more effective in averting major economic 
disasters like famines than in addressing the problem of endemic hunger 
and poverty (Bardhan 1999; Drèze and Sen 1989; Sen 1981, 1983). The 
recent public action against monga is a testimony to the fact that political 
incentives in a democracy can be created for combating severe incidence 
of seasonal hunger as well, once the phenomenon catches public atten-
tion. However, a lack of similar awareness may have resulted in the 
neglect of other regions in Bangladesh that are vulnerable to seasonal 
poverty and hunger.
In the northern region of the country, the areas on the eastern bank of 
the Jamuna River in the Jamalpur district and on the western bank of the 
Jamuna River south of Rangpur and the haor (depressed land) areas in 
the other northern districts remain ecologically vulnerable poverty pock-
ets. The southern coastal regions are increasingly facing threats to liveli-
hoods from environmental degradation and climate change. This research 
has found that the areas with adverse agroecological environments tend 
to be doubly disadvantaged; these areas are particularly vulnerable to 
seasonal shocks and may be neglected by the public infrastructure invest-
ments and other development programs that help mitigate seasonality.
Although reliable poverty estimates are lacking, some districts in the 
southern and southwestern coastal regions of Bangladesh have already 
emerged as new ecologically vulnerable poverty pockets. Widespread 
damage to livelihoods in these areas is resulting from a combination of 
factors: (a) increasing intrusion of saline water caused by reduced river 
water flows resulting in reduced agricultural productivity; (b) waterlog-
ging of vast land areas from siltation of riverbeds; (c) more frequent 
cyclones, including the two recent devastating ones, Sidr and Aila; and 
(d) the adverse geography reflected in poor infrastructure and remoteness 
to metropolitan centers. 
The InM has recently carried out a baseline survey of some of the 
worst-affected coastal areas as part of the preparation to launch a special 
microcredit program similar to PRIME in Rangpur. The survey’s prelimi-
nary findings are quite revealing: not only is the extent of food deprivation 
among the poor households severe, but there also is a very marked season-
ality. However, the patterns of seasonal variations are quite different from 
those in other parts of the country, including Rangpur. The percentage of 
the poor households sampled that have full meals each day increases to 
about 70 percent during the September−November period from a low of 
less than 10 percent during the April−June period (InM 2011). Thus, the 
commonly observed seasonal pattern seems to be almost reversed. 
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This finding is hardly surprising. The dry season high-yielding boro, 
which is the major rice crop in most parts of Bangladesh, is almost non-
existent in these coastal areas. Instead, the early rainy season low-yielding 
aus crop is grown in these areas along with the main aman crop. However, 
many households in these coastal areas depend for their livelihoods 
mainly on low-technology marine fishing, which has its distinct seasonal-
ity and is vulnerable to climate change. Thus, the pattern of hunger and 
seasonality in these emerging poverty pockets may differ from that of 
Rangpur and may call for different types of policy interventions. But 
some lessons are still to be drawn from the experience of Rangpur. 
What are those general lessons? The sources of seasonal hunger are 
context specific, so that policies for addressing the problem need to be 
locally relevant, socially acceptable, and economically feasible. Each type 
of environment, being unique in some respect, will have its own priorities 
and will require its own mix of policies. Because of the multidimensional 
nature of the problem, these policies need to be harmonized within the 
general economic, social, and environmental policies of a country. No 
single cure exists for seasonal hunger; a country may need to implement 
an array of specific measures with the help of government agencies, non-
governmental organizations, and international actors.3 Meeting the 
emerging threats of climate change and environmental degradation will 
need even more innovative solutions. Ultimately, the challenge will be 
how to enhance the ability of the rural poor to cope with the increasing 
complexity and uncertainty linked to seasonality by making their liveli-
hoods more flexible, adaptable, and resilient. This book addresses some of 
these questions using data from Bangladesh with the hope that the find-
ings are relevant for policy makers from the governments and interna-
tional agencies that fight poverty and hunger worldwide. 
Notes
 1. Initially, some type of “food or cash for work” employment was also made a 
component of the program, but this component was subsequently dropped as 
the government expanded such employment programs in the region.
 2. These varieties include BRRI-33, BRRI-39, and BINA-7, which are adapted 
to local conditions for the aman season and have been developed to substitute 
for the currently popular BRRI-11.
 3. See further policy discussions in Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler, and Longhurst 
(2012).
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Agricultural diversifi cation has lessened the severity of seasonal hunger in many parts of the 
developing world. Yet in some pockets, seasonal hunger and poverty persist due to regular 
periods of scarcity in the agricultural cycle, when the previous year’s harvest stock has 
declined, food prices are high,wages are low, access to credit is limited, and jobs are few. 
For the four-fi fths of the world’s poor people, living in rural areas and dependent on 
agriculture for their livelihoods, these seasons of scarcity can be times of acute hunger 
and undernutrition. Severe weather, irregular harvests, or crop failure can exacerbate the 
typically adverse periods of seasonal hunger, resulting in disaster and famine. 
Governments across the developing world have adopted various policies to ensure food 
security. Too often, however, these policies do not focus on agricultural seasonality to 
adequately address to the ever-changing complexities of seasonal hunger. Policies aimed 
at reducing general poverty may disregard seasonally poor populations, placing these 
populations at risk of irreversible endemic poverty. 
Seasonal Hunger and Public Policies: Evidence from Northwest Bangladesh draws on the 
example of rural Bangladesh, where life revolves around the rice economy and seasonality 
of income and consumption is a common feature of livelihoods. The focus of analysis is on 
the economically depressed and ecologically vulnerable northwest region, which has a 
history of famine and where the interlocking of seasonality and endemic poverty results 
in severe seasonal hunger. 
Drawing on rich data sets, the authors provide an exhaustive inquiry into the underlying 
causes of seasonal hunger and the eff ectiveness of policies and programs to bolster the food 
security for the most vulnerable people. The authors identify the reasons why traditional 
government policies fail to address the issue adequately, evaluate new initiatives that target 
seasonality, and draw lessons applicable to new pockets of poverty that are emerging 
because of environmental degradation and climate change.
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